Contracting Out Government Procurement Functions: An Analysis by Lamm, David & Yoder, Cory
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Reports and Technical Reports All Technical Reports Collection
2007-09-01
Contracting Out Government








Approved for public release, distribution unlimited. 
 









Contracting Out Government Procurement Functions:  
An Analysis 
18 September 2007 
by 
David V. Lamm, Professor Emeritus, and 
E. Cory Yoder, Lecturer 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 
















The research presented in this report was supported by the Acquisition Chair of the 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
 
 
To request Defense Acquisition Research or to become a research sponsor, 
please contact: 
 
NPS Acquisition Research Program 
Attn: James B. Greene, RADM, USN, (Ret)  
Acquisition Chair 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
555 Dyer Road, Room 332 
Monterey, CA 93943-5103 
Tel: (831) 656-2092 
Fax: (831) 656-2253 
e-mail: jbgreene@nps.edu   
 







do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - i - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Abstract 
This report presents the results of a study investigating the issues 
surrounding contracting out of Government procurement functions to private firms.  
Surveys were completed by and interviews were conducted with contracting and 
program office personnel in the Department of Defense as well as State and local 
government procurement officials.  The primary focus of the research was the 
effectiveness of contracts which have been used to perform contracting functions, 
but also included are several problem areas related to the award and administration 
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This report presents the results of a study investigating the issues 
surrounding contracting out of Government procurement functions to private firms.  
Surveys were completed by and interviews were conducted with contracting and 
program office personnel in the Department of Defense as well as State and local 
government procurement officials.  The primary focus of the research was the 
effectiveness of contracts which have been used to perform contracting functions  
but also included are several problem areas related to the award and administration 
of these contracts.   
B. Findings and Conclusions 
The study concludes that contracts for procurement services are generally 
considered to be very effective, but robust metrics to measure and assess contractor 
performance are lacking; buying organizations are acquiring contracted services due 
to the lack of organic resources; the boundaries of inherently governmental functions 
continue to be fuzzy and have been severely tested; some organizations are not 
procuring contracted services because they believe such services are an inherently 
governmental functions; significant conflict of interest and ethical issues exist; 
personal services relationships are evitable due to the necessary close working 
circumstances between Government contracting employees and contractor 
personnel; contractor employees performing procurement functions should be co-
located with Government contracting personnel; contracted services should be 
acquired on a temporary basis, will have a negative affect on the development of 
Contracting Officers, and could have a positive affect on the ability of organizations 
to consider procurement options; industry’s willingness to participate in the 
competitive marketplace may suffer; contractor personnel performing procurement 
functions for the Government should be held to the same training, experience and 
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wrongdoing that pertain to Government contracting personnel do not apply to 
contractor personnel performing the same functions; a policy statement concerning 
the procurement of contracting functions is needed; and specific measures must be 
taken to protect the integrity of the contracting process.  
C. Recommendations 
The study recommends the following: metrics must be developed and 
robustly utilized to monitor and assess contractor performance of Government 
contracting functions; DOD should issue a policy statement regarding the contracting 
out of procurement functions; safeguards to protect the integrity of the contracting 
process when using contractor support to accomplish contracting functions should 
be strengthened and vigorously enforced; the prohibition on the use of personal 
services should be removed; sanctions and penalties for violation of statutes and 
ethical standards of conduct should be extended to contractor personnel performing 
Government procurement functions; and DOD and the Services/Defense Agencies 
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I. Introduction 
The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development & 
Acquisition (DASN (RDA) (Acquisition Management)), requested the Acquisition 
Chair, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy (GSBPP) at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) analyze the contracting out of procurement functions 
currently being performed by Navy, Marine Corps, and other DOD Activities.  The 
request specifically focused on assessing the degree of effectiveness and 
shortcomings of such contracting out efforts.   
Contracting in the Federal Government has been continually challenged 
throughout the last several decades.  It is a very public process that has undergone 
myriad changes intended to effect improvements. The process of procurement 
reform has proceeded continually in an attempt to make the system more efficient 
while balancing its goals and objectives.  
The key focus of this study is to provide DASN (RDA) (Acq Mgmt) with 
thoughts and ideas as elements of a strategy concerning the nature and extent to 
which the contracting out of procurement functions should occur.  Ultimately, ASN 
(RDA) may find it necessary to issue an integrated policy regarding such actions, or, 
in the alternative, recommend to the Office of the Secretary of Defense that such a 
policy be issued.  Some Navy organizations have proactively endorsed contracting 
for procurement services while others have rejected any such contracts on the basis 
that all contracting functions are inherently governmental.  The reasons for 
contracting out, or not, are varied and require integration into a corporate level Navy 
strategy. 
This research sought to answer the following questions in order to ascertain 
how effective contracting out of the contracting process has been.  First, which 
contracting functions are now being contracted out by Navy and other DOD 
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procurement functions currently being performed under contract.   Second, how 
effectively have contractors performed on these contracts and is there room for 
improvement?  Which of the functions have been performed most successfully and 
which functions should remain with Government personnel?  Third, what metrics are 
being used and could be used to assess the quality of both the Government’s 
management of these contracts and contractors’ quality of performance? 
Although the primary focus of this study is the effectiveness of contracts used 
to procure contracting services, several closely related subjects have been explored.  
In any discussion of contracted procurement services, the issues of inherently 
governmental functions, personal service relationships, organizational conflicts of 
interest, and ethics will almost certainly be included.  Further, questions regarding 
the impact on the contracting system, the development of Contracting Officers, the 
participation of competing companies in the marketplace, training and experience 
qualifications, and agency procurement decision-making and policies will also most 
likely surface. 
Several factors have led to an increased reliance upon the private sector to 
provide services.  One of the most critical factors has been the lack of adequate 
numbers of civil servants to perform the functions required of buying organizations.  
The number of Government employees has been significantly reduced due to 
retirements or transfers to other agencies and, in certain metropolitan areas, the 
number of qualified applicants available to fill vacant positions has fallen to a 
seriously low level.  Another of the principal factors has been to further reduce cost 
of providing services.  With competition and a more efficient process of producing 
services, it is widely believed that significant savings have and will continue to 
accrue.. Another factor has been the ability to obtain certain skills which the 
Government workforce does not possess. This has become more critical as 
agencies have reduced the size of their workforce. Yet another is the ability to obtain 
services on an emergency or surge basis.  DOD has come to rely more and more 
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The reader is encouraged to examine each of the following chapters to gain 
an appreciation for the conclusions and recommendations made by the researchers. 
II. Methodology 
A. Introduction 
This study attempted to gain the understanding of the issues surrounding the 
contracting out of procurement functions.  The researchers felt this could be 
accomplished by: (1) delving into studies, reports and articles on this subject as well 
as related topics; (2) evaluating results produced by survey questionnaires and 
interviews; and (3) talking to selected individuals about specific comments and 
observations they have made about the subject. 
B. Literature Sources 
Several organizations involved in acquisition research were consulted, 
including the following: reports issued by the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO); theses and master’s degree projects from students at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) and the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT); 
student reports from the Naval War College, Army War College, and Air War 
College; reports and studies from the RAND Corp, the Project on Government 
Oversight (POGO), the Defense Science Board, the Contract Management Institute, 
the Professional Services Council and the Logistics Management Institute (LMI); 
papers presented at the NPS Annual Acquisition Research Symposium; and student 
and faculty reports from the Defense Acquisition University and the University of 
Maryland.  Various periodicals were examined including the Defense Acquisition 
Review Journal, Contract Management, Defense AT&L, and the Journal of the 
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C. Survey Questionnaires 
Two survey questionnaires were developed.  The first focused on participants 
at the policy and senior management levels and asked questions about the broader 
issues involved in contracted procurement services.  The second survey focused on 
management  and operating level personnel. Although some of the same questions 
were posed as on the first survey, the second mainly asked questions regarding the 
effectiveness of contracts that are being or had been used to procure contracting 
support services. 
The research was announced and the surveys were initially released during 
the 4th Annual Acquisition Research Symposium at NPS on 16-17 May 2007.  
Following the symposium, surveys were distributed via e-mail to a variety of 
Navy/Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, and Defense agency contracting offices, and 
selected State and local government procurement offices. 
Surveys were completed by a total of one hundred contracting professionals 
and thirty-two program management and technical personnel.  A comparison of 
organizational affiliation of the contracting participants completing surveys is 
presented in Table 2-1.  All thirty-two program management and technical personnel 
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Table 2-1. Contracting Survey Participants by Organization 




Army 16 12 
Navy/Marine Corps 35 26 
Air Force 7 5 
Defense Agencies 38 29 
Non-Federal Agencies 4 3 
Contracting Personnel Total 100 76 
Program Management and Technical Survey Participants 
Air Force 32 24 
Total Survey Participants 132 100 
 
Seventy-six percent of survey respondents are from the contracting 
community, while twenty-four percent are from the program management and 
technical community.  It is understood that some bias has been introduced into this 
study by the large number of program management and technical personnel not only 
from one Service but also from the same location.  To account for some of this bias, 
survey responses from the Air Force group have been separately identified and 
discussed within each issue/topic area. 
In answering questions, some respondents submitted multiple responses, 
although only one response was required.  For example, if a “Yes” or “No” answer 
was needed, the respondent may have checked both.  In such cases, the 
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support of the answer.  If a predominant response could not be discerned, the 
answer was recorded as “NA” for no answer.   
In some instances, survey responses represented a consensus opinion from 
several individuals in an organization.  In more than one case, the senior managers 
of a major acquisition organization provided their collective views.  Thus, the number 
of individuals participating in the survey responses are greater than the number of 
surveys received, but the researchers have no way of knowing the total number of 
persons involved.  Although a collective response was received from some, the 
views expressed on surveys and during interviews are considered to be those of the 
participant and not their organization, their Service or DOD. 
Chapters V and VI present the results of the surveys and interviews.  The 
researchers have tried to remain faithful to the intent and attitude expressed therein,  
however, because many respondents said essentially the same thing, a combination 
of their thoughts and opinions occurred.  It is hoped that the flavor of their opinions 
and views is not lost in the consolidation of responses.  Also, the survey asked if the 
respondent would consent to allowing citation of their responses with attribution in 
the final report.  Although some replied in the negative, the majority of participants 
indicated agreement.  The researchers have decided however, not to identify any 
participant in this study even though several quotations have been used.  Materials 
used, on the other hand, from reports, studies, documents, books, articles and other 
similar sources have been appropriately referenced. 
D. Interviews 
Face-to-face interviews were conducted with nineteen senior contracting 
personnel (over 80 percent of whom are from the Navy Department), many of whom 
also completed a survey.  Phone interviews were conducted with ten personnel. 
Generally, phone interviews were conducted with those who had indicated a 
willingness on their survey responses to clarify or expand upon their answers.  All 
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responses in the results and analysis chapters.  Therefore, during the discussion in 
subsequent sections, respondents or participants will refer to both those who 
returned a survey as well as those who served as interviewees. 
E. Terminology 
Throughout the study, the terms “procurement” and “contracting” are used 
interchangeably.  Also, the terms “function,” “task” and “duty” are used 
interchangeably.  The terms “contracted services,” “contracted support services,” 
and “procurement services” refer to those contracting functions or tasks that are 
typically performed by civil servants and are now, or might be, performed by 
contractor employees.  “Outsourcing” refers to accomplishment by contractors and 
does not include other Federal Agencies. 
F. Government versus Industry 
This research work was undertaken with the intent of exploring and evaluating 
only those actions and efforts initiated by the Government side of the buyer-seller 
relationship.  Although there are a significant number of companies who provide 
contracted support services, as well as industry and professional associations who 
have intimate knowledge and understanding of the process, the present research 
was limited to the issues and problems experienced only by Government personnel. 
Although the research has specifically avoided obtaining input from private 
industry, some of the discussion will certainly bear the views and observations that 
industry holds regarding the issues.  This is particularly true in those cases in which 
respondents’ opinions somewhat reflect how contractors and their employees view 
the situation. 
G. Impediments to this Study 
A few situations arose which dampened the numbers of surveys and 
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One situation existed due to the impression that this study was attempting to 
determine those contracting functions which could be prime targets for contractor 
performance which, in turn, could lead to a reduction in contracting workforce 
personnel.  Some potential participants explained that this had occurred a few years 
ago and it appeared to have resulted in further reductions of the workforce.  
Although the researchers attempted to clarify that this was not the intent, it is 
probable that only a few individuals who held this impression were willing to 
participate.   
A second situation occurred wherein some agency officials were concerned 
about negative responses to their procurement practices. Specifically, some 
agencies are contracting out functions which other agencies may even consider to 
be inherently governmental, and they felt they would be criticized for having placed 
these functions on contract.  Some agencies appear to others to be aggressively 
using contractors to perform a significant number of contracting functions. 
A third situation involved a general feeling that top agency management was 
against placing contracting functions on contract, which made our study a moot 
point.  These potential participants felt the decision had already been made about 
this issue and further discussion was meaningless.   
Lastly, a few organizations simply said they were too busy to participate in the 
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III. Literature Review 
A. Introduction 
A significant degree of research and study has gone into the topic of 
outsourcing and contracting out in the Federal Government.  One of the major 
policies of the Federal Government is to rely on the private sector for goods and 
services.  Over the years, this policy has forced aggressive actions to evaluate what 
the Government performs and which functions accomplished by Government 
personnel could be acquired from commercial sources. 
The idea of contracting out the contracting process is a more recent subject of 
discussion.  Some of the early studies and reports touched on this area by 
addressing the problem of contracting for functions considered to be inherently 
governmental.  Through the decades, functions performed by Federal Government 
contract specialists were automatically classified as inherently governmental and 
were judged “off limits” to any performance by commercial firms.  Over the last few 
years, however, various dynamics have caused Federal Government buying 
organizations to rethink this position.  A significant draw down of the acquisition 
workforce, coupled with an increase in contract actions, has compelled the 
acquisition leadership to seek alternative methods for accomplishing mission-critical 
procurement functions.  One line of thinking has been that, taken in its totality, the 
contracting function is basically an inherently governmental function.  But when this 
perspective is decomposed and analyzed more carefully, some believe that certain 
tasks within the broad framework of the contracting process are not inherently 
governmental and could be accomplished by the private sector.  As buying 
organizations attempt to apply the policies and definitions, this issue is clouded by 
the fact that there is a significant difference of opinion among all involved as to what 
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Recent studies on the subject  were reviewed, the most important of which 
are examined in this chapter.  The literature review consisted of analyzing several 
sources found to have some relevance to this study; including: (1) recent Federal 
Government agency studies; (2) Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports 
and testimony; (3) Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) policies and procedures; (4) reports 
and studies from Congressional commissions and panels; (5) Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB), Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) and other 
Executive Branch documents; (6) student theses and faculty reports from the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS), the Air Force Air War College, the Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU), and other educational institutions; and (7) studies and reports from 
research groups such as RAND, the Logistics Management Institute (LMI) and the 
Contract Management Institute (CMI). 
B. Office of Federal Procurement Policy and Office of 
Management and Budget 
In September 1992, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) issued 
Policy Letter 92-1 (OFPP, 1992), which established Federal Government policy 
relating to service contracting and inherently governmental functions with the 
purpose of assisting Government officials in avoiding an unacceptable transfer of 
official responsibility to Government contractors.  Policy Letter 92-1 defined an 
inherently governmental function as a function that is so intimately related to the 
public interest as to mandate performance by Government employees.  These 
functions include those activities that require either the exercise of discretion in 
applying Government authority or the making of value judgments in reaching 
decisions for the Government.   
OFPP Policy Letter 93-1 (OFPP, 1994) was issued in May 1994, establishing 
policy and providing guiding principles in managing the acquisition and use of 
services.  This Policy Letter was prompted by a review that found uneven service 
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address various common management problems.  The Policy Letter addressed 
issues of conflicts of interest, effective management best practices, inherently 
governmental functions, best value and cost effective acquisition of services, 
competition, and the management and oversight needed during contract 
administration.  Appendix A of the Policy Letter set forth a series of questions 
addressing these issues intended to help agencies analyze and review requirements 
for service contracts. 
In May 2003, OMB Circular A-76 (revised) (OMB, 2003) superseded Policy 
Letter 92-1 and, although it reduced the list of functions involved, it retained basically 
the same definition of “inherently governmental function.”  It clarified the idea of 
substantial discretion and stated that its use is inherently governmental if it commits 
the Government to a course of action when two or more alternative courses of action 
exist which are not already limited by policy, procedures or other guidance and not 
subject to final approval by agency officials at a higher level. 
C. Federal Acquisition Regulation/Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) (2005) addresses the acquisition of 
services and the issue of inherently governmental functions in a few places.  FAR 
2.101 explains that the definition of inherently governmental function is a policy 
determination, not a legal determination, and includes activities that require either 
the exercise of discretion in applying Government authority or the making of value 
judgments in Governmental decisions.  Inherently governmental functions involve, 
among other things, the interpretation and execution of the laws of the U.S. but do 
not normally include gathering information for or providing advice, opinions, 
recommendations or ideas to Government officials or functions that are primarily 
ministerial and internal in nature. FAR 7.5 applies to all contracts for services and 
specifically prohibits the use of contracts for the performance of inherently 
governmental functions.  It provides a non-inclusive list of examples of functions 
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generally not considered inherently governmental but which may approach that 
category due to their nature.  FAR 37.2 speaks to advisory and assistance services 
(A&AS) and states that the acquisition of these services is a legitimate way to 
improve Government services and operations and, therefore, may be used at all 
organizational levels to help managers achieve maximum effectiveness or economy 
in their operations.   
The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) (2005) 
addresses inherently governmental functions in DFARS 207.5 and service 
contracting in DFARS 237.  The former states that an agency may enter into 
contract performance of acquisition functions closely associated with inherently 
governmental functions only after the Contracting Officer has determined that 
military or civilian DOD personnel: (1) cannot reasonably be made available to 
perform the functions, (2) will oversee contractor performance, and (3) will perform 
all inherently governmental functions associated with contract performance.  The 
latter does not specifically address contracts for procurement services but does 
mention some issues related to personal services contracts and limitations on the 
procurement of audit services. 
Both the FAR and DFARS language cited above will be explored more 
completely in Chapter IV. 
D. Government Accountability Office 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) (formerly known as the General 
Accounting Office) has issued several reports over the years concerning 
outsourcing, contracting out, and the acquisition of services. 
GAO (1981) published a report which discussed “contractors’ excessive 
involvement in executive branch agencies’ basic management functions.”  The 
review was conducted “because we were concerned about agencies using 
contractors to do work that should be done by Federal employees.  GAO believes 
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control the direction of Government programs. (p.i)”  The report went on to describe 
the rapid growth in the contract workforce, the difficulty of distinguishing between 
advice from a contractor and the performance of a Government function, and that 
many Government employees were performing commercial services that could be 
contracted out, thus lessening contractor involvement in management functions.  
One of GAO’s recommendations was that OMB should issue guidelines that will 
better distinguish between contractors’ advice on Government functions and their 
performance of such functions.  Ten years later, GAO (1991) issued a report 
regarding the potential performance of inherently governmental functions by 
contractors.  It found that the concept of “governmental functions” is difficult to 
define; some service contactors appeared to be administering governmental 
functions; some Federal agencies may be using service contractors rather than 
Government employees due to a lack of authorized Federal positions or a lack of 
Federal employees with sufficient expertise to perform the work; and, in some 
instances, agencies appear to have relinquished Government control to contractors.  
GAO recommended that OMB, among other things, clarify its guidance on 
contracting for consulting services, compile a short, generic list of Government-wide 
functions that, as a mater of policy, should never be contracted out, and require 
agencies to issue implement instructions unique to their circumstances. 
By and large, GAO has been very critical of DOD’s acquisition of services.  In 
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness and 
Management Support, (GAO, 2007) it criticized DOD’s lack of skills and 
competencies to manage the rapidly growing volume of service acquisitions by 
stating: 
As service acquisition spending has grown, the size of the civilian 
workforce has decreased.  More significantly, DOD carried out this 
downsizing without ensuring that it had the specific skills and 
competencies needed to accomplish DOD’s mission.  For example, 
the amount, nature, and complexity of contracting for services have 
increased, which has challenged DOD’s ability to maintain a 
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industry trends, the ability to prepare clear statements of work, the 
technical details about the services they procure, and the capacity to 
manage and oversee contractors.  I addition, new skills have been 
required to use alternative contracting approaches introduced by 
acquisition reform initiatives. (p. 3) 
In recent testimony before Congress concerning services acquisition, GAO 
(GAO, 2007,b) summed up its findings by stating that: 
The lack of sound business practices-poorly defined requirements, 
inadequate competition, the lack of comprehensive guidance and 
visibility on contractors supporting deployed forces, inadequate 
monitoring of contractor performance and inappropriate use of other 
agencies’ contracts and contracting services-expose DOD to 
unnecessary risk, waste resources, and complicate efforts to hold 
contractors accountable for poor service acquisition outcomes. 
Overall, DOD’s management structure and processes overseeing 
service acquisitions lacked key elements at the strategic and 
transactional levels. 
At this point, DOD does not know how well its services acquisition 
processes are working, which parts of its mission can best be met 
through buying services, and whether it is obtaining the services it 
needs while protecting DOD’s and the taxpayer’s interests. (p. i) 
In recent testimony (GAO, 2007c) before the Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs regarding the use of contractors to replace 
civilian or military personnel, the Comptroller General cautioned that: 
The proper role of contractors in providing services to the 
Government is currently the topic of much debate.  In general, I 
believe there is a need to focus greater attention on what type of 
functions and activities should be contracted out and which ones 
should not, to review and reconsider the current independence and 
conflict-of-interest rules relating to contractors, and to identify the 
factors that prompt the Government to use contractors in 
circumstances where the proper choice might be the use of civil 
servants or military personnel.  Possible factors could include 
inadequate force structure, outdated or inadequate hiring policies, 
classification and compensation approaches, and inadequate 
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In examining the effects of contracted support services, GAO provided an 
example of what can happen in a career field when Government personnel are 
reduced and the work is taken over by contractors (GAO, 2007d). In the critical area 
of cost estimating, some Government officials believed that acquisition reform cost 
savings could be realized by reducing technical staff, including cost estimators, due 
to the initiative of greater reliance on commercial-based solutions.  The Services, 
particularly the Air Force, saw significant reductions in the number of their best and 
brightest cost-estimators.  Cost estimating organizations are now more dependent 
on support contractors who generally prepare cost-estimates while Government 
personnel provide oversight, guidance and review of the cost estimating work.  This 
reliance on support contractors has raised questions from the cost estimating 
community about the sufficiency of numbers and qualifications of Government 
personnel to provide oversight of and insight into contractor cost estimates.  
E. Acquisition Advisory Panel 
In a very thorough Report of the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of 
Federal Procurement Policy (AAP, 2007), the Panel examined the issues of 
inherently governmental functions, personal services contracts, and organizational 
and personal conflicts of interest in its chapter on the appropriate role of contractors 
supporting the Government. The Panel cited an increased reliance on private sector 
contractors for goods and services due to a variety of reasons including the need “to 
acquire hard to find skills, to save money, to have the private sector do work that is 
not inherently governmental, to augment capacity on an emergency basis, and to 
reduce the size of government.” 
The Panel’s findings centered on: (1) the several developments that have led 
Federal agencies to increase the use of contractors as service providers; (2) the 
existence of a multisector workforce with co-located Federal employees and 
contractor employees that has blurred the lines between governmental and 
commercial functions, as well as personal and non-personal services; (3) an 
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application of the term “Inherently Governmental”; (5) a very wide degree of 
difference in the use of contractors within and across agencies; (6) an increased 
potential for organizational conflicts of interest; (7) a need to assure that increased 
contractor involvement does not undermine the integrity of the Government’s 
decision-making processes; (8) the unnecessary need for additional laws or 
regulations controlling Government employee conduct, notwithstanding highly 
publicized violations that were, in fact, adequately dealt with through existing 
remedies; (9) the fact that most statutory and regulatory provisions applying to 
Federal employees do not apply to contractor employees; (10) the potential that a 
blanket application of the Government’s ethics provisions to contractor personnel 
would create issues related to cost, enforcement, and management; and (11) the 
current prohibition on personal services contracts, has forced agencies to create 
unwieldy procedural safeguards and guidelines to avoid such contracts. 
The Panel recommended the following: (1) OFPP should update the 
principles for agencies to apply in determining functions that must be performed by 
Government employees; (2) agencies must ensure that functions which must be 
performed by Government employees are adequately staffed; (3) the current 
prohibition on personal services contracts should be removed; (4) OFPP should 
provide specific policy guidance related to procurement of personal services; (5) the 
FAR Council should consider developing standard OCI and ethics clauses which set 
forth contractor responsibilities; (6) the FAR Council should provide additional 
regulatory guidance for the protection of contractor confidential and proprietary data; 
(7) the FAR Council, DAU [Defense Acquisition University] and FAI [Federal 
Acquisition Institute] should jointly develop and provide OCI and ethics training, as 
well as tools for the protection of confidential data; (8) No agencies should consider 
mandatory ethics training for all service contractors operating in a multisector 
workforce environment; and (9) agencies should ensure that existing remedies, 
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F. Defense Acquisition University 
A well-written DAU report (2005) concluded that: (1) it is reasonable to 
contract out non-inherently governmental functions or tasks when an increased 
workload suddenly appears, when a requirement for extra workload is only 
temporary, or when special expertise is required; (2) DOD agencies and other 
Federal agencies seem to be contracting out procurement functions more widely 
than the Services, but contracting out similar functions; (3) for most organizations, 
mission accomplishment drives the use of contractor support; (4) growth of future 
Contracting Officers should not be a problem if contracted out procurement support 
is kept at a reasonable level; (5) no laws are violated as long as inherently 
governmental functions are not contracted out, unauthorized personal services are 
avoided, core procurement capability is retained, and consistency with the FAIR Act 
[Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act] submissions are maintained; (6) many 
organizations’ missions would be severely impacted if they were suddenly unable to 
contract out; and (7) understaffed conditions tend to weaken the argument against 
contracting out procurement functions. 
The report recommended that, instead of a restrictive list of do’s  and don’ts 
each DOD activity be limited to no more than twenty-five percent of their workforce 
that may be contracted out.  The report stated that this would provide flexibility for 
each activity to react to surge workload situations, would result in management 
assignment of lower priority and less sensitive tasks to contractors, and help 
address the concern over growing future Contracting Officers. 
G. U.S. Air Force 
An Air Force Material Command (AFMC) study found that laws and 
regulations allow DoD wide latitude to outsource, but controls and approvals would 
be required if other than general administrative tasks not requiring contracting 
knowledge or contracting series personnel were outsourced.  Further, the study 
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advisory and assistance services support had potential for outsourcing with controls 
and special approvals on a case-by-case basis, and contracting functions are 
inherently governmental functions and were not recommended for outsourcing. 
An Air War College (AWC) paper by LtCol John Cannaday (2004) proposed 
that the Air Force develop a Contracted Procurement Services (CPS) strategy that 
would define limits, at a corporate level, on the use of contractors in performing 
procurement functions.  He recommended the Air Force: (1) more thoroughly 
uncover the potential for using contractors on a cyclical basis to process purchase 
orders and delivery orders in the last quarter of each year, (2) ask DAU to provide 
early training on the determination of activities performed by Government personnel 
as inherently governmental or commercial, (3) ensure that contracted procurement 
services (CPS) contracts do not contradict  DOD inventory of “exempt from 
competition” or “inherently governmental” functions, (4) establish policy regarding 
the conditions for use of CPS, and (5) assess the root cause of CPS thus far in the 
Air Force. 
H. Defense Logistics Agency 
A Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) study evaluated the numbers of 
Government and contractor full-time equivalents (FTEs) at two Defense Supply 
Centers. Procurement contractor support was classified as either pre-award (29%) 
and post-award (54%).  The study examined workload changes and potential 
workload transfer.  The study concluded that contractor FTEs cost more and that 
DLA had too many contractor FTEs compared to Government FTEs. 
I. Naval Postgraduate School 
Over the years, several theses and Master of Business Administration (MBA) 
projects at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) have addressed procurement and 
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In his thesis entitled A Taxonomical Structure for Classifying the Services 
Procured by the Federal Government, Scott Allen (1991) developed a taxonomical 
scheme that practitioners may employ in classifying services procured by the 
Federal Government along a continuum from procurements that are strategically 
complex. A secondary research objective was to determine what characteristics are 
appropriate for classifying services on a strategic basis. A literature review, expert 
interviews, and survey using twenty heterogeneous sample services were conducted 
to determine the relationship between characteristics and services. Cluster analysis 
was used to group services into categories with similar compositions of selected 
characteristics. A taxonomical structure was developed for classifying services into 
five categories. Potential benefits may arise via application to staffing and directing 
of procurement functions and refinement of procurement policy.   
In an Acquisition Research Sponsored Report and MBA project entitled 
Department of the Navy Procurement Metrics Evaluation, and published as 
Acquisition Research Sponsored Report Series NPS-PM-05-17, Christopher G. 
Brianas (2005) investigated and provided a comprehensive evaluation of current 
Department of the Navy Procurement Metrics.  The purpose of the project was to 
determine if the current metrics are the appropriate procurement performance 
measures.  This work capitalized on the analytical framework provided by Robert 
Simon’s Levers of Control model, including metric objectiveness, completeness and 
responsiveness.  The main parameters of the metric alignment were the customer, 
people (within the organization), process, financial, and value.  The specific work of 
Brianas and his advisors related primarily to an overarching strategy within the 
Department of the Navy, and not specifically to individual operating units.  Brianas 
concludes that the overarching metrics align with the Navy strategy, however, the 
level of objectivity and completeness of the metrics varied.  Additionally, Brianas 
observed there was a high degree of variation and subjectivity in the metrics, and in 
many cases, the value of the metrics currently in use, and as observed in the study, 
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recommended that a working group be established to review all the metrics and 
revise them to ensure they provide true value to the agency. 
In his thesis entitled Development of a Procurement Task Classification 
Scheme, Clark Fowler (1987) utilized a classification structure to categorize 
procurement tasks performed by the contracting professional.  His work classified 
tasks into one of the following five groups: (1) searching for and receiving 
information; (2) identifying objects, actions, and events; (3) information processing; 
(4) problem solving and decision making; and (5) communicating.  He found that 
over thirty-eight percent of the time was involved in problem solving and decision 
making. The next closest activity was communicating which occurred twenty-seven 
percent of the time. 
In her thesis entitled An Examination of Acquisition Ethical Dilemmas: Case 
Studies for Ethics Training, Joycelin Higgs (1995) identified common ethical 
dilemmas faced by DOD acquisition employees, the decision-making skills and 
ethical values used to reach resolution and the consequences of the decisions 
made.  She concluded that most of the ethical dilemmas faced by acquisition 
personnel come from their role as a liaison between their customers and contractors, 
an improper influence of contractors over their customers, the potential appearance 
of conflict of interest rather than actual conflicts, and the desire to conduct business 
fairly while acting in their role as protector of the taxpayer’s interests. 
In his thesis entitled The 12-phase Acquisition Process: A Comparison of 
Theory vs Practice, Chris Lehner (2001) utilized a 12-phase model which shares 
commonalities with Stanley N. Sherman’s Generic Procurement Model and OMB 
Circular A-76’s Major Systems Acquisition Cycle.  One of the differences in the 12-
phase model from other similar models is that it provides distinct phases required to 
procure equipment and hardware, primarily from a contracting officer/specialist’s 
perspective.  Lehner used the existing 12-phase model and framework to examine 
specific acquisitions at the 1st Special Forces Group to determine whether there 
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controls by program offices and requirement generators, and particularly in the 
preliminary missions needs assessment, would greatly improve the entire 
procurement process.  Although Lehner’s thesis did not specifically address metrics 
associated with the 12-phases, the ability to identify and utilize a consistent process 
framework proves valuable in defining process points and potential areas for further 
study related to metrics. 
Contractor past performance information was examined extensively by Roger 
D. Lord (2005) in an Acquisition Research Sponsored Report entitled, Contractor 
Past Performance Information (PPI) in Source Selection: A Comparison Study of 
Public and Private Sector.  Lord examined the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
section which mandates the use of contractor past performance information as an 
evaluation factor in all source selections involving negotiated procurements above 
$1,000,000, and examined the capabilities of the Federal Government to effect 
decision-making with data collected as they relate to source selection.  Using PPI as 
a factor in all source selections is modeled after industry best practices.   Lord 
explored the current PPI collection and evaluation process used by DOD and by 
those employed in industry.  The goal behind the research was to determine best 
practices and improve  DOD’s use of PPI as a tool in the acquisition process.  This 
work is relevant to the contracting out procurement function analysis in that PPI is 
one of the mandatory metric tools utilized to measure and record contractor 
performance data under prescribed conditions.   
Mary A. Malina and Frank H. Selto published Choice and Change in 
Measures in Performance Measurement Models in an Excerpt from the Proceedings 
of the Second Annual Acquisition Symposium (Malina & Selto, 2005).  This paper 
uses management control, resource-based, systems-based, and contingency-based 
strategy theories to describe a large U.S. manufacturing company’s efforts to 
improve profitability by designing and using a performance-measurement model 
(PMM). Malina and Selto defined key performance measure attributes essential for 
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should be objective and accurate, (3) measures must be informative, (4) benefits of 
measurements should outweigh costs of collection, (5) measures can have greater 
benefit if they reflect causality, (6) measures can communicate strategy, (7) 
measures create incentive for behaviors, and (8) measures improve decision-
making.  Although their work was designed to examine corporate profitability 
parameters, elements of this work may benefit any researcher and practitioner 
interested in determining efficiencies and effectiveness of organizations and 
processes, including contracting functions.   
In a slide presentation (Naegle, 2007) entitled Software Measurement and 
Metrics developed for the Software Acquisition and Management class at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Senior Lecturer Brad Naegle emphasized the importance of 
measuring software development.  He states that, “Software development, perhaps 
more than any other component, requires effective measurement techniques.”  His 
presentation highlighted the critical role of metrics in design, development and 
management.  Naegle placed metrics in three categories or types: management, 
process, and quality.  He concluded the presentation with sound ground rules for 
use of metrics.   
In his thesis entitled A Taxonomic Approach to Contracting Officer Tasking, 
Asa Page (1989) sought to develop an appropriate behavioral classification scheme 
which will accurately describe in relevant terms contracting officer taskings.  He 
utilized an existing taxonomy to categorize tasks required of Contracting Officers in 
the FAR as being either mandatory (using such words as “will”, “must” or “shall”) or 
discretionary (using such words as “may” or “should”) and either explicitly or 
implicitly set forth.  He concluded, among other things, that a significant number of 
procurement tasks in the FAR are implicit in nature, thus requiring the contracting 
officer to exercise, to a large degree, decision-making and judgmental skills. 
In his thesis entitled An Analysis of the Feasibility of Outsourcing Contract 
Administration Functions Within the Defense Contract Management Command, 
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administration functions performed by Government civil servants as an efficient and 
effective option for meeting mission requirements in the face of resource constraints.  
He concluded, among other things, that outsourcing does not always result in 
savings; thirty of the eighty contract administration tasks performed by DCMC are 
inherently governmental, while the remaining fifty were not and could be outsourced; 
other Federal agencies have successfully outsourced their contract administration 
functions; and there are a sufficient number of firms able and willing to perform 
contract administration functions.  Although many of the tasks identified by Porter 
were not contracting functions, several of those described as inherently 
governmental were Contracting Officer tasks. 
In her thesis entitled Outsourcing Market Research in DOD Commodity 
Acquisition: The Issues, Concerns, and Private Industry Capabilities, Michelle 
Skubic (2001) assessed market research in Department of Defense commodity 
acquisitions.   She examined the feasibility of outsourcing market research functions 
in the commodity acquisition arena, focusing on which elements of market research 
would be most practicable to outsource and what capacity exists in private industry 
to provide market research services for the Federal acquisition environment.   
Skubic concluded that because of current circumstances (reductions in acquisition 
workforce, budgetary constraints, and acquisition reforms emphasizing effective 
market research for commercial items), market research enhances and optimizes 
the use of available resources.  Further, she concluded that while there are issues 
and concerns to be addressed when considering outsourcing market research, 
private industry does offer a viable alternative for conducting market research 
functions in DOD commodity acquisitions.   
J. Logistics Management Institute 
In a report (Macfarlan, 2003) entitled The Role of the Business Manager or 
Advisor in Federal Acquisition, the Logistics Management Institute (LMI) conducted 
an independent research project regarding the environment in which contracting and 
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and competencies needed to meet the emerging acquisition management needs, 
and performance metrics for contract managers.  The information gathered during 
the research was used as the basis for developing a case study intended to assist 
organizations examine, build, and institutionalize practical business management 
skills and competencies for those in the contracting career field. 
K. Contract Management Institute 
In a study  (CMI, 1999) entitled Survey of Contracting and Purchasing 
Professionals: Emerging Demands on a Changing Profession, the Contract 
Management Institute (CMI) reported on a survey performed by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers that focused on professional activities that define the 
contract management profession, the skills and competencies that contract 
managers must possess to excel in their field, and standards (or benchmarks) that 
form the basis for measuring performance in contract management. 
The study presented core activities most frequently recognized by contracting 
personnel at the transactional level.  Eight core activities considered to be basic 
process components were identified.  These core activities are: (1) proposed 
evaluation and source selection, (2) structuring the business arrangement; (3) 
preparing solicitation documents, (4) conducting negotiations; (5) conducting 
price/cost analysis, (6) developing requirements statements, (7) executing contracts, 
and (8) planning the acquisition.  It can be argued that experience with each of these 
core activities is essential to developing the mechanical skills and abilities eventually 
needed by competent Contracting Officers.   
This study also asked respondents to select strategic components from a list 
of elements of the contracting process.  Most frequently cited were: (1) pursuit of 
innovative contracting or business approaches, (2) decision-making, (3) building 
strategic relationships internally and externally, (4) acquisition reform and continuous 
improvement, (5) training and continuing education, (6) strategic planning and 
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collaborative acquisition planning.  Many of these strategic components require 
more advanced understanding of the challenging elements of the contracting 
process.  They require business management acumen not easily acquired without 
intense involvement in the day-to-day activities of contracting. 
In another study entitled Performance Metrics for the Contract Management 
Discipline, CMI (2001) reported on a Stratecon analysis which focused on 
performance metrics and evaluation systems by which organizations measure the 
work of contracting professionals, performance standards that might be appropriate 
for future use, and the types of performance metrics that motivate or enhance 
productive performance.  The study found that metrics suggested for future use in 
the contracting profession were: (1) business judgment, (2) decision-making, (3) 
problem-solving ability, (4) negotiation skills, (5) customer service (external), (6) 
integrity/ethical standards, (7) education, (8) human/interpersonal relations, (9) 
responsiveness, and (10) communications. 
L. Professional Associations 
1. National Association of State Procurement Officials 
The National Association of State Procurement Officials (NASPO) adopted a 
resolution (2005) opposing privatization or outsourcing of public procurement.  The 
resolution affirmed, in part, that state procurement: (1) is an inherently governmental 
function; (2) has a strategic role in every function of government;(3) requires 
specialized skills, knowledge and ability; (4) requires a transparent process with 
clearly stated rules to ensure equity and fairness in awarding contracts and instill 
public confidence; (5) protects public funds from conflicts of interest, anti-trust 
violations, fraud and abuse; (6) ensures that contracting decisions serve the best 
interests of the government and its citizens; and (7) mandates that officials maintain 
public trust and confidence and be accountable to the public.  It resolved that: (1) 
any effort to outsource or privatize state procurement is opposed by NASPO; (2) 
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and (3) outsourcing state procurement presents an opportunity for significant waste, 
fraud and abuse. 
2. National Institute of Governmental Purchasing 
The National Institute of Governmental Purchasing (NIGP) issued a resolution 
(2005) opposing the proposed privatization of the procurement and contracting 
function in the state government of Alaska.  In response to legislation introduced into 
the Alaska Legislature, the resolution mirrored many of the NASPO statements cited 
above and also affirmed that: (1) the unique benefits of the public procurement 
function include the promotion of a transparent system that ensures the fair and 
equitable treatment of all persons, that provides unfettered access to public dollars 
by all qualified suppliers, that leverages public spending to enhance socio-economic 
principles, and that assures integrity through ethical behavior; (2) the public 
procurement and contracting function is a public trust; as such, the State of Alaska 
has previously adopted the Model Procurement Code for State and Local 
Governments to ensure that trust; (3) the complex and dynamic environment of the 
public procurement function requires personnel with relevant, professional 
experience, continuity, and institutional knowledge; and (4) it is essential that those 
individuals who manage the public procurement and contracting function be fully 
committed to serving the public trust and fully accountable to the public rather than 









Outsourcing has been a delicate and controversial issue for several years. It 
involves a variety of stakeholders, each of whom has emotional attachments to an 
organization, a professional community, an ideological viewpoint, or a deep seated 
feeling.  Over time, outsourcing has been studied from numerous perspectives by 
research institutes, investigative bodies, operational organizations, and policy 
personnel.  It will continue to engage our collective psyche for years to come.   
Conventional wisdom suggests that attempting to outsource a commercial 
function performed by Federal Government personnel, be they military or civilian, 
forces the element of competition into its performance (regardless of who ultimately 
carries out the function), thus improving quality and/or lowering cost.  With 
competition comes an impetus to find ways to reduce the labor hours required, to 
shorten turnaround time, to use fewer personnel, and to manage more efficiently.  
These are just some of the actions organizations take, be they in private industry or 
governmental, when competition is present.  Although businesses must be profitable 
to survive while Government organizations can exist while being highly inefficient, 
competition forces both types of organizations to examine their functions and costs 
in order to become more economical. 
Outsourcing of commercial activities introduces an element of competition 
into the mix.  Some outsourced functions come very close to being considered 
“inherently governmental.” 
Several measures, in both dollars and numbers of contract actions, have 
recently shown that the Navy contracting workload is steadily increasing while 
personnel to perform contracting functions have decreased.  There has also been a 
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Excessive backlogs are being created that have significantly delayed the 
procurement process. 
Concern has also arisen over the last several years regarding the skill sets 
held by the Navy contracting workforce.  Significant time and expense have been 
invested in training and educating the workforce to bring skills to the level required of 
21st century contracting challenges.  Much remains to be accomplished in the 
initiative to improve workforce knowledge, skills and abilities. 
In order to relieve the pressures of too few personnel and a lack of 
contracting skills in certain areas, some organizations have begun to contract out 
selected contracting functions associated with the acquisition process.  For various 
reasons, some organizations have done nothing to contract out procurement 
functions.  Other organizations have actively promoted contracting out efforts and 
see this as an integral part of their corporate strategy. 
Some contracts for contracting or procurement services have been successful 
and have contributed to meeting organizations’ mission needs.  Other efforts have 
been less than successful and demand closer investigation into what factors 
contributed to this outcome.  Reliable metrics that easily and accurately assess the 
progress contractors make in performing procurement services are an important part 
of monitoring these contracts. 
B. Statutory and Regulatory Issues 
1. Inherently Governmental Functions 
It is well known that Federal employees have performed a variety of functions 
that provide myriad items and services required by the Government.  In the 1950s, 
the Administration adopted a policy that agencies would rely on the private sector, to 
the maximum extent practical, to obtain needed goods and services.  This policy 
became more formalized when the Bureau of the Budget (later reorganized to 
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stated that “the federal government will not start or carry on any commercial activity 
to provide a service or product for its own use, if such product or service can be 
procured from private enterprise through ordinary channels” (p. 1).  By this time, 
many of DOD’s weapons arsenals had been closed or transferred to private 
management following the height of production in World War II, save for selected 
Navy shipyards.  Most of the arsenals not closed or transferred were generally used 
for maintenance and repair operations.  This resulted, in essence, in the 
performance of services by Federal employees with very little production of goods 
accomplished in-house.  When OMB Circular A-76, “Performance of Commercial 
Activities,” was issued in 1967, it principally identified services as the commercial 
activities upon which its policies were focused.  In clarifying commercial activities, A-
76 recognized that certain “functions are inherently Governmental in nature, being 
so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance only by 
Federal employees.” (p.A-2)  
In order to afford more helpful guidance as to what were inherently 
governmental functions (IGFs), OFPP issued Policy Letter 92-1 (later superseded by 
the 29 May 2003 revision of OMB Circular A-76).  The Policy Letter cautioned that 
agencies “have occasionally relied on contractors to perform certain functions in 
such a way as to raise questions about whether Government policy is being created 
by private persons. (p.3)”   It expanded on IGFs by stating:  
These functions include those activities that require either the exercise of 
discretion in applying Government authority or in the making of value 
judgments in making decisions for the Government.  Governmental functions 
normally fall into two categories: (1) the act of governing, i.e., the 
discretionary exercise of Government authority, and (2) monetary 
transactions and entitlements. An inherently governmental function involves, 
among other things, the interpretation of the laws of the United States. (p. 1) 
The Policy Letter listed examples of specific functions that are inherently 
governmental as well as those which generally are not, but require “closer scrutiny” 
together with examples and explanations.  Appendix A of the Policy Letter provided 
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Germane to acquisition is the section on Federal procurement activities regarding 
prime contracts which cites the following as inherently governmental: (1) determining 
what supplies or services are to be acquired; (2) participating as a voting member on 
any source selection boards; (3) approval of any contractual documents to include 
documents defining requirements, incentive plans, and evaluation criteria; (4) 
awarding contracts; (5) administering contracts; (6) terminating contracts; and (7) 
determining whether contract costs are reasonable, allocable, and allowable.   
Appendix B of the Policy Letter listed services and actions that, although not 
considered inherently governmental, may approach that categorization due to the 
manner in which a contractor performs a contract or the manner in which the 
Government administers contractor performance.  It advised vigilance concerning 
the terms of the contract, contractor performance and contract administration to 
ensure preservation of agency control.  The explanatory list of such functions 
included services that: (1) relate to the evaluation of another contractor’s 
performance; (2) support acquisition planning; (3) provide assistance in contract 
management, such as where a contractor might influence official evaluations of 
other contractors; (4) provide technical evaluation of contract proposals, (5) provide 
assistance in developing statements of work; (6) require participation as technical 
advisors to a source selection board or participation as voting or nonvoting members 
of a source evaluation board; (7) have a contractor serving as an arbitrator or other 
method of dispute resolution; and (8) provide legal advice and interpretations of 
regulations and statutes to Government officials. 
The FAR also speaks to the issue of IGF.  The term is defined in FAR Section 
2.101, and a prohibition against contracting for IGFs is contained in FAR Sections 
7.503 (a) and 37.102 (c).  FAR Subpart 7.5 applies the OFPP Policy Letter and A-76 
policies.  It also states that “Agency decisions which determine whether a function is 
or is not an inherently governmental function may be reviewed and modified by 
appropriate Office of Management and Budget officials.”  Specifically, FAR 7.505 
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The following is a list of examples of functions considered to be 
inherently governmental functions or which shall be treated as such. 
This list is not all inclusive: 
In Federal procurement activities with respect to prime contracts — 
(i) Determining what supplies or services are to be acquired by the 
Government (although an agency may give contractors authority to 
acquire supplies at prices within specified ranges and subject to 
other reasonable conditions deemed appropriate by the agency); 
(ii) Participating as a voting member on any source selection 
boards; 
(iii) Approving any contractual documents, to include documents 
defining requirements, incentive plans, and evaluation criteria; 
(iv) Awarding contracts; 
(v) Administering contracts (including ordering changes in contract 
performance or contract quantities, taking action based on 
evaluations of contractor performance, and accepting or rejecting 
contractor products or services); 
(vi) Terminating contracts; 
(vii) Determining whether contract costs are reasonable, allocable, 
and allowable; and 
(viii) Participating as a voting member on performance evaluation 
boards. 
Although policy and regulations have attempted to more clearly define IGF, 
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governmental functions caused by the discretionary ability of agencies to decide its 
boundaries will continue to plague the acquisition process for the foreseeable future. 
2. Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act 
In 1998, Congress passed the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act (FAIR 
Act) intended to provide a process for classifying Federal Government functions.  
Using the same definition of IGF as the OFPP Policy Letter, the Act requires 
executive agencies to develop annual inventories identifying commercial activities 
performed by Federal employees.  OFPP believes that by annually reviewing and 
revising workforce inventories, agencies are better able to understand the functions 
their workforce is performing.  Functions identified as inherently governmental or 
commercial, but not suitable for competition, may undergo reengineering efforts or 
management reviews.  Functions deemed suitable for competition may be examined 
as potential candidates for competitive sourcing. 
3. Conflict of Interest 
FAR 9.5 addresses organizational conflicts of interest.  It suggests that good 
judgment, common sense and sound discretion is required in the decision whether a 
significant potential for conflict of interest exists and, if so, the proper means for 
resolving it.  Two underlying principles are identified.  First, prevention of conflicting 
roles that could bias a contractor’s judgment and, second, precluding a contractor’s 
unfair competitive advantage, such as through the use of proprietary information 
from Government sources or source selection information not available to all 
competitors. 
Several conflict of interest issues have arisen with the increase in service 
contracting.  A particularly important organizational conflict of interest (OCI) concern 
occurs when contractors are involved in assisting the Government in developing 
requirements which are then open to market competition.  Those contractors, or 
affiliates of these firms, might then be potential participants in the competitive 
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have access to confidential or proprietary data, they may have an unfair advantage 
in future competitions. 
4. Personal Services 
In order for an organization to accomplish its work, it can either hire 
employees or contract with other organizations.  The process involved in deciding 
whether to perform the work in-house or out-of-house is frequently referred to as the 
make vs buy decision.  Both industry and government continually face this decision 
process.  It may be driven by economics, competencies, productivity, or policy. 
In the Federal Government, it is important to recognize the distinction 
between the buyer-seller relationship and the employer-employee relationship 
(sometimes referred to as the master-servant relationship).  The former relates to 
the contractual relationship established by a legally binding contract under which the 
Government contracts for work to be performed.  The two parties to the relationship 
have privity of contract with each other, and each retains loyalty and commitment to 
their own organization.  Each party should avoid any conflicts of interest that would 
impair the association.  The relationship should be characterized by trust, 
cooperation, continuous communications and a professional respect for each other.  
Some use the analogy of a “partnership” where both parties are in the endeavor 
together and must look out for the other’s best interests.  Adversarial aspects in the 
affiliation are to be avoided.  In this case, the relationship created with those who will 
perform the work effort is nonpersonal. 
The latter relationship refers to the situation in which the Government hires 
(appoints) individuals to perform the work involved.  As employer, the Government 
supervises, directs and controls the effort of the employees including promotion, 
discipline, and dismissal.  In the role of employer, the Government must conform to 
civil service rules which set parameters in the employment of individuals.  The 
relationship created with those who will perform the work is personal.  Generally, if 
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accordance with the civil service statutes and procedures, it is a violation of Federal 
law.   
The issue of personal versus non-personal services becomes most important 
when the Government establishes a contractual relationship with a private firm for 
the performance of services but, in fact, directs the contractor personnel in such a 
manner as to create an employer-employee relationship.  Herein occurs the violation 
of Federal law. 
5. Ethics 
Ethical conduct is absolutely essential to any organization.  It is part of the 
public character of an entity and demonstrates to others the extent to which 
principled behavior is part of its moral fabric.  DOD has stated that ethics is a critical 
part of its core values and, to protect the health of the acquisition process, must be 
continually emphasized in everyday decision-making at all levels. In some cases, 
unethical behavior may also be illegal.  In Federal Government acquisition, flagrant 
violations of ethical boundaries have frequently resulted in statutes that outlaw such 
behavior.  To assist members of the acquisition workforce in understanding their 
responsibilities and obligations as public servants, standards of conduct have been 
developed and widely publicized.  One of the principal tenets of ethical behavior is 
not only the avoidance of compromising situations but also the appearance or 
perception of such relationships or actions. 
One aspect of Federal procurement is the fact that contracting officials, in 
creating and maintaining the buyer-seller relationship, are the central interface 
between Government and industry.  As such, these officials step into the commercial 
marketplace and perform their tasks under the light of market rules and norms, some 
of which may be in conflict with Government policies and standards.  One facet of 
the marketplace is the intense competitive pressure created by rapidly changing 
technology and the need to be “first to market” with the latest product or service.  
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have served to increase the forcefulness of this pressure.  To counter this 
phenomenon, some firms have resorted to less-than appropriate trading practices.  
Such a business model can only serve to undermine the integrity of the marketplace.  
Government procurement officials must be vigilant in monitoring the marketplace 
and, when necessary, take swift and decisive action to counter any adverse effects 
that may result from firms engaging in unacceptable business practices. 
With the above-mentioned pressures in mind, one of the major concerns in 
Federal contracting is the potential for use of improper business practices by both 
Government and industry.  In Government, some of these practices are addressed 
by standards of conduct, such as gratuities, while others are covered by long-
standing laws, such as public officials benefiting from their position or prime 
contractors receiving subcontractor kickbacks.  In the mid-1980s, a major breach of 
public trust involved allowing competitors access to proprietary source selection and 
contracting information by current and former Government employees.  This abuse 
led to Congressional enactment of the Procurement Integrity Act, which imposed 
safeguards and sanctions on both Government officials and contractors that went 
beyond those that were currently in place.  It is DOD’s policy that contractors 
conduct themselves with the highest degree of integrity and honesty supported by 
standards.  For industry’s part, the Defense Industry Initiative (DII) was formed to 
encourage companies to publicly profess their commitment to an ethical culture and 
to take appropriate action when their employees have failed to follow their ethical 
standards.  DOD’s policy is that contractors conduct themselves with the highest 
degree of integrity and honesty; the Department has issued contractor standards of 
conduct in the DFARS.  Management control systems should provide, among other 
things, a written code of business ethics, an ethics training program for all 
employees, periodic reviews of company procedures to ensure compliance with 
standards, a mechanism for employees to report suspected breaches of ethical 
conduct, internal and external audits, a method for appropriate corrective action, 
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Government officials of any suspected or possible violation of law in connection with 
Government contracts.   
The above discussion concerning ethics is extremely important to this study.  
As will be detailed in coming sections, the additional access provided to private 
industry by contracting out procurement functions could, if not vigorously protected, 
result in both actual and perceived unethical behavior extremely detrimental to the 
Federal acquisition system. 
C. Acquisition Issues 
1. Acquisition Principles 
The acquisition process can be characterized by its principles and concepts.  
It is the structure of these principles that identifies the culture within which 
acquisition and contracting are undertaken.  In order to execute the responsibilities 
of acquisition, one must have a firm grasp of the basic concepts and underlying 
fundamentals of the process that form the framework upon which strategies, actions, 
ideas and change are implemented.  Although not an exhaustive accounting of 
acquisition principles, some of the more important of these to this study are 
presented here.  Because Federal Government procurement is a public activity 
exercised on behalf of the taxpayer to accomplish Government missions, the 
business of procurement should always be conducted with fairness, openness and 
integrity.  Ethical conduct that captures and maintains the public’s trust at all times is 
essential.  Fairness and reasonableness for both the Government and industry must 
prevail.  Although the primary function of procurement is to acquire needed goods 
and services, it must also recognize public policy objectives, particularly those that 
are obtained through the contracting vehicle.  The contracting system should 
promote competition, maximize the use of commercial products and services, 
nurture cooperative relationships between the Government and suppliers, and use 
public resources efficiently.  Risk management should be employed judiciously.  




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 37 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
should be consistently adhered to.  All members of the acquisition team should 
continually seek innovative and creative methods to accomplish their responsibilities.  
Judgment and decision-making should utilize sound business practices and 
concepts.  The buyer-seller relationship should be identified in the contract and 
preserved in its execution.  The health of this relationship is the most critical factor in 
successful contract performance. 
2. Contracting Process and Contracting Functions 
The researchers were tasked with examining the contracting process and the 
tasks or functions performed by Government employees within this process.  
Valuable to this examination would be a definition of the contracting process used by 
those in the contracting community.  Although there are various opinions about this 
definition, a useful starting point would be relevant definitions found in the FAR and 
other sources. The FAR defines “contracting” as follows: 
“Contracting” means purchasing, renting, leasing, or otherwise 
obtaining supplies or services from nonfederal sources. Contracting 
includes description (but not determination) of supplies and services 
required, selection and solicitation of sources, preparation and award 
of contracts, and all phases of contract administration. It does not 
include making grants or cooperative agreements.(FAR 2.1) 
One of the principal officials in the contracting process is the warranted 
Contracting Officer.  The FAR defines the “Contracting Officer” as follows: 
“Contracting officer” means a person with the authority to enter into, 
administer, and/or terminate contracts and make related 
determinations and findings. The term includes certain authorized 
representatives of the contracting officer acting within the limits of 
their authority as delegated by the contracting officer. “Administrative 
contracting officer (ACO)’’ refers to a contracting officer who is 
administering contracts. “Termination contracting officer (TCO)” refers 
to a contracting officer who is settling terminated contracts. A single 
contracting officer may be responsible for duties in any or all of these 
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In a broader context, “acquisition” encompasses “contracting” but begins with 
some critical steps before the contracting process is fully engaged.  The FAR 
defines “acquisition” as follows: 
“Acquisition” means the acquiring by contract with appropriated funds 
of supplies or services (including construction) by and for the use of 
the Federal Government through purchase or lease, whether the 
supplies or services are already in existence or must be created, 
developed, demonstrated, and evaluated. Acquisition begins at the 
point when agency needs are established and includes the 
description of requirements to satisfy agency needs, solicitation and 
selection of sources, award of contracts, contract financing, contract 
performance, contract administration, and those technical and 
management functions directly related to the process of fulfilling 
agency needs by contract. 
3. Integrity of the Contracting Process 
It is essential that the Federal Government acquisition process maintain a 
culture considered to be of the highest integrity.  The process is governed by a 
complex set of rules and regulations many of which allow, or even demand, 
remedies for situations considered unfair to one or more of the parties involved.  The 
contracting process is woven around bedrock principles and precepts that should be 
recognized and protected in every action taken by process participants.  The 
integrity of the contracting process should be first and foremost in whatever 
decision-making mechanism is employed.  One of the key elements of this integrity 
is trust.  Trust extends to several dimensions  including: (1) trust between buyers 
and sellers; (2) public trust and confidence that Government officials will always hold 
the best interests of the Government uppermost; (3) Congressional trust that the 
Executive Branch will carry out their responsibilities with loyalty and honesty; and (4) 
trust among contracting professionals that each will judiciously perform their tasks 
with sincere regard for their fellow Federal employees.  It is axiomatic that the 
contracting process be conducted with impartial, fair and equitable treatment of 
contractors.  It is critical that public servants conduct business with fairness, 
openness and honesty while pursuing public policy objectives in the most effective 
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contracting process should be vigorously attacked.  Opportunities for actual or 
perceived conflicts of interest must be recognized and carefully avoided.  Situations 
which might place the process at risk must be carefully analyzed before deciding to 
undertake these risks.  Actions which might take the Government outside ethical 
boundaries are to be seriously evaluated.  Contracting officers should be 
continuously asking if the decision before them would have any affect on enhancing 
or detracting from the process’ integrity.  Innovation and resourcefulness should be 
the hallmarks of a healthy and robust contracting process continually stimulated by 
vision and ingenuity. 
In assessing the consequences of using contractors to perform procurement 
functions, the Acquisition Advisory Panel (AAP) stated: 
the cost and delay associated with resolving potential OCIs after-the-
fact adversely affects agency programs and the public interest.  Yet, 
“the more we integrate non-Federal employees, contractors or call 
them blended workforce, into the actual governing and administration 
of our agencies, the larger the gap we have and the more difficult it is 
for us to insure the integrity of Government decision making.”(p.407 
An example of Congressional mistrust has to do with the General Services 
Administration’s Mission Oriented Business Integrated Service (MOBIS) and 
Representative Henry Waxman’s position that this program may “cause conflicts of 
interest and result in unnecessary waste, fraud and abuse.”  Although GSA claims 
the MOBIS program contains “safeguards” to avoid conflicts of interest, Waxman 
believes that given past performance on these types of contracts, promised 
safeguards “[do] not generate confidence in this approach.”(p.1) 
The integrity of the contracting process is forced and shaped by these very 
types of events. 
4. Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) has been in 
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educational requirements on those Government employees who occupy positions 
identified as part of the acquisition workforce.  These requirements were established 
by Congress in order to improve the knowledge, skills and competencies of those 
involved in acquiring goods and services.  These requirements are categorized by 
functional areas, e.g., Contracting and Purchasing, as well as by certification levels 
denoting qualifications as follows:  (1) Basic or Entry level, (2) Intermediate or 
Journeyman level, and (3) Advanced or Executive level.  Special baccalaureate 
degree requirements were established for Contracting Officers with warrants above 
the simplified acquisition threshold.  Critical acquisition positions (CAPs) within the 
acquisition corps were also established to recognize the unique qualifications 
required of senior procurement professionals.  Workforce members must also 
participate in meaningful continuous learning activities to stay current and proficient 
in their functional discipline, policy initiatives, and leadership and management skills. 
5. Contractual Remedies 
During the performance of a contract, differences of opinion may arise 
between Government personnel and the contractor.  Such potential conflicts may 
have to do with the quality of performance, specific provisions in the contract with 
which the Government believes the company has not complied, the extent to which 
the firm has put forth its best efforts to cooperate in recognizing unique conditions 
and circumstances encountered by the Government, or one or both parties may 
even believe the other has breached the contract.  These and many more situations 
might occur between the buyer and seller.  When the Government believes the 
contractor has failed to perform in accordance with the terms and conditions of the 
contract, appropriate remedies exist.    Many of the rules, regulations and literature 
concerning contractor failure to perform involve the delivery of goods with far less 
focus on the performance of services.  The latter is much more difficult to address 
because it frequently involves subjective assessment of contractor performance.  
Clear contractor failure to perform, or even repudiation of the contract, are probably 
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provided in a services contract.  If contractors are performing procurement functions 
for the Government and at the same time are suffering differences of viewpoint 
about that effort, such complications may cast an undesirable shroud over the entire 
working relationship.  Even beyond this, other contractors’ perception of how their 
confidential data and information is being handled by both parties might be highly 
questioned. 
6. Advisory and Assistance Services 
It is the policy of the Federal Government that Advisory and Assistance 
Services, utilized at all organizational levels to assist managers in achieving 
maximum effectiveness or economy in their operations, is a legitimate method to 
improve Government services.  The procurement of Advisory and Assistance 
Services (A&AS), whether contracts are made with individuals or organizations that 
involve either personal or nonpersonal services, is governed by FAR Subpart 37.2.   
When essential to an agency’s mission, contracts for A&AS are permitted for 
a range of reasons, including: (1) to obtain points of view on critical issues; (2) to 
obtain advice concerning developments in industry, university or foundation 
research; (3) to obtain opinions, special knowledge or skills held by noted experts; 
(4) to enhance understanding and develop alternative solutions to complex 
problems; (5) to support and improve organizations’ operations; and (6) to ensure 
the more efficient or effective operation of managerial or hardware systems. 
There are several particular cases in which A&AS cannot be used, including 
the following: (1) to perform work of a policy, decision-making, or managerial nature 
which is the responsibility of agency officials;(2) to bypass or undermine personnel 
ceilings, pay limitations, or competitive employment procedures;(3) awarded to 
former Government employees on a preferential basis;(4) to aid in influencing or 
enacting legislation;and (5) to obtain professional or technical advice readily 
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7. Metrics and Measures of Effectiveness and Efficiency 
Measures of effectiveness and efficiency are key elements in the assessment 
of any procurement function.  Since one of the key questions being addressed by 
this research is the effectiveness of contracting out the procurement function, the 
researchers developed a framework for analysis that lends itself as a sound 
mechanism to assess the results of surveys and interviews conducted in the body of 
this work.  Among common themes throughout the effectiveness and efficiency 
discussion are two essential and universal questions. First, what do we need to 
measure? Second, how do we measure it? 
Framing the measures or metrics set is essential to ensure the “what” and the 
“how”’ questions are tailored to the specific business level to maximize the utility of 
the measure.  Framing is simply ensuring the business element and level within the 
broader agency context have the correct measures.  The utility is the ability of the 
measure or metric to be of use in monitoring and controlling the behavior of 
participants and processes within the business unit. 
Several levels of analysis are available.  First, the metric is gathered and/or 
utilized at the organizational level or strata.  Second, the metric can be framed 
according to its application association—whether workforce, work process, or work 
product output.  Third, the metric can be defined by its nature or type.  Within this 
context, two primary types of metrics exist: quantitative metrics and qualitative 
metrics.  Fourth, the contract action itself can include specific performance 
measurements and metrics designed to monitor process integrity, process and 
outcome qualities and quantities—all as a means of determining effectiveness and 
efficiency.   
a. Level or Strata of the Business Entity  
Metrics (measures of effectiveness and efficiencies) can be developed and 
utilized at all levels of an organization.  For contracting and acquisition within the 
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level, the macro-organizational level, the business unit level (which can be 
subcategorized at the activity level), and the branch or division levels. 
The strategic level can be defined as  DOD.   Strategic measures at  DOD 
level related to contracting and outsourcing procurement functions can be utilized to 
affect policy decisions, strategic manpower alignment, and other similar activities.   
The macro-organization level is simply the specific agency.  The Department 
of the Navy, Department of the Army, and the like, is the macro-organizational level.  
Within this level, specific major commands can utilize metrics for efficiency and 
effectiveness within their organization as consolidators of metric information being 
fed to higher-level strategic uses at  DOD, and for providing general guidance to 
subordinate levels.  
 GAO recently published a report (2005b) which provides a valuable 
framework for both a strategic and macro-organizational analysis of acquisition 
functions.  It promotes four cornerstones for assessing the acquisition function, 
defines key elements of each cornerstone, and further identifies critical success 
factors for each of the key elements supporting the four cornerstones.  The four 
cornerstones are: (1) organizational alignment and leadership; (2) policies and 
processes; (3) human capital; and (4) knowledge and information management.  
Although the assessment is designed for the entire acquisition process, it contains 
many elements specifically related to contracting. 
The business unit level is where the “production floors” are located.  The 
Navy’s Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers (FISCs) are examples of organizations at 
this level.  Within the business-unit level are all the activities and commands within 
each major organization.   For example, FISC Jacksonville has imbedded divisions 
and branches supporting customers, which can have metrics in place for each of the 
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Among the varying levels, metrics can be assigned, measured and utilized as 
immediate control and process measures, or for consolidation to higher-levels for 
broader evaluation and control of the larger organization.   
b. Application Association of the Metric    
By combining the work of Naegle (2007) and Brianas (2005), the researchers 
can assign metrics within the framework of their application to three primary areas: 
workforce measures, work process measures, and work output measures.   
Workforce metrics, as the name implies, clearly deal with the capacity and 
capability of the workforce.  One key measure is the number of workers expressed 
as FTEs.  Other, more specific, measures of workforce can align the numbers 
against descriptors such as personnel classifications, certification levels and 
experience levels.  Within DOD, the civilian personnel system has specific 
classifications related to the acquisition workforce, one of the most common being 
the 1102 Series Contract Specialist.  Among a specific series is the level or banding, 
which can be a further descriptor of capability.  DAWIA provides an additional 
capability component, often linked to the level or banding.    
Work process metrics can measure quantitatively and qualitatively across 
specific processes.  This capability can be particularly useful when making 
determinants of efficiencies and effectiveness through specific business processes 
required to effect a business transaction.   For example, transaction cost analysis is 
a type of work process metric that combines a quantitative/cost component to 
specific actions required to conduct a business transaction, and is particularly useful 
at measuring the extent to which costs have been reduced.  Within this framework is 
a specific subset entitled control measures, which can be utilized to affect 
consistency and predictability in processes to ensure greater efficiencies and 
effectiveness, along with compliance with specific statues, regulations, instructions, 
and desired protocols.   This is related to compliance in that the process and 
protocol integrity are examined, along with the conduct and assignment of work 
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other words, it is the assurance that the proper business protocols are utilized based 
on sound business judgments, as the requirement is being processed, not just when 
it is completed.   
Process metrics can span all the functions required within procurement 
functions.  The acquisition process itself has a number of sub-processes, or 
phases—all of which can have unique sets of metrics.  Lehner (2001) identified 
twelve phases of the acquisition process.  Phases five through ten are the traditional 
contracting functions in which there are myriad processes, all of which can be 
measured.  Those six phases are: (1) acquisition planning; (2) solicitation; (3) 
proposal/bid evaluation; (4) negotiations; (5) contract award; and (6) contract 
administration.  This framework is important because in defining measures of 
effectiveness and efficiency, the specific phase may help to frame the nature, type, 
level and detail of the metrics needed.  The complexities of defining metrics across 
all the phases should be of note.   
Work output and outcome metrics can assign quantitative and qualitative 
measures to outputs or specific outcomes or the end-state of an effort.  This type of 
metric, to a large degree, is directly related to the construction and management of 
the contract itself, and the contract is the vehicle to achieve an end-state.  To a large 
degree, performance-based contracting is predicated on this type of metric.  Since 
performance-based contracting is now required under the FAR for all service 
contracts, it is a given that this output- and outcome-based metric should be of 
critical concern to activities conducting, or considering, contracting out procurement 
functions. 
Related to the control measures indicated above in the process metrics is a 
subset within the output and outcome framework of metrics: compliance.  In this 
context, compliance is viewed in a past-tense manner, to determine after-the-fact 
whether statutes, regulations, instructions, and desired business protocols were 
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Business entities, which either are or are contemplating contracting out 
procurement functions, should have metrics that can evaluate the efficiency and 
effectiveness of such action.  These measures should include appropriate baseline 
data, or standards, against which any organizational and/or protocol change is 
made.  Just as important would be an Acceptable Quality Level (AQL) measure 
which is used to monitor and control processes and outputs.   
Brianas (2005) identified several metrics under output and outcomes which 
are applied to: (1) customer; (2) people; (3) process; (4) financial; and (5) value.  He 
argues that any procurement analysis must incorporate these five major elements.  
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Table 4-1. Procurement Metrics 
Category Metric 
1. Customer Customer Satisfaction Index 
2. People Employee Survey 
 Workforce Stability 
 Continuous Learning 
 DAWIA Certification 
 Acquisition Professional Community 
3. Processes E2E Metrics 
 P-Card Delinquency 
 DD1716 
 Interest Penalties 
 Cycle Time 
 Consolidate Service Contract 
4.  Financial Procurement Direct/Indirect Ratio 
 Industry Spend Analysis—Competition 
 Industry Spend Analysis—Small Business 
 Industry Spend Analysis—Commercial Items - 
Actions 
 Industry Spend Analysis—Commercial Items - 
Dollars 
 Industry Spend Analysis—PBSA - Actions 
 Industry Spend Analysis—PBSA - Dollars  
5. Value Performance Unit Costing—Large Contracts 
 Performance Unit Costing—Simplified Acquisition 
Proc. 
 
These are the main areas being monitored under current procurements by the 
Navy.  However important these data are, it may not give specific information for 
adequate management and control of the myriad of functions under contracts for 
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functions identified and called forth at the contract level.  Notwithstanding this 
deficiency, these are valuable measures to consider.   
c. Quantitative and Qualitative Metrics 
Metrics spanning the other genres of classification (whether organization level 
or strata, application association, or any other classification), may further be defined 
as quantitative or qualitative, or as a hybrid of the two.  This classification can also 
be characterized or labeled as a specific attribute measure.  Quantitative metrics can 
encompass an organization’s productivity, such as total contract actions (e.g., by 
type of action, award, modification) or dollars.  These are, by nature, relatively easy 
to measure with existing systems.  Qualitative measures may be less tangible in 
nature than quantitative measures, and as such, may be more challenging to 
adequately define and measure.  Such measures may include customer satisfaction, 
which can vary from customer to customer, and can be dependent on factors not 
specifically subject to the immediate measurements themselves.  
d. Contract Metrics 
The last area of measurement within the specific contract action may 
embrace the quantitative and qualitative measures indicated above in addition to 
other contract-unique requirements.  This last measurement is of great importance, 
and often one of the most challenging for contract professionals to adequately 
utilize.  The challenge comes from the diversity and complexity of the myriad types 
of procurements within DOD organizations—varying from base operating support to 
advisory and technical assistance, and a whole spectrum of services and 
commodities.  Add the mandate for the use of performance-based service 
contracting, and the emphasis in this area becomes even more critical.  
Naegle’s software measurement and metrics presentation highlights many of 
the challenges in developing sound metrics in software acquisition, and is important 
in this discussion to highlight the challenges in creating contract-specific metrics. 
While software development is unique in numerous ways (lack of physical 
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critical to the systems it operates), it has many similarities to service contracts 
involving complex processes. Government procurement functions have several of 
these features.  Naegle emphasized three main types of metrics: management, 
process, and quality.  There are clear parallels that can be drawn between these 
software metrics and the contracting out of procurement functions.  
Notwithstanding the challenges of creating metrics for individual contracts, 
using the Malina and Selto work first presented in Chapter III, all construction of 
metrics for individual contract actions should consider whether the metrics 
contemplated for use are diverse and complementary, objective and accurate, 
informative, more beneficial than costly, causality related, strategic communicators, 
create incentive for improvement, and are supportive of improved decisions.  Many 
recent studies have indicated that DOD needs continued emphasis to create sound 
and objective measures and metrics in its contracts. 
D. Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided essential background and foundational information 
necessary for understanding key aspects of contracting out the contracting function, 
and some of the complex issues germane to any further examination and analysis.  
Specifically, brief discussions concerning inherently governmental functions, 
conflicts of interest, the FAIR Act, personal services, ethics, acquisition principles, 
the contracting process, the integrity of the contracting process, the Defense 
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act, contractual remedies, advisory and 
assistance services, interagency procurement, and metrics and measures of 
effectiveness and efficiency were presented.  The following chapter will present 
specific results from the Policy and Senior Management surveys and interviews with 
senior contracting officials.  Chapter VI will provide results from the Management 
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V. Survey and Interview Results from Policy and 
Senior Management Personnel 
A. Introduction 
This chapter addresses research results from the surveys and interviews 
involving Policy and Senior Management personnel.  Most sections are focused 
around one or more survey questions.  All interviewee comments related to that area 
have been integrated into the discussion.  Survey responses and interviews 
involving Management and Operating Level personnel are presented in Chapter VI.   
The Policy and Senior Management surveys and interviews speak to the 
following subject areas: (1) the contracting process; (2) inherently governmental 
functions; (3) personal services relationships; (4) conflicts of interest; (5) legal 
issues; (6) ethical issues; (7) workforce experience and qualifications; (8) the 
necessity for a policy statement, (9) the authority used for procuring contracting 
services; (10) reasons for acquiring procurement functions; (11) impact on the 
contracting system; (12) integrity of the contracting process; and (13) workforce and 
workplace issues. 
B. Policy and Senior Leadership Surveys and Interviews 
1. Contracting Process and Contracting Functions  
In querying participants about contracting functions, it was felt that their 
perception of the process was an underlying element needed to discern the issues 
to be explored.  In order to obtain this insight, the first survey question focused on 
the respondent’s perception of which contracting functions are included in the 
contracting process.  Question 1 asked: 
“What is your understanding of the scope of the term ‘contracting 
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Some respondents provided an explanation of the contracting process and 
listed specific steps which occur, while others listed functions performed by 
contracting personnel in executing their procurement responsibilities.  Still others 
made a general statement that it covers all actions taken by an 1102-series 
Government employee, or that it covers all functions required to satisfy a customer’s 
needs via a contract.  Respondents recognized that it included the acquisition of 
goods and services to include all elements of planning, executing, administering and 
closing out a contractual action.  Acquisition means obtaining these goods and 
services either through lease or purchasing.  A few distinguished between pre-award 
and post-award tasks which were recognized as contract formation and contract 
administration respectively.  Some suggested that it could include grants, 
cooperative agreements and other transaction authority, while others specifically 
excluded grants and cooperative agreements. The FAR definition excludes both 
grants and cooperative agreements.  One response pointed out that, unlike the 
commercial sector, Government contracting is governed by statutory and regulatory 
requirements imposed by higher authority, such as Congress, DOD, the Services 
and major buying Commands. 
Some responses were from a Systems perspective and suggested that these 
terms denote a broad range of contracting support to DOD requirements generators 
including: (1) procurement planning and business advisory services that usually 
occur very early on in the acquisition process; (2) contract execution, including 
developing and executing solicitations and contracts and obligating procurement 
dollars; and (3) contract administration.  All these functions can occur at every stage 
of the acquisition process, from Concept and Technology Development to System 
Development and Demonstration to Production and Sustainment to Removal of 
equipment from the inventory.  In addition to Systems contracting support, these 
functions also cover other types of services that require contracting support, such as 
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Most responses were generally consistent with the FAR definition of 
“contracting,” and some even referenced the definition.  Only a few included the 
action of determining requirements, a function which precedes contracting and is 
specifically excluded from the contracting process by the FAR.  A couple of 
respondents took the question to be asking about their experience and knowledge of 
the contracting profession and explained their credentials and background.  A few 
respondents specifically included actions involving other agencies, such as the 
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), the Department of Labor (DOL), the 
Courts, and the General Services Administration (GSA). 
One respondent provided an extremely articulate definition of procurement 
that captures several of the business concepts involved in contracting and depicts 
the cultural approach needed to successfully accomplish acquisition. 
Partnering with a requiring activity to understand requirements and 
develop an acquisition strategy.  Translate that requirement into a 
solicitation assuring that all applicable statutes, regulations and 
policies are included.  Develop a business strategy for soliciting offers 
and negotiate the best deal on that strategy to satisfy the requiring 
activity’s needs.  Partnering with industry and the customer to assure 
performance with contract terms and conditions and assure 
performance of the contract.  Negotiate changes as needed and 
determining an equitable adjustment for same.  Close out the contract 
at completion. 
The FAR definition of the contracting process was explored in 
Chapter IV. 
2. Inherently Governmental Functions 
Central to the issue of contracting for procurement functions is the idea held 
by many that the entire contracting function is inherently governmental.  As found in 
the literature, there is a growing opinion that, although the entire function may be 
considered inherently governmental, there are certain tasks within the overall 
contracting responsibility that definitely should not be considered inherently 
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private industry.  Also, as noted in Chapter II, there is not complete agreement as to 
exactly what are and what are not inherently governmental functions.  One 
organization’s call as to inherently governmental is another organization’s call as to 
non-inherently governmental.  It is up to each organization to decide for itself what it 
will include on the IGF list. 
Three questions on the survey address the issue of inherently governmental 
functions.  These questions attempted to discover the following: the extent to which 
an organization has ever wrestled with the distinction between IGF and non-IGF due 
to a capability deficiency; the extent to which IGFs are being performed by 
contractors; and, from a non-exhaustive list of contracting functions, which are 
deemed inherently governmental and which are not.   
a. Capability Deficiency 
Many organizations have had to face a decision concerning what is and what 
is not an inherently governmental function because, for one reason or another, they 
were unable to accommodate performance of the function.  To determine the extent 
to which organizations were forced to make this distinction because a capability 
deficiency existed, the survey questioned respondents on this point.  Question 6 
asked: 
“Has a capability deficiency in your organization ever caused you to 
have to assess and determine whether a function was inherently 
governmental or non-inherently governmental?  ____Yes   ___No   If 
yes, briefly explain.” 
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Table 5-1. Capability Deficiency has Caused Organizational Determination 
of Inherently Governmental Functions 
Organization Yes No NA Totals 
Army 2 3  5 
Navy/Marine Corps 8 10  18 
Air Force 2 3  5 
Defense Agencies 5 8  13 
Non-Federal Agencies 1 3  4 
Total Surveys 18 27  45 
Percentage 40% 60%   
 
The results indicate that forty percent of the respondents have had to 
determine if a function was inherently governmental as a result of a capability 
deficiency.  In most cases, the reasons were a shortage of personnel (frequently 
expressed in terms of full time equivalents) to perform the workload, high personnel 
turnover, the loss of corporate expertise and experience through attrition and 
retirement, or a temporary shortage in the skills needed to provide full contracting 
effort.  One respondent explained that because they are careful to evaluate contract 
requirements for organizational conflicts of interest, this sometimes results in an 
analysis of the types of tasks necessary for the requirement and whether they are 
inherently governmental.  Another respondent found that the desire to use a 
consultant caused an examination of the entire procurement process to ensure there 
were no integrity issues.  Some expressed that the determination was caused by a 
capacity deficiency rather than a capability deficit.They have labor dollars to hire 
contractors but are unable to recruit and retain Government contract specialists.  
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inherently governmental and any movement toward contracting out this function will 
have serious long-term ramifications. 
b. Inherently Governmental Functions on Contract 
Without attempting to find specific cases in which the restriction on 
contracting for inherently governmental functions was being contravened, a question 
was asked about the respondent’s knowledge where functions identified as 
inherently governmental, or exempt from competition, were in fact being placed on 
contract.  Question 7 asked: 
“To your knowledge, are any functions that have been determined to be 
inherently governmental or exempt from competition being performed 
by contractors?  _____ Yes   _____ No”   
The results are displayed in Table 5-2.   
Table 5-2. Are Inherently Governmental Functions Being Performed by 
Contractors? 
Organization Yes No NA Totals 
Army 0 5  5 
Navy/Marine Corps 2 16  18 
Air Force 1 4  5 
Defense Agencies 4 9  13 
Non-Federal Agencies 1 3  4 
Total Surveys  8 37  45 
Percentage 18% 82%   
 
The results indicate that slightly less than twenty percent of the respondents 
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performed by contractors.  Some of this is accounted for by the fact that the 
respondent believes it is an IGF, but those who decided to contract out the function 
do not.   Even within the same organization, there are differences of opinion as to 
what can be appropriately performed by contractors and where they should not be 
permitted to participate.  Nonetheless, there are some who believe the rules 
concerning contracting for IGFs are being violated. 
c. Identifying Inherently Governmental Functions 
Most reports and studies consulted during this research specifically avoided 
trying to determine which contracting functions are inherently governmental and 
which are not.  Although not comprehensive, the researchers constructed a list of 
functions typically cited as being one or the other.  Knowing that the decision as to 
the status of a function as being one or the other is a matter of policy, and could, 
therefore, differ among organizations, the researchers nevertheless asked 
respondents to state their position on this selected list.  Question 8 asked: 
“Within the context of your organization, which of the following 
functions are inherently governmental and should not be contracted out 
and which are non-inherently governmental and could potentially be 
contracted out?  Provide qualifying comments if needed” 
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Requirements determination 36 9  
Developing Statements of Work 13 32  
Structuring market research 14 31  
Conducting market research 10 35  
Performing acquisition planning 27 18  
Developing solicitation documents 14 31  
Issuing solicitation documents 30 15  
Developing and applying evaluation criteria 32 12 1 
Member of  Source Selection Evaluation 
Board 
32 13  
Evaluation of proposals/offers 24 20 1 
Performing cost and price analyses 16 29  
Negotiating contract prices, terms & 
conditions 
36 9  
Structuring and approving incentive plans 39 6  
Preparing price negotiation memoranda 26 19  
Awarding contracts 44 1  
Negotiating contract modifications 34 11  
Determining cost allowability 38 7  
Exercising options 37 8  
Assessing contractor performance 31 14  
Implementing action based on contractor 
performance 
35 9 1 
Accepting or rejecting goods and services 40 5  
Terminating contracts 45 0  
Preparing contracts for closeout 9 34 2 
 
There is unanimous opinion that terminating contracts is an inherently 
governmental function, while only one individual believes that awarding contracts is 
not.  These two functions are very closely identified as requiring a Contracting 
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Developing statements of work, structuring and conducting market research, 
developing solicitation documents, performing cost and price analyses, and 
preparing contracts for closeout are predominantly considered non-inherently 
governmental.  All other functions listed in Table 5-3 tend to be considered 
inherently governmental.  Several respondents commented that the administrative 
and support effort leading up to many of the functions they listed as inherently 
governmental are tasks that could be performed by contractors. 
In commenting about their replies, several respondents cautioned that the 
potential for organizational conflicts of interest must be properly managed.  Some 
suggested that although a function, e.g., requirements determination, was inherently 
governmental, contractors could assist in its performance if the Government 
provided proper scrutiny and the potential for OCI was controlled.  Others stated that 
requirements determination is a non-IGF and could be performed by contractors, but 
that issues of OCI must be closely watched.  While citing some functions as non-
inherently governmental, several respondents made caveats about their selection, 
such as: contractors should have a very limited role, contractors must use 
Government policies and procedures, procurement can be performed with 
Government oversight to assure transparency, and other similar statements. 
3. Personal Services 
The issue of personal versus non-personal services has plagued the 
contracting process for several years.  Contracts for personal services are prohibited 
with certain exceptions; performance of procurement functions under contract is not 
one of the exceptions.  Although a carefully crafted services contract may appear to 
avoid the problem of personal services, it generally becomes the manner in which 
the contract is performed that determines the actual relationship that exists between 
the buyer and seller.  If there is a definite employer-employee relationship that, de 
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As noted in Chapter IV, personal services distinctions have become 
extremely blurred.  To get at the issues involved, Question 11 asked: 
“Is there a potential problem with personal services relationships when 
contracting out procurement functions?  ____Yes ____No”   
The results are displayed in Table 5-4. 
Table 5-4. Potential Personal Services Problem? 
Organization Yes No NA Totals 
Army 4 1  5 
Navy/Marine Corps 17 1  18 
Air Force 4 1  5 
Defense Agencies 10 3  13 
Non-Federal Agencies 4 0  4 
Total Surveys 39 6  45 
Percentage 87% 13%   
 
An overwhelming majority of the respondents believe there are potential 
personal services relationships that could become problematic when acquiring 
procurement functions.  Some believe that poorly defined Performance Work 
Statements (PWSs) or Statements of Work (SOW) will almost automatically lead to a 
personal services relationship in order to accomplish the contractual effort.  They 
emphasize that this can be avoided if the requirement is properly structured.  Others 
have noted that a performance-based SOW is very difficult to develop and 
implement.  Even if the SOW is written precisely, the danger is that management will 
openly engage in direction to contractor employees in order to get the work done on 
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author of documents.  These exchanges, if done by Contracting Officers and 
contractors, could be interpreted as personal services.  The co-location of contractor 
employees in Government facilities certainly creates the appearance that they are 
Government employees, if not actual treatment as such.  Personal services 
relationships will occur no matter how often people are counseled on the “arm’s 
length” relationship that must be maintained.  Some pointed out that this same 
problem is also faced in other Government disciplines. 
Some believe that many of the contracting functions that might be contracted 
out are so closely intertwined with functions that must be performed by Government 
personnel (e.g., a Contracting Officer) that a personal services relationship will 
almost certainly develop since it will be so easy for the Government to assume the 
role of “supervisor.”  Contracting Officers, by nature, are used to giving directions 
and instructions to those performing acquisition functions.  Their authority places 
them in a decision-making role.   
In turn, for expediency reasons, contractor personnel may start asking for 
guidance from Government employees and lose all sight of the contractor 
relationship.  Contracting approval relies on the research and preparation of 
contractor employees.  Over time, a relationship develops due to the close nature of 
the work and a certain level of trust needed to be an effective team.  Yet, 
participants must remain mindful that a line still exists between the Government and 
the contractor. 
Some respondents are resigned to the fact that improper personal services 
relationships will exist even under the best of circumstances.. With a blended 
workforce, it is easy to forget that contracted employees sitting next to Government 
employees answer to and work for their company instead of the organization.  They 
believe that the only effective way to work in a contracting environment that is 
constantly changing and responding to the issues of the day is for Contracting 
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these specialists and support staff are contractor employees, this will be personal 
services.   
Respondents stress that the Government needs to ensure that the factors 
that prevent it from becoming personal services must be tightly controlled.  This 
includes the supervision of contractor personnel by a contractor manager (e.g., 
project manager), the requirements are clearly defined as expected outcomes, and 
the organizational structure and location of contractor employees is such that 
Government personnel and the general public (including other vendors and other 
agency Government employees) can easily discern contractor personnel.  The 
organization should maintain a training program to heighten awareness of the 
potential for personal services and to ensure that everyone adheres to the limitations 
regarding inherently governmental functions. 
4. Conflicts of Interest 
There is always concern regarding actual or perceived conflicts of interest in 
Federal Government procurement.  The Government’s policy is that procurement 
officials in all phases of the process be carefully alert to identify and avoid both 
personal and organizational conflicts of interest.  In services contracting, particularly 
where contractor employees are performing services at a Government facility in 
close proximity to Federal employees, the opportunity for both types of conflict 
increase significantly.  Most of the examples of circumstances in which conflicts of 
interest could occur cited in FAR 9.5 are very closely related to contracting and 
acquisition tasks.  In attempting to recognize specific conflict of interest conditions 
that might exist in obtaining procurement services, Question 12 asked: 
“How could a conflict of interest situation arise when contracting for 
procurement services? 
Although a few individuals indicated that conflict of interest situations should 
not be a problem if due diligence is exercised, most respondents identified situations 
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The obvious organizational conflict of interest cases wherein contractors 
possess proprietary information that might give them an unfair competitive 
advantage were cited quite often.  A contractor cannot be involved in requirements 
determination and then, in turn, bid on a resulting solicitation.  A sole source contract 
to the company who helped develop the requirement would, at the very least, appear 
to be a conflict of interest.  A contractor could be delivering procurement services to 
a Government office and, at the same time, bidding on other contracts from that 
office.  Access to procurement-related information which may possibly unduly assist 
the contractor’s competitive status could be a potential conflict.  The contractor could 
pass on privileged, proprietary, and/or sensitive business information that could be 
used to create an unfair competitive advantage for his or another competing 
company.  A contractor could gain insight into how requirements were developed, 
future procurements, or the details of other contractors’ operations.  The more a 
contractor performs contracting functions, the greater the opportunity for access to 
such proprietary and sensitive business information.  Obviously, a support contractor 
who is also an offeror cannot evaluate its own company’s proposal, but offerors who 
are being evaluated by direct competitors on other solicitations could have a bias 
against giving them work. 
The integrity of the contracting process is called into question when support 
contractors are performing evaluations and assessments of other contractors, 
particularly when the firms involved are “competitors.”  Contractors who are 
performing quality assurance on others, negotiating with firms, evaluating 
performance, accepting products or services, and other similar interactions with 
companies create an opportunity for an impression that the support contractor is 
performing in its own best interests.  When a contractor’s “contract specialist” is 
negotiating with an offeror with whom it has a financial interest, this could lead to a 
conflict of interest.  The question is, would the Government even know that a 
financial interest existed?  Some believe that it is important for contractor personnel 
to disclose their interests in the same manner as Government contracting personnel.  
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could lead to a conflict of interest with the effect of excluding the most 
knowledgeable contractors and reduced competition. 
Some observe that there is real potential for abuse in that a contracted 
support person has access to intellectual property and proprietary business matters 
of competitive firms.  After that individual leaves the firm engaged to provide the 
contracted services, he/she takes that knowledge to the open market.  Government 
personnel have post-employment prohibitions that restrict the potential to abuse 
such information.  Contracted personnel have no such limitations.  Said one 
respondent, there are myriad opportunities for conflicts of interest to occur, such as: 
company loyalties and biases, and stock ownership and self-interests that are 
currently addressed for Federal employees and would have to be addressed in a 
very detailed fashion with legitimate and strong consequences for breeches.  
Another echoed this concern with the financial interests of spouses, minor children, 
general partners or an organization in which they have an arrangement for 
prospective employment.  In addition, this relationship would raise the appearance of 
loss of impartiality. 
Some respondents pointed to organizational relationships and associations 
as posing a critical problem.  With the considerable amount of mergers and 
acquisitions that have occurred and might occur in the future among various 
companies, the organizational affiliations are often not quite so obvious.  A support 
contractor performing contracting services where no organizational conflicts appear 
to exist might acquire, or be acquired by, a company which presents an immediate 
conflict.  The competitive status may not be direct, but might occur subtly through 
divisions of complex corporate structures, wholly owned subsidiaries, partnerships 
and alliances, and other similar arrangements that are transparent to the cursory 
observation. 
Day-to-day activities could be affected by the careful adherence to potential 
conflicts of interest.  Those who call meetings to discuss contracting issues or 
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company employees who would otherwise be in attendance.  There are less internal 
controls over contractor employees which lead to less process integrity. 
Issues regarding source selection sensitive information are always a concern.  
The potential disclosure by support contractors of information related to their 
contracting tasks to interested vendors could certainly provide an unfair advantage.   
Some respondents commented that personal conflicts of interest could also 
arise on the part of Government employees.  Working so closely with contractor 
employees, they could observe individuals performing contracting functions for 
which they are paid at a far lower Government rate.  Future employment 
opportunities might be very attractive and could cloud their judgment and decision-
making ability toward the bests interests of the Government.  This may become 
particularly acute when the support companies are staffed with former Government 
employees who are well-known to the Government personnel, possibly having even 
supervised or are close friends of these workers.  Making it even more complicated 
would be situations in which former Government workers obtained employment with 
a support contractor’s competitor. 
5. Legal Issues 
The DAU report concluded that there were no legal or statutory restrictions 
concerning contracting for procurement services.  To determine if this was generally 
understood among contracting professionals, the survey inquired about such 
restrictions or limitations.  Question 9 asked: 
“Are there any legal issues or impediments associated with contracting 
for procurement functions?  ____Yes ____No”      
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Table 5-5. Legal Issues? 
Organization Yes No NA Totals 
Army 4 1  5 
Navy/Marine Corps 16 2  18 
Air Force 5 0  5 
Defense Agencies 12 1  13 
Non-Federal Agencies 2 2  4 
Total Surveys 39 6  45 
Percentage 87% 13%   
 
Over eighty-five percent of the respondents reported that legal issues existed 
in the process of contracting for procurement functions.  The majority of these 
responses, however, related to either: (1) contracting out of inherently governmental 
functions or (2) organizational and personal conflicts of interest.  The responsibility 
of the Contracting Officer to perform certain decision-making functions was 
frequently cited.  Some respondents commented that making decisions about 
contractor status, such as determining competitive range or consideration for not 
meeting performance metrics, must be made by a warranted Contracting Officer.  
Decisions that could benefit or be harmful to an offeror or contractor must be made 
by responsible Government employees.  Some highlighted their response by 
indicating that there would be potential legal issues only if the Government did not 
carefully manage the situation with appropriate firewalls, confidential disclosure 
agreements from contractors and their personnel, and careful training of 
Government personnel.  Having contractor employees involved in the process could 
lead to situations where these employees provide their employer with information 
prior to issuance of a solicitation, during the evaluation process, or after award that 
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Several respondents brought up the need for non-disclosure statements or 
agreements from support contractors, both from the corporation as an entity and 
from individuals within the corporation, in order to avoid the improper, and potentially 
illegal, release of proprietary or classified information, including inappropriate 
transfer of technology.   
An important issue raised by some survey respondents and mentioned by 
interviewees is the fact that most of the statutes regarding improper, and possibly 
illegal, procurement actions apply to Government employees but not to contractors.  
There is even discussion as to whether one or more of the rules which apply to 
Federal employees should be extended to contractors performing contracting 
functions.  Further, pondered one respondent, would the Government be liable if 
court action was taken by a harmed competitor due to the contractor’s improper 
disclosure of proprietary information while acting as a Government “contracting 
agent”? 
6. Ethical Issues 
Ethical considerations are important in every contracting action.  Although the 
circumstances in a particular contractual action might not be cause for 
apprehension, procurement officials should be constantly attuned to the ethical 
pattern surrounding an action and immediately express any hesitation or uneasiness 
sensed.  In order to determine the extent to which individuals felt procuring 
contracting functions might be an ethical problem, Question 10 asked: 
“Are there any ethical issues associated with contracting for 
procurement functions?  ____Yes ____No     If yes, please explain”      
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Table 5-6. Ethical Issues? 
Organization Yes No NA Totals 
Army 3 2 0 5 
Navy/Marine Corps 16 2 0 18 
Air Force 5 0 0 5 
Defense Agencies 7 5 1 13 
Non-Federal Agencies 4 0 0 4 
Total Surveys 35 9 1 45 
Percentage 78% 20% 2%  
 
Almost eighty percent of the respondents believe that ethical issues are 
associated with contracting out of procurement functions.  Many of the respondents 
cited organizational conflicts of interest, both actual and perceived, as the key ethical 
concern.  OCI issues can arise very quickly in this scenario and must be mitigated 
as soon as possible.  Another issue is contractor access to proprietary or sensitive 
data.  Obviously, data from other contractors, particularly technical and cost 
information, can be easily compromised without careful safeguards and restrictions.  
Non-disclosure statements may provide some level of security to prevent contractors 
from divulging proprietary data, but one instance of inappropriate release of data can 
put a black cloud over the entire process.   If co-located, contractor employees 
working alongside 1102s would be more likely to have access to procurement-
sensitive information, even though they are not using the information and, therefore, 
have no need for access.  There is a real issue of overhearing advanced acquisition 
information if located in a contracting office or even a Government technical office.  
Some respondents felt that firm firewalls would have to be established to prevent 
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Several respondents stressed that loyalties of employees rested with their 
employers.  Government personnel are expected to demonstrate their allegiance to 
their Federal employer and, one would assume, contractor employees are likewise 
faithful to their firm.  Contractor personnel are responsible for obtaining the best 
return for their owners.  Their jobs, salary and bonuses may be tied to the viability of 
the company.  Their allegiance is first to the company and second to their customer.  
This can easily come in conflict with the protection of the interests of the United 
States. 
One respondent believed that this situation allows Government personnel to 
easily abdicate to others the responsibilities they hold to protect taxpayers.  Another 
stated that to maintain total trust in the system, minimal or no contractor participation 
should occur.  Supporting this, another believed the judgment of a Government 
employee, not someone with motivations other than doing what is best for the 
Government, should be employed in these decisions.  Substituting someone else’s 
judgment is defaulting on our responsibilities as stewards of the citizens’ trust.  
Ethically, there is a need to ensure the integrity of the process and ensure fairness 
and objectivity to both Government and contractor. 
One individual who responded with a “No” believed that it is important that 
companies doing business with the Government understand that private firms are 
assisting with contract specialist functions.  Our solicitations carefully make known 
that contractors will be assisting with contract award documentation, administration 
and close out documentation functions.  Another felt that ethical issues are not 
involved as long as contractors do not make direct decisions outside the expressed 
guidance of the cognizant Government person they are representing. 
Some respondents cited the Government’s requirement for financial 
disclosure by certain Federal employees to ensure senior officials do not have 
interests that might be counter to the Government.  These same financial 
disclosures, however, do not currently apply to contractor personnel who may be 
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monitors the contractor to this level?  Obvious OCI relationships might be easier to 
recognize, but contractor procurement specialists who hold private interests with 
business associates or even family members are not so easily observed. 
Some interviewees mentioned the effect that has taken place as a result of 
the Darleen Druyun case.  It caused the Services to immediately examine their 
internal checks and balances to ensure that safeguards existed and were working to 
prevent reoccurrence of such a situation.  Another effect has been suspicion on the 
part of industry that other individuals in Government with similar “power” might also 
be less than upstanding in their actions.  Not since “Operation Ill Wind” has the 
procurement profession seen such an egregious transgression of responsibilities to 
the Government. 
7. Experience, Qualifications and Training 
a. Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act Requirements 
One might consider that because Government employees entrusted with 
contracting responsibilities are required to comply with DAWIA provisions, the 
individuals to whom these responsibilities could be transferred might also be 
required to have the necessary qualifications to accomplish contracting tasks.  This 
consideration generated two DAWIA questions on the survey.  Question 13 asked: 
“Do the DAWIA requirements have any bearing on the procurement of 
contracting functions?  ____Yes ____No”      
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Table 5-7. Do DAWIA Requirements Have Any Bearing on Contracting Out 
Procurement Functions? 
Organization Yes No NA Totals 
Army 3 2 0 5 
Navy/Marine Corps 12 5 1 18 
Air Force 4 1 0 5 
Defense Agencies 11 1 1 13 
Non-Federal Agencies 2 1 1 4 
Total Surveys 32 10 3 45 
Percentage 71% 22% 7%  
 
The majority of respondents believe that there are DAWIA implications in 
acquiring procurement services.  DAWIA provides minimum statutory professional 
standards for individuals performing contracting responsibilities.  They state that 
personnel involved in forming and awarding contracts must have attained 
appropriate levels of training and experience demonstrated by certification to ensure 
a professional and competent workforce.  These requirements are important 
elements to ensure that individuals working in the field have the ability to think 
logically and have the training to execute the acquisition.   When using contractor 
personnel, where there is not a similar commercial certification, it is difficult to 
determine whether these personnel have the appropriate education and training to 
perform certain procurement functions.  We should insist that contractors providing 
procurement services have the same level of competence, which DAWIA 
certification measures, as Government personnel.  Because the expectations for 
Government contracting personnel have been raised over the last fifteen years, the 
same should be true for any contractor employees who are hired to perform these 
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established.  If responsibilities are to be handed over to contractors, taxpayers have 
a right to expect the same level of expertise.  One respondent looked at the DAWIA 
implications as an issue of inhibiting the growth of Contracting Officers, since many 
of the functions contractors are likely to perform are the more junior-grade level 
tasks.  A lack of DAWIA requirements at the lower levels would leave a significant 
experience gap.  Another felt that because DAWIA requirements are so demanding, 
it has become more difficult to hire Government employees into the field. 
Some Government organizations have used DAWIA qualifications, or 
equivalent, as an evaluation criterion in assessing offerors who seek to perform 
contracting functions.  Subsequently, these qualification requirements are placed in 
the Statement of Work which is incorporated into the contract.  Others use DAWIA 
language to describe desired qualifications and expertise sought by the agency, or 
include them as part of labor category descriptions.  One respondent felt the impact 
could require significantly greater DAWIA training resources if contractors need to be 
certified. 
In supporting a negative response, some respondents do not believe that 
DAWIA applies to contractor personnel.  For some, DAWIA only comes into play for 
the inherently governmental duties. Contractor personnel will not be Contracting 
Officers and will not be taking DAU courses.  If training is needed, there are plenty of 
commercial courses available.  Further, most contractor specialists are former civil 
servants or military who already hold DAWIA credentials. 
b. Imposing Certification Requirements on Contractors 
To explore the feasibility of applying DAWIA certification or requirements 
similar to DAWIA qualifications to contractors, Question 17 asked: 
“Should contractors be required to comply with DAWIA or ’DAWIA-like‘ 
certification requirements as a condition for receiving contracts for the 
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The results are displayed in Table 5-8 
Table 5-8. Should Contractors be Required to Comply with DAWIA 
Requirements? 
Organization Yes No NA Totals 
Army 4 1 0 5 
Navy/Marine Corps 8 9 1 18 
Air Force 3 2 0 5 
Defense Agencies 12 1 0 13 
Non-Federal Agencies 2 1 1 4 
Total Surveys 29 14 2 45 
Percentage 65% 31% 4%  
 
Almost two-thirds of the respondents believe that some form of DAWIA-type 
certification should be imposed as part of the contractual arrangement for these 
services.  Curiously, some respondents replied “No” to question 13 and replied “Yes” 
to this question.   
If these requirements are essential for DOD employees in the acquisition 
career field, some say, it is not practical to lower the standards for contractor 
personnel. DOD needs to assure that its total workforce, inclusive of contractors, is 
the best trained to perform all functions.  All working in this field should have the 
same minimum standards of proficiency set by DAWIA, which provides a common 
understanding and definition.  These standards are both beneficial and useful for 
setting expectations of the contracting workforce; they also help keep everyone 
current in the latest practices in the acquisition field.  Just as in any other 
performance-based acquisition, the personnel that the offeror is proposing to employ 
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perform procurement functions.  To ensure qualification of contractor employees, 
DAWIA-like certification requirements should be properly described in the solicitation 
and be a valid evaluation criterion.  The knowledge is required to perform the 
function, so why make a distinction based on the badge the individual happens to 
wear?   
One respondent stipulated that DAWIA-like requirements should only apply to 
contractor employees acting as Government contract specialists to ensure the same 
level of capability and professionalism.  Narrow portions of the process, however, 
such as market research, should not require DAWIA since the Government is 
typically using contractors to gain more professional capabilities than could be 
obtained within its own workforce.  For example, the fact that a contract specialist 
has DAWIA certification would not make him/her a better market researcher than a 
person working for a commercial firm that specializes in market research for specific 
industries.  Requiring a similar DAWIA certification would limit competition for market 
research needs and drive up the price to obtain the support. 
Those responding “No” claim that DAWIA applies only to Government military 
and civilian personnel, particularly Contracting Officers who have the responsibility 
for obligating the Government.  Unless we authorize personal services for this work, 
we should not use Government standards to qualify contractor employees.  Offerors 
may propose employees who have been DAWIA certified as a prior Government 
employee and the Government agency may rate previous DAWIA certification higher 
than the competition without it, but DAWIA standards as currently written in statute 
do not apply to employees of private industry.  Instead of attempting to impose 
DAWIA requirements, say some, make the requirement performance-based and 
apply best value concepts.   
Other individuals responding “No,” point to the fact that most contractor 
personnel already have DAWIA credentials or are learning on the job.  Some 
suggested that they would hate for some program which is designed to get better 
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they didn’t “measure up.”  Applying a Go/No-Go standard to who can work on the 
actions makes the Government’s mission more difficult to accomplish.  A simpler 
solution is the power of the marketplace.  When a contractor fails to perform in 
accordance with expectations, the Government warns the contractor.  If performance 
does not improve, options are not awarded, contracts are terminated, and past 
performance documentation impedes the contractor from winning new awards. One 
respondent stated that since contractors are not permanent employees, it would be 
a waste of resources to attempt to mold them into Contracting Officers with a 
detailed knowledge of the procurement process. 
A few respondents said contractors should not be performing any 
Government procurement functions, which makes DAWIA certifications a moot point. 
8. Policy Statement 
A policy serves to guide and direct those who are to take specific actions.  It 
is usually written in broad terms in order to point out the general parameters within 
which operating procedures should be developed.  Although policies and procedures 
exist regarding contracting for services, none specifically address the acquisition of 
contracting or procurement services. Given the volatility of this subject, the need to 
issue a policy as well as the essential elements such a policy should contain, were 
explored. 
a. Issuing a Policy 
The use of contractors to perform procurement services is relatively new.  
Although buying organizations appear to be appropriately using contractual methods 
to obtain these services, the fact that there is such a difference of opinion regarding 
the correctness of acquiring procurement services begs the question as to whether 
the general guidelines that a policy would define should be established.  In order to 
address this issue, Question 14 asked: 
“Should DOD or the Services issue a policy statement regarding the use 
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The results are displayed in Table 5-9. 
Table 5-9. Should DOD or the Services Issue a Policy Statement? 
Organization Yes No NA Totals 
Army 3 2 0 5 
Navy/Marine Corps 14 4 0 18 
Air Force 1 4 0 5 
Defense Agencies 7 5 1 13 
Non-Federal Agencies 2 1 1 4 
Total Surveys 27 16 2 45 
Percentage 60% 36% 4%  
 
A majority of the survey respondents and interviewees indicated that a policy 
statement issued at senior DOD levels would be useful, perhaps even essential.  
Supporting their position, some asserted that agencies are getting too close to 
crossing the line regarding IGF and are risking compromising the integrity of the 
procurement process.  They state that we need to define the threshold limits.  One 
interviewee suggested that senior DOD leadership should question the need for a 
policy and, in so doing, solidify its position on the primary reasons supporting the 
necessity for a policy.  Other interviewees asked “where is the playing field?”  What 
are the “swim lanes?” What is acceptable and what is frowned upon?  Contracting 
Officers don’t always think these issues through clearly and need appropriate 
guidance.  DOD should bring the contracting leaders together to analyze and 
determine what the policy should state.  It really depends on DoD’s overall goals and 
vision across the contracting workforce. One respondent believed a policy statement 
would disseminate information about procuring contracting services since not 
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accomplish the job.  Another affirmative respondent placed a caveat that the 
problem with blanket policy is that it often creates unintended consequences.  One 
stated that the policy should prohibit the practice of contracting for procurement 
services. 
Some of the negative replies maintain that sufficient policy exists in the FAR 
and from the Services; thus, additional guidance is unnecessary.  Some stated that 
a policy is not needed, but that further guidance regarding conflicts of interest could 
be useful. Indeed, methods to reduce the road blocks to obtaining additional 
Government billets would be extremely helpful.  A qualified “Yes” suggested that this 
is appropriate only if the agencies are fully supported with Government resources 
and give the activities time to hire and train to replace contractors.  It appears this 
individual believed the policy would require such functions to be brought back in-
house for Federal employee performance.  Some respondents answered “No” but 
explained that it really depends upon what the policy would contain. 
b. Elements of a Policy 
Expecting that some respondents would reply to Question 14 positively, a 
follow-on question to determine the essential elements that should be included in 
such a policy was posed.  Question 15 asked: 
“If DOD or the Services were to issue a policy statement regarding 
contracting for procurement functions, what key elements should be 
included?” 
Almost all of the respondents who answered this question immediately stated 
the need for a clear definition of what is and what is not an inherently governmental 
function, although a few cautioned that a policy should not attempt to identify specific 
functions appropriate for contractor performance.  Because there is so much 
diversity of opinion concerning many contracting functions, the need to identify 
Government-only functions was emphatic.  The definition is needed in order to 
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threshold limits regarding work to be contracted out.   Further, respondents felt it 
important to know what functions should not be contracted out even though they are 
not defined as inherently governmental.  
Besides the IGF definition, respondents generally wanted to know the broad 
boundaries within which contracting out could occur.  They point to the need for 
acceptable performance standards that will help mitigate the problem of actual or 
apparent personal services relationships.  They also want to know to whom the 
policy will apply.  Such a policy needs to take a management approach.  It should 
incorporate limitations on the degree to which contractors should be used and allow 
organizations to opt in or out of the process.  If they opt in, they should develop both 
short- and long-range plans which address the use of contractors and how they will 
develop future Contracting Officers.  Tailored plans are more useful than a blanket 
policy because each organization has different issues, different requirements and 
different recruitment challenges. 
Respondents felt the policy should: (1) identify the extent to which DOD 
endorses the continued use of contractor support, particularly in high-risk areas, but 
should not prohibit the use of contractors; (2) use language that provides flexibility 
and will allow each activity to implement the policy in their own way; (3) express 
“preference” for certain organizational actions as opposed to “dictating” actions to be 
performed; (4) provide clarification as to the generally acceptable instances for the 
use of contracted service and specifically identify the extent to which contractors can 
perform procurement functions; (5) identify an “order of precedence” from which 
functions are selected as workload increases or personnel levels decrease; (6) 
define the situations under which performance must be temporary or may be on a 
permanent basis (although many stated it should be temporary only); and (7) show 
how the inability to obtain contracting personnel affects the policy. 
Respondents felt several key elements related to the security, safeguards and 
sanctions were essential to protect against improper behavior.  These included the 
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prohibits contractors from bidding on any other agency work, (2) an identification of 
the organizational conflicts of interest that may become problematic and potential 
conflict of interest mitigation strategies, (3) a caution to protect procurement-
sensitive information, (4) a list of those situations in which legal statutes or 
precedent applies, (5) a reminder of post-employment restrictions on former 
Government employees now working for contractors, and (6) an enumeration of 
disciplinary action or sanctions to be taken for failure to follow the policy. 
Some key elements suggested by respondents focused on the use of 
authority and approval levels that should be put in place.  These included: (1) 
identify the approval authority for using contractor workforce together with possible 
exceptions and extensions; (2) clearly state that contractors shall have no decision, 
determination or signing authority and cannot commit the Government or appear to 
be a Government employee;(3) emphasize and make clear that no Government 
personnel are to be working for or to be supervised by contractors; (4) specify levels 
of authority for contractor personnel; and (5) make no reference to quotas or 
numerical limitations. 
Still other key elements focused on characteristics of the acquisition process 
that should be addressed.  These included: (1) identify the risks and dangers of 
using contractors to perform procurement functions and how to minimize and 
manage these risks, (2) require a business case to determine if it is economically 
justifiable before using contractor support, (3) identify best practices in using 
contractors, (4) ensure all solicitations issued include a clause letting perspective 
offerors know that a contractor may be reviewing their proposal, (5) suggest 
measures or metrics to be used in evaluating and assessing contractor performance 
of procurement functions, (6) plan for phase out (exit plan) of the reliance on 
contract support as soon as possible, (7) use it for low-risk and low-visibility 
functions, (8) identify the types of contracts that should be used and those that 
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Lastly, some key elements were suggested that should be specifically 
imposed on contractors.  These included: (1) ensure corporations and their 
employees sign non-disclosure agreements; (2) restrict contractors to providing 
support or advisory services only; (3) require a specified level of training and 
experience that must be possessed by contractor employees (perhaps in terms of 
DAWIA requirements); and (4) identify the extent to which contractor personnel 
should and should not be involved in Government employee activities, such as 
social get-togethers, after-hours work functions, and similar events. 
A few respondents maintained their position that the contracting out of 
procurement functions should be strictly prohibited in all cases and answered this 
question by stating the policy should forbid such contracting. 
9. Authority 
As noted earlier in this report, a major policy of the Federal Government is 
that it will rely on the private sector for goods and services.  FAR 37 prescribes the 
policy and procedures that are unique to the acquisition and management of 
services obtained by contract.  Commercial services are governed by the provisions 
of OMB Circular A-76.  Agencies generally cite A-76 as the authority for contracting 
out services previously performed in-house.  The DAU report cited earlier in this 
report concluded that the acquisition of procurement services did not fall under A-76, 
but rather the provisions of advisory and assistance services (A&AS) found in FAR 
37.2.  In order to determine the authority buying organizations believe is appropriate, 
Question 5 asked: 
“If your organization contracts out procurement functions, what 
authority does it cite?  _____OMB A-76    _____Advisory & Assistance 
Services (FAR 37)   _____Other”   
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Table 5-10. Authority for Procuring Contracting Functions 
Organization A-76 A&AS Other NA Totals 
Army 0 2 1 2 5 
Navy/Marine Corps 1 3 2 12 18 
Air Force 0 1 0 4 5 
Defense Agencies 0 8 2 3 13 
Non-Federal 
Agencies 
0 0 0 4 4 
Total Surveys 1 14 5 25 45 
Percentage 2% 31% 11% 56%  
 
Several individuals pointed to A&AS as the proper authority for obtaining 
contracting services.  Over half of the respondents marked “Not Applicable” or did 
not provide an answer.  Of those that responded “Other,” one questioned whether an 
authority citation was required.  Most responses involved an explanation of what the 
agency was currently doing, such as using transition employees in support of an 
enterprise renewal, or that Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (ID/IQ) contracts 
were utilized for the skill sets needed.  It appears that most believed the general 
authority for meeting requirements by contract is sufficient authority for obtaining 
procurement services. 
10. Acquiring Procurement Functions 
A series of questions was asked to determine the extent and types of 
contracting functions being contracted out, the reasons why they may or may not be 
so obtained and the permanency with which contractors should be involved in 
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a. Procurement Functions Contracted Out 
To determine the extent to which organizations might be contracting out 
various procurement functions, Question 2 asked: 
“Are procurement functions being contracted out in your organization?  
____Yes ____No    If yes, which functions?”      
The results are displayed in Table 5-11. 
Table 5-11. Are Procurement Functions Being Contracted Out in Your 
Organization? 
Organization Yes No NA Totals 
Army 4 1 0 5 
Navy/Marine Corps 5 13 0 18 
Air Force 1 4 0 5 
Defense Agencies 11 2 0 13 
Non-Federal Agencies 0 4 0 4 
Total Surveys 21 24 0 45 
Percentage 47% 53%   
 
This question was asked of policy and senior procurement personnel and, 
since many are located in headquarters or policy offices which have few, if any, 
procurement responsibilities, it was anticipated that some would respond in the 
negative.  This was the case.  From those who responded in the affirmative, the 
predominant function was contract closeout with performance on either a periodic or 
continuing basis.  Also cited were market research, requirements development, 
statements of work, acquisition planning, drafting policy, developing evaluation 
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of contract specialist-type functions in preparation for a Contracting Officer’s review 
and approval.  
Some respondents stated that every function performed by existing 1102s is 
also performed by a contractor on-site, except for inherently governmental functions, 
such as decision-making or signing as a Contracting Officer with a warrant.  These 
tasks include research and analysis leading to the preparation of positions and 
documents for the Contracting Officer’s consideration up to the point of award or a 
decision.  Some stated that all of the contract specialist’s functions are performed,  
but then made some exceptions.  These exceptions included negotiating prices and 
structuring incentive plans. 
b. Reasons for Contracting Out Procurement Functions 
To understand the basic reasons why contracting functions are procured, 
Question 3 asked: 
“If you are contracting out contracting functions, what are the primary 
reasons for doing so?” 
The most frequently cited reasons for procuring contracting services were the 
lack of sufficient organic resources to meet workload demands and the lack of 
expertise.  Over the past several years, continual downsizing and the failure to hire 
new personnel have put a heavy strain on contracting professionals.  Funds seem to 
be more readily available for contracts than for Government employees.  Further, 
contracted support allows flexibility to expand or shrink the numbers of personnel 
based on workload volumes.  Also, due to the demands for qualified contracting 
specialists in certain metropolitan areas, (e.g., the National Capital Region), there is 
much less turn over on the contract personnel side when compared to the churn with 
Government personnel. Another reason is the unstable work environment currently 
driven by Base Realignment and Closure movements. After citing workload 
increases and the inability to get additional Government billets as the reasons for 
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desire to contract out for contract specialists.  “My preference is to fill this need with 
Government 1102 civilians.” 
In some cases, the very low priority assigned to contract closeout, which is 
viewed as an administrative burden, almost assures that it would not receive 
attention unless performed by contractors.  Contract closeout is viewed as a 
repetitive specialty in which there is little risk to the Government.  This frees up 
Contracting Officer teams to concentrate on pre- and post-award functions, where 
their business acumen and technical skills can add value.  
Another reason for contracting out is to obtain technical and business practice 
insight into commercial capabilities that could be applied to Government 
requirements.  One respondent stated the following:  
Typically this expertise does not reside within the organization and there are 
commercial firms who specialize in researching specific industries and 
providing/selling that information to commercial and governmental 
organizations.  The investment in the use of these firms is justified by the 
return via the effective implementation of commercial best practices and 
technology, better contract and pricing relationships and better selection 
processes that focus on past experience and technical, performance and 
cost/price risk. 
c. Reasons for Not Contracting Out Procurement Functions 
If organizations are not procuring contracting services, it would be important 
to understand the fundamental reasons. Question 4 asked: 
“If you are not contracting out contracting functions, what are the 
reasons?” 
Respondents provided a variety of replies, however, the main themes were 
that sufficient organic resources existed and/or all contracting functions are 
considered inherently governmental and are, therefore, prohibited from being 
contracted out.  FAR Part 7 and OMB regulations were cited as making these 
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as inherently governmental, there is a preference or philosophy against contracting 
them out.  Some felt their unique mission did not provide any advantages if the 
functions were outsourced.  Some cited lack of funding as a reason.  Some offices 
replied that they are small and are responsible for determining agency policy and the 
application of regulations, both areas which are considered inherently governmental.  
One respondent believed that anyone other than civil servants performing these 
functions could be biased.  This belief was coupled with the concern that 
Government employees held responsible for approving and signing an award would 
be denied essential experience (e.g., negotiations) because these roles were 
contracted out.  Taking an opposite position, one respondent stated, “Although I 
personally believe that many more functions could safely be contracted out, there is 
great resistance within both the leadership and the workforce in this HCA [Head of 
Contracting Activity] to using contractors in any of the contracting processes.” 
d. Using Contractors Temporarily or Permanently 
Many organizations have reported that they use contractors only on a 
temporary basis to perform contracting functions.  Some personnel have 
complained, however, that even though the policy is to acquire such services on a 
temporary basis, these contracts have gone on for several years and appear to be 
permanent.  To determine how respondents felt about limiting the length of time 
such contracts are used, Question 16 asked: 
“Should the contracting of procurement services be permitted only on a 
temporary basis or allowed to be a permanent part of an organization’s 
acquisition resources?  ______Temporary   _____Permanent” 
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Table 5-12. Use Contractors on Temporary or Permanent Basis? 
Organization Temporary Permanent NA Totals 
Army 3 1 1 5 
Navy/Marine Corps 15 3 0 18 
Air Force 2 3 0 5 
Defense Agencies 6 7 0 13 
Non-Federal Agencies 2 1 1 4 
Total Surveys 28 15 2 45 
Percentage 63% 33% 4%  
 
Over sixty percent of the respondents believe that obtaining contracting 
services should be on a temporary basis only.  Some wanted it limited to surge 
demands, while others felt a periodic reevaluation of need and internal capability 
should be the deciding point to continue under contract.  One respondent suggested 
that it depends on the agency’s policy.  If the long-term plan is to convert back to the 
Government any functions contracted out after sufficient staff has been recruited and 
hired, then the timeframes could be in years.  If the contracts are for certain 
functions, e.g., market research or requirements development, in which the 
contractor is typically engaged in a specific acquisition under a task order, then 
these are of a more temporary nature.  One respondent felt that because different 
organizations have different requirements, it could be temporary for some and 
permanent for others.  A good gauge would be an organization’s ability to recruit 
skilled professionals. 
Some of those who responded “permanent” felt they were recognizing reality.  
Since we have a long-term problem of getting additional Government billets, 
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retain a steady cadre of trained Government 1102s, which will take years.  Contract 
closeout is an example of a recurring need where we may never be caught up and 
contracted services are, out of necessity, integrated into the normal workload. 
11. Impact on the Contracting System 
Another set of questions was asked in an attempt to assess the affect 
contracting out of procurement functions would have on Government procurement 
decision-making and the development of Contracting Officers as well as the impact 
on companies that are or might be market participants pursuing Federal contracts. 
a. Procurement Options 
OMB Circular A-76, in discussing inherently governmental activities, cautions 
that although a contractor does not have the authority to decide on a course of 
action, with agency oversight it might be tasked to develop options or implement a 
course of action.  In such cases, private sector involvement might be so extensive 
that the ability of agency management to develop and consider options is or would 
be inappropriately restricted.  To determine if there is a perceived affect on the 
Government’s procurement decision-making ability to contemplate procurement 
options, Question 18 asked: 
“Could contracting out of procurement services either (1) limit or (2) 
expand an organization’s decision-making ability to develop and 
consider procurement options?  _____Limit   _____Expand   
_____Neither   Please explain.” 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 88 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Table 5-13. Could Contracting Out Limit or Expand an Organization’s Decision- 
Making Ability Regarding Procurement Options? 
Organization Limit Expand Neither NA Totals 
Army 0 3 2 0 5 
Navy/Marine Corps 5 6 7 0 18 
Air Force 2 2 1 0 5 
Defense Agencies 0 9 4 0 13 
Non-Federal 
Agencies 
0 3 0 1 4 
Total Surveys 7 23 14 1 45 
Percentage 16% 51% 31% 2%  
 
Slightly over half of the respondents believe the Government’s decision-
making ability would be expanded as a result of engaging in the procurement of 
contracting services.  Responses focused on the benefits to be gained by having 
contractors involved.  Some said the Government could hire the exact expertise 
(trained and experienced) rather than having to develop it in-house over time.  
Others indicated that the contractual avenue provides more options to accomplish 
the work, particularly when it frees Government personnel from mundane and 
repetitive tasks and allows them to focus on value-added functions which are the 
more time-intensive and issue-complex tasks that support customer needs.  Perhaps 
the most compelling argument is that it opens the Government to industry business 
methods and practices, which gives added depth and breadth to the acquisition 
process.  Contractors may be able to accomplish and supply market research and 
planning alternatives that would be more difficult for Government personnel to 
provide.  Some believe the value obtained depends on the quality of the contractor 
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group, then you are more likely to have an enhanced ability to consider procurement 
options. 
One respondent pointed out that the Government has dedicated an entire part 
of the FAR to commercial item acquisition that encourages use of commercial 
practices.  Having members from the private sector employed in a contractual 
supporting or advisory capacity may expose the Government to industry practices 
that may benefit many areas of contracting.  Having people from differing 
backgrounds and diversity should improve the quality of discussions and 
considerations for acquisition options.  Contracting out provides another tool for 
accomplishing the mission which gives us a better chance for success.  Another 
stated that for market research and technical support, an expansion of our decision-
making ability is the expected outcome and the reason why we hire these types of 
firms.  Often within an organization, a method or process was developed and 
continues to be used without an update or the consideration of better alternatives.  
The Government needs to expand its efficiency capability when it comes to 
procurement practices. 
A few respondents felt that contracting out would limit the Government’s 
decision-making ability.  Their reasoning basically centered on the experience and 
development that would be denied the Government workforce.  We would be unable 
to cultivate fully competent journeymen or senior employees because they have not 
performed the range of procurement functions early in their careers.  One cautioned 
that we are rapidly losing the expertise and historical knowledge base of our 
programs.  Government personnel are potentially loosing the ability to evaluate the 
adequacy of contractor work.  Others felt a contractor might not have the 
Government’s best interests in mind and would pursue only avenues that benefited 
them.  “I would question input from a contractor performing procurement functions.  
Is the input based on what is the best approach or what is best for the company?”  
Some felt the support contractor might have made recommendations about 
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limits the options. A few respondents pointed to the limiting factors of conflicts of 
interest and personal services that would inhibit the sharing of ideas. 
Some believed that contracting out procurement services would neither 
expand nor limit the Government’s decision-making ability.  They believe that 
experience is what gives an organization options and it should not matter if 
experienced personnel are Government employees or contractors, as long as the 
Government is making the decisions.  One felt it was a staffing issue.  The 
Government can add either contractor support or civil servants to handle contracting 
functions, but civil servants give more flexibility.  Others saw it as dependent upon 
the situation and felt it would be leadership driven. 
b. Developing Contracting Officers 
Some studies and reports have cited concern regarding the professional 
development of Government personnel to competently perform contracting 
functions, specifically at the Contracting Officer level.  To assess the impact on the 
Government’s ability to fully develop Contracting Officers, Question 19 asked: 
“Would contracting out of procurement services have either (1) a 
negative affect on or (2) a positive affect on an organization’s ability to 
develop Contracting Officers?  _____Positive   _____Negative   _____No 
affect    Please explain.” 
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Table 5-14. Would Contracting Out Have a Positive or Negative Affect on 
Developing Contracting Officers? 
Organization Negative Positive No Affect NA Totals 
Army 4 1 0 0 5 
Navy/Marine Corps 12 2 4 0 18 
Air Force 4 1 0 0 5 
Defense Agencies 8 2 3 0 13 
Non-Federal 
Agencies 
1 0 2 1 4 
Total Surveys 29 6 9 1 45 
Percentage 65% 13% 20% 2%  
 
Approximately two-thirds of the policy survey respondents and almost all of 
the interviewees believed there would be a negative affect on the development of 
Contracting Officers.  Many respondents cited the loss of training opportunities for 
new employees and interns as the primary reason.  There would basically be no 
entry point and a very limited career progression.  Where would mentors come 
from? You must be able to “grow” Contracting Officers up through the ranks while 
providing them with hands-on experience.  If the lower level functions were 
contracted out, then personnel may be ill-prepared to do the more complex tasks 
later in their careers.  A career field in which the function could be contracted out at 
any time would not help in the recruitment and retention of top level talent.  If an 
agency “cuts off the pipeline,” how does it replace Contracting Officers and first-line 
supervisors when they retire?  One respondent stated that they had seen some very 
complex work “pushed” to contractors, such as developing business cases and 
pricing strategies.  This severely detracts from the learning and experience base 
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made to increase the number of contractors in the field, there will be less full-time 
Government employees hired, which ultimately reduces the pool of potential 
Contracting Officers.  There is no way for an agency to know as it selects individuals 
for acquisition positions if their professional development will be such that they will 
be qualified to hold a warrant.  As Contracting Officers move on or retire, there is a 
reduced group of candidates from which to choose their successors.  One 
respondent suggested that the potential negative impact could be mitigated through 
establishment of robust intern programs much like those that existed during the 
1980s and early 1990s. 
One interviewee commented that it takes away from the ability to groom and 
train contracts professionals.  They need judgment skills, cultural awareness and the 
ability to make trades.  These are lost if contractors do the work.  Another stated that 
we need a solid base of Government employees to be developed into future 
Contracting Officers.  Having a contractor compete for resources can result in their 
“cherry picking” of the best and pay them salaries more lucrative than they might get 
under Government auspices.  This can create a two-tier system within the office that 
will not help retain the best and brightest.  Another interviewee believed that in order 
to become a qualified Contracting Officer, one must do the mechanics.  If 
contractors perform the specialist’s functions, “it is like buying software and inserting 
it into the contracting process.  You see an end product, but you don’t know what 
assumptions were used to structure the product and you certainly don’t know the 
logic behind the actions taken.”   Competent Contracting Officers need to thoroughly 
understand the logic underlying the procurement decision-making process.  A survey 
respondent stated that specialists learn from each other, and with contractor 
specialists as part of the workforce we degrade control over the influence 
Government specialists receive in developing their skills. 
Other respondents explained that the role of the Contracting Officer has gone 
significantly beyond the traditional duties typically performed in the 1990s and 
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regulatory function driven by statute.  With an expanded role, the Contracting Officer 
is now a business advisor to program managers and acquisition organizations.  The 
business management skills needed for such a role exceed those which would be 
acquired while just doing contracting functions.  Knowledge of the marketplace and 
industry conditions integrated with contracting processes would not be obtained if 
contractors were to be performing the procurement functions involved.  The training 
ground within the Government is needed for these business skills. 
Others believe that by segmenting out some of the functions which lead up to 
a Procuring Contracting Officer’s (PCO’s) decision for contractor performance, the 
Government has lost some efficiencies.  For example, if cost and price analysis is 
performed by one contractor and handed off to another contractor who performs 
negotiations which, when completed, is submitted to a PCO for signature, the 
Government has lost the integrated aspects these functions would provide.  There is 
a view that Contracting Officers may just be “ratifying” actions taken by contractors 
who present one position for approval.  Certainly the PCO can review the work 
performed by the contractor, but by this time, “it is almost a ’done deal,’ and it is very 
hard to reverse course.” 
The issue of training and skill development goes beyond just Contracting 
Officers and contract specialists.  Over the years, there has always been serious 
concern regarding the knowledge and abilities of Contracting Officers’ Technical 
Representatives (COTRs), also known as Contracting Officers’ Representatives 
(CORs).  In most cases, COTRs have a week or less of training concerning their 
responsibilities, are usually fairly junior and new to their organization, and are 
assigned COTR functions as a secondary or tertiary duty.  Paul Denett, OFPP 
administrator, has promised to issue a memo requiring agencies to provide more 
COTR training and experience. 
Supporting the position that it would have a positive effect, a respondent said 
that Contracting Officers are the front line to receiving and understanding 
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Contracting Officers to this element by using contractors should have only a positive 
impact on developing their effectiveness in contracting.  Another stated that it allows 
contractor personnel to come in and develop junior Government employees.  The 
good contractor personnel are most likely retired Government Contracting Officers 
who can step in and properly train and mentor Government employees.  The 
Government’s ability to hire very skilled contracted personnel to assist Contracting 
Officers has greatly improved the abilities of the Government workforce.  One 
respondent remarked that it would have a positive affect by freeing up Contracting 
Officer’s from non-inherently governmental duties and allow them to devote more 
time to true acquisition functions that have a much higher value-added importance. 
One respondent felt that there would be little affect on training and 
development if contractors were used on a temporary basis such as during a surge.  
Another stated that use of the option to contract out should not mean the lack of 
consideration of other options such as local and/or Service intern programs.  The 
Government should use all options rather than relying on a chosen few. 
c. Market Participation 
Expecting that companies participating in the marketplace may have a 
negative view of situations in which private firms are involved in their procurements, 
Question 20 asked: 
“Might contracting out of procurement services have a real or perceived 
negative impact on market participants?  ____Yes ____No     If yes, what 
are these negative aspects?”      
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Table 5-15. Might Contracting Out Have a Real or Perceived Negative Affect on 
Market Participation? 
Organization Yes No NA Totals 
Army 4 1 0 5 
Navy/Marine Corps 15 2 1 18 
Air Force 2 2 1 5 
Defense Agencies 0 13 0 13 
Non-Federal Agencies 2 1 1 4 
Total Surveys 23 19 3 45 
Percentage 51% 42% 7%  
 
Slightly over half of the respondents felt there would be a negative impact on 
companies participating in the marketplace.  Two individuals did not understand the 
question. 
In maintaining an outlook regarding a negative impact, one respondent stated 
that he could see firms questioning the integrity of the process far more if non-
Government personnel handle proprietary information and participate in or influence 
acquisition strategies and source selections.  There would certainly be perceived 
biases by contract employees.  Some felt that it could scare industry and question 
their trust in the procurement system.  Vendors will loose confidence in the fairness 
and objective treatment of offerors.  There are more likely to be cases of conflicts of 
interest or preferential treatment by contractors for certain businesses or affiliates.  
Competition could be suppressed since industry will not invest marketing or 
administrative dollars for requirements they perceive as slanted or earmarked for a 
specific company.  They will not compete if they perceive it as “locked in” for the 
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profit focused company which may not always be in the best interest of the 
Government. 
Some respondents stated that an obvious danger is the releasing of 
procurement sensitive information that a contractor employee can be exposed to on 
a daily basis.  It would not be a stretch for someone without vested interest to 
conceive a plot to act as a broker of such information.  Vendors are leery about 
sending sensitive information to contract support contractors.  Private companies 
have concerns about exposing proprietary data and prices to non-Government 
entities.  Some will not do it, so it impedes competition and the Government’s ability 
to choose from the best offers.  One respondent felt that the perceived negative 
impact might lead to an increase in protests.  Another remarked that a corporate 
buy-out of a firm which performs a contracting function may create an instant conflict 
of interest. 
Several respondents believe there would not be a negative affect on market 
participation.  Some of these have had experience with procurement services 
contractors for many years and have not seen any perceived or real impact on 
market participants.  They feel offerors are willing to do business with us.  Some feel 
that if companies want to be players, they’ll play regardless. 
12. Integrity of the Contracting Process 
Contracting professionals should be continually vigilant regarding the health 
and vitality of the acquisition process.  This includes maintaining high quality 
standards for actions performed within the process and for maintaining the integrity 
of the procurement system.  In order to understand how respondents proposed to 
enforce these standards when procurement functions are outsourced, Question 21 
asked: 
“What steps should be taken to ensure the integrity of the contracting 
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All participants in the survey answered this question.  A few respondents said 
“Don’t do it” or “Prohibit the practice,” while others said that we should be performing 
contracting functions (pre- and post-award and Contracting Officer’s representative 
functions) only with Government resources.  Some respondents wanted to limit the 
functions placed on contract to just a few, such as contract closeout and market 
research, and then only on a temporary basis.  Several respondents cited again the 
need to ensure that IGFs are not placed on contract.  Also, respondents pointed to 
the need for clear rules concerning conflicts of interest, including strong OCI 
provisions in applicable contracts, and the actions needed to address such conflicts 
if they do arise.  The Government should ensure that firms proposing to supply 
contract procurement personnel have no direct corporate relationship, no matter how 
insignificant, with potential contractors.  Part of this would include having corporate 
officials and employees sign procurement integrity statements.   
Some stated that the Government should hold contract employees to the 
same high standards as Government employees, including minimum education and 
experience requirements.  They felt agencies should establish standards of mission 
effectiveness and efficiency within contracting statutes, regulations, policies and 
guidance and ensure training and continued professional education to that level and 
beyond. They also felt the Government should perform periodic reviews by both 
independent internal reviewers and outside knowledgeable reviewers.  One 
respondent felt that the integrity could not be ensured without tremendous oversight, 
which would negate the savings anticipated in the contracting out process.  Others 
said that a key element is Government oversight, with periodic reviews or audits to 
ensure contractors are not exceeding their authority.  One suggested increased 
public access to procurement records. 
Said one:  
The cornerstone of the procurement function performed by the Federal sector 
is that all participants competing for Government business be treated equally, 
that the procurements be conducted fairly and results are unbiased.  If 
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will fall apart quickly.  Favorable treatment of one competitor over another will 
ruin Government procurement. 
One individual felt that a legal opinion stating that all statutory requirements 
were reviewed and that the acquisition is compliant should be part of every contract 
file.  Some expressed the need to establish a clear policy for the use of contractors 
to augment the acquisition workforce and a proper framework for oversight and 
review.  Once specific functions to be performed by contractors are established, 
develop measures to evaluate contractor performance.  One said that we must 
stress the ultimate responsibility of Contracting Officers to critically evaluate 
products and support provided by contractors.  One interviewee was very concerned 
with the integrity of the contracting process. The problems of proprietary information, 
access to confidential data, leaks to contractors, the need for non-disclosure 
statements, the necessity to lock everything up at the end of the day, etc., all pose 
too many risks for our integrity.  It is better not to have contractors doing this in the 
first place.  A few respondents stated that the Government needs legal remedies 
and statutory authority to bring criminal and civil sanctions against contractor 
employees for violating the same trust issues to which we hold a Government 
employee accountable. 
Some viewed this as no different than any other procurement.  They felt that 
the integrity of the contracting process is always a top priority, not just in this special 
circumstance.  They saw no need to distinguish this from any other advisory and 
assistance services process, other than to ensure that the Statement of Work or 
Performance Work Statement did not include inherently governmental functions. 
From an organizational point-of-view, some respondents were very 
concerned about their image and reputation.  Some expressed that they had a very 
good ethical reputation and absolutely did not want to do anything to tarnish it.  They 
perceived their organization’s good name to be an integral part of the integrity of the 
contracting process. 
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You can’t necessarily teach integrity in the workforce, however, you can 
promote an environment of high integrity through constant awareness and 
zero tolerance.  Effective leadership is key, too.  In the end, ensuring integrity 
from contractors is not much different than ensuring integrity from 
Government employees, although the motivating factors for a lack of integrity 
might be slightly different. 
13. Workforce and Workplace Issues 
a. Workforce Competencies 
The Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) is piloting 
a Competency Model which is an attempt to look at the collective capability of the 
contracting workforce in DOD.  The process is an evaluation of one’s skills, together 
with the supervisor, that contribute to the organization’s buying capability.  From this 
assessment, “capability gaps” can be determined and focused upon by the 
organization, the Service and OSD.  Preliminarily, OSD has found capability gaps in 
two major areas: (1) cost and price analysis skills, and (2) market research skills, 
primarily in the procurement of services.  There is recognition by some that, in the 
short term, we may have to concede the need to rely on contractors to meet gap 
requirements.  
Currently, organizations do not have sufficient human resources to effectively 
accomplish their buying missions.  Not one contracting organization has stepped 
forward to claim they have enough personnel to do the job.  One of the problems is 
that resource deficiencies have generally been expressed in terms of numbers of 
employees rather than skill or competency deficiencies.  Once the Competency 
Model is launched DOD-wide, it is expected that a clearer picture of capability gaps 
will greatly assist personnel restructuring efforts. 
Interestingly, the necessity to define acceptable boundaries for contractor 
performance of procurement functions has caused us to focus more on the lack of 
skills and competencies than we have in the past.  Previously, there has been a 
greater focus on the numbers of workforce personnel reductions compared to the 
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b. Compensation Differentials 
Several surveys and interviews surfaced an issue concerning the significant 
differences that could exist in compensation between Government employees and 
contractor employees performing the same or very similar functions.  This situation 
can become even more acute when these individuals are working side-by-side in a 
“blended” environment.  Due to statutory pay limitations, the Government cannot 
usually match contractor compensation levels.  Even if the company is not paying 
higher amounts, if the contractor employee is a retired civil servant or military, the 
two incomes push the remuneration to much higher levels in the performance of the 
same functions.  This disparity can lead to dissatisfaction on the part of Government 
employees and potentially give them some motivation to consider looking elsewhere 
for employment.  Those Government employees usually comparing their situation to 
contractor employees regarding compensation are generally not at the more senior 
levels but, rather, are junior contract specialists.  These personnel are of the 
generation that tends to be highly mobile and more easily moves from one 
organization to another for pay and professional reasons.  They are more likely to 
change organizations if dissatisfied with their level of pay compared to others 
performing the same functions.  This also becomes a morale problem.  
Another personnel issue that surfaced involves the flexibility afforded some 
Government organizations because they have the authority to utilize pay banding.  
Those Government organizations that do not have this authority perceive that they 
are limited in their ability to attract or retain qualified 1102s when they must compete 
with organizations that do have this authority.  This was specifically identified as a 
problem for those seeking qualified 1102 applicants in the National Capital Region 
(NCR) and was pinpointed as one of the reasons for the drain of 1102 talent. 
c. Government Employee Unions 
A few interviewees surfaced the issue of employee unions as a potential 
problem.  They did not report that union activities had directly impacted any efforts 
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suggested that this may become a concern if Government organizations began to 
aggressively pursue efforts to contract out procurement functions, particularly if 
employee reductions are occurring at the same time. 
d. Personnel Policies 
Several survey respondents and interviewees pointed to the personnel 
policies of the past ten to fifteen years as one of the root causes of our workforce 
dilemmas today.  Almost every participant who acknowledged that their organization 
is using contracted support services explained that the critical shortage of 1102 
personnel is the principal reason they are relying on contractors.  Some admitted 
that recent endeavors to rectify the lack of younger entry level personnel have 
started to correct the problem, but they are still left with a significant gap between 
the five- and fifteen-year point where very few professionals fill the ranks.  This, 
coupled with the fact that over fifty percent of the contracting workforce is eligible for 
retirement in the next few years, generates considerable anxiety on the part of 
senior contracting leadership. 
e. Nature of Contractor Personnel 
One respondent expressed concern regarding the inability of the Government 
to fully integrate contractors as part of the acquisition team.  It was explained that we 
cannot recognize contractor employees with awards, provide incentives or “bring 
them into the fold.”  On Government holidays, Federal employees are off, but in 
many cases contractor employees must work.  Sometimes they have problems 
getting on base, they wear different color badges, and feel they are second-class 
citizens and not really part of the team. 
f. Government Employment Culture 
A particular phenomenon has emerged that demonstrates the nature of 
Government work and the desire of individuals to be part of Government acquisition 
dynamics.  There have been instances in which individuals have worked in 
Government acquisition, perhaps held a Contracting Officer’s warrant, made 
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success.  Some have left Government employment to work as contract specialists 
for contractors only to miss the professional achievement they felt when in 
Government.  The self-identity they enjoyed in the Government is missing and 
cannot be overcome by higher pay or benefits.  Some have even returned to the 
Government in order to recapture that sense of personal excitement and passion in 
accomplishing acquisition. 
14. General Remarks 
Question 22 solicited comments not covered by any of the other questions 
on the survey.  It was hoped that respondents would speak freely regarding their 
opinions.  Most of the statements projected an attitude of vigilance.   
One respondent believed that with the continual push to reduce the number of 
full-time Government employees and replace them with contractors, the Government 
must proceed in this area with caution.  As the Government’s business face to 
industry, it is imperative that we continue to recruit highly qualified, energetic men 
and women into the career field.  Failure to replenish the workforce with sufficient 
numbers of highly qualified and dedicated permanent employees will have a long-
term, detrimental affect on DOD’s ability to procure adequate products and services 
to support the warfighter. Supporting this, another suggested removing impediments 
to hiring retired annuitants with incentives to encourage them to return if only on a 
part-time basis.  “They are a fertile source of expertise that could be used to bridge 
the gap between workload and experienced, available personnel.  Using them would 
re-enforce the perception that the people doing the work are fair and unbiased while 
possessing the necessary training and experience.” 
Another said that contracting out contracting is a necessary evil in many 
cases.  It allows us to get today’s job done but at the expense of growing seasoned 
Contracting Officers for the future. 
Yet another stated that, “we hire a lot of retired Government employees back 
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natural transfer of responsibility is disrupted, and the folks that should be moving to 
a senior mastery level, if only informally, do not do so.”  Giving a slightly different 
perspective, an interviewee noted that some contract specialists, and even 
Contracting Officers, leave the Government with “baggage” that seems to follow 
them right back into the Federal workplace when they are hired by contractors to 
perform contracting functions.  Also, since contractor employees tend to be retired 
Government personnel, they are older and are participating in a blended workforce 
that really needs to be cultivating a younger generation of professionals. 
A senior contracting official stated that if DoD really wants to, or needs to, 
contract out our buying, it should do it by awarding large, performance-based 
contracts that require the delivery of similar (or appropriately grouped) commodities 
on an as-required basis.  “The prime contractor is then responsible for issuing 
subcontracts to buy what we require and we won’t end up having a quasi-personal 
services contract having contractor employees trying to buy to our rules.” 
Another senior official stated that he/she has a difficult time justifying 
contractors in contracting, primarily in the contract formation phase.  “We make 
fundamental procurement decisions about what to buy, from whom, where to buy it 
and what is a fair price.  Perhaps one could live with contractors in some areas of 
contracting due to surge requirements and there are some post-award functions that 
might be acceptable for contractor performance.”  The real breakdown is in the 
requirements determination process, which has caused significant frustrations in the 
customer base. 
Yet another senior official said: 
Suggest your introduction discuss the root causes of why Agencies/Services 
have to use contracting out services for procurement functions.  Our Agency 
would be at “mission failure” if we did not have our contracted out support.  
Policy makers should identify long-term consequences of their decisions and 
not just the short-term impact to make them look like they’ve achieved 
something worthwhile.  Notwithstanding the work that won’t get done; the 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 104 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
because 1102s are CONSTANTLY under the gun to get the contract/mod 
awarded. [Individual does not want to be cited with attribution] 
To quote a senior contracting official:  
If I had to sum up my thoughts on this topic, I believe the crux of the issue is 
growth of Contracting Officers.  Integrity is also a critical area of concern, but 
that really exists in any job that is contracted out; and really, applies to 
Government personnel as well.  The conviction of Darleen Druyun is a good 
example of this.  Contracting Officer responsibilities are clearly inherently 
Governmental; this is not a gray area.  And Contracting Officers are not 
grown overnight; nor are they grown in just a few years.  It takes several 
years of training, experience, education and mentorship to entrust someone 
with this huge responsibility.  The more you contract out, the less options or 
opportunity you have to develop Contracting Officers.  However, we need 
specialists, too.  They are the real work horses.  If you don’t have them, then 
sometimes you have to acquire them through other means, such as 
contracting out.  The greatest challenge is striking a balance between the two.  
One respondent asked how the Government would maintain proper 
separation of function (SOF) responsibilities if all of the procurement functions listed 
in Table 5-3 were contracted out. 
A non-Federal respondent replied that the procurement laws and regulations 
in all fifty States vary in regards to outsourcing of procurement functions, however, 
most, if not all, State procurement directors oppose any attempt to outsource 
procurement functions.  In two States, experience has demonstrated it is very costly 
to use contractors over State employees.   
C.  Chapter Summary 
This chapter has presented survey and interview responses from those 
contracting personnel at the policy and senior management levels.  Questions were 
asked regarding several issues surrounding the procurement of contracting services.  
Briefly, the following areas were presented and discussed: (1) respondents’ 
understanding of the scope and nature of the contracting process and related 
functions; (2) what has caused an organization to evaluate functions and, from a list 
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non-inherently governmental; (3) the magnitude of personal services relationships 
that may have been created; (4) the difficulties with organizational and personal 
conflicts of interest; (5) what are judged to be legal issues in these procurements; (6) 
ethical dilemmas; (7) workforce experience and qualifications primarily from 
application of DAWIA;(8) the necessity for a policy statement and, if so, the elements 
that should be included in such a statement; (9) the authority used for procuring 
contracting services; (10) reasons for either acquiring procurement functions or 
deciding not to contract for such services; (11) the likely impact on the ability to 
develop Contracting Officers, to consider various procurement options, and 
participation by companies in the competitive marketplace; (12) the effect on the 
integrity of the contracting process; and (13) critical workforce and workplace issues 
raised by contracting for procurement functions.  An analysis of all these areas, 
together with responses from management and operating level personnel, is 
presented in Chapter VII. 
The next chapter will present the results of surveys and interviews involving 
management and operating level personnel.  Whereas this chapter included 
responses from people only in the contracting community, the next chapter includes 
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VI.Survey and interview Results from Management 
and Operating Level Personnel 
A. Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of surveys of management and operating-
level personnel from two separate groups.  The first group consists of contracting 
personnel from all Services and various Defense Agencies.  The second group 
consists of personnel from Air Force program management organizations at Tinker 
Air Force Base, Oklahoma.  The latter group was selected to participate primarily to 
determine if there were any marked differences in responses between contracting 
personnel and that of program management offices.  Responses throughout this 
chapter from the two groups will be identified separately in order to preserve the 
variation between the two and to permit comparison. 
A total of thirty-two program office personnel participated in the management 
and operating level survey from Tinker AFB.  Several logistics and support group 
wings were represented in the sample, including the 327th Aircraft Sustainment Wing 
(Contractor Logistics Support) and subordinate sustainment elements which 
included the 727th Aircraft Sustainment Wing (Contractor Logistics Support) and the 
747th Aircraft Sustainment Wing (Combat Systems).  Additional personnel 
participated from other Wings based at Tinker, such as the 540th ACSS (B-52 
System Program Office).   
B. Management and Operating Level Personnel Surveys and 
Interviews 
1. Acquiring Procurement Functions 
Similar to the survey used with policy and senior management personnel, 
questions were asked to determine the extent and types of contracting functions 
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a. Procurement Functions Contracted Out 
To determine the extent to which organizations might be contracting out 
various procurement functions, Question 1 asked:  
“Are procurement functions being contracted out in your organization?  
____Yes ____No     If yes, which functions?”      
The results are displayed in Tables 6-1a and 6-1b. 
Table 6-1a. Are Procurement Functions Being Contracted Out in Your 
Organization? (Categorized by Department) 
Organization Yes No NA Totals 
Army 8 3  11 
Navy/Marine Corps 6 11  17 
Air Force 2 0  2 
Defense Agencies 22 3  25 
Contracting Response 
Totals 
38 17  55 
Percentage 69% 31%   
Air Force Prgm Mgmt/Tech 
Totals 
18 14  32 
Percentage 56% 44%   
 
Table 6-1b. Are Procurement Functions Being Contracted Out in Your 
Organization? (Total all Surveys) 
Responses Yes No NA Totals 
Number 56 31  87 
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Almost seventy percent of the contracting respondents were from 
organizations involved in procuring contracting services.  These functions ranged 
across pre- and post-award contracting phases, including preparing statements of 
work, issuing solicitations, evaluating bids and proposals, negotiations, contract 
award and contract administration through contract closeout.  Specifically mentioned 
were contract requirements packages, market research, acquisition strategy and 
acquisition planning, award-fee management, preparation of business clearances, 
participation in fact-finding, discussion of profit/fee with contractors, evaluation of 
offers, contract policy, source selection facility, executive management, procurement 
analyst functions, and cost and price analysis.  Several respondents merely stated 
all contract specialist functions in support of the Contracting Officer as a 
comprehensive way to capture the totality of functions performed by contractors.  A 
number of buying organizations reported that they contracted out only the contract 
closeout process and had gone no further in obtaining contracting services.  Some 
who responded “No” indicated that they were considering the possibility of obtaining 
contract closeout services under contract.  Many respondents were careful to state 
that Contracting Officer functions involving decisions, approvals and requiring a 
signature were not performed by contractor support personnel. 
Although technically not part of the contracting functions per se, secretarial 
and administrative tasks such as establishing and maintaining files, document 
distribution and receiving functions were also identified. 
Slightly over fifty-five percent of Air Force program office personnel indicated 
they were contracting out procurement functions.  Several procurement functions 
were described  including (in no order of precedence): 
 Developing and/or defining requirements,  
 Developing acquisition plans,  
 Conducting market research, 
 Identifying potential sources of supply/contracting, 
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 Preparing Contract packages (including preparing Statement of Work 
(SOW) and Performance Work Statements (PWS), 
 Preparing Purchase Requests (PR) for submission to the contracting 
office, 
 Qualifying potential sources of supply and/or support, 
 Conducting technical evaluations, 
 Conducting contract negotiations, 
 Developing and writing contract modifications,  
 Budget planning, formulation, and tracking, 
 Performing contract management functions,  
 Performing contract reconciliations and closeout,  
 Providing technical management, and, 
 Providing overarching program management and oversight.   
Of those answering “Yes,” one respondent stated:  
Contractors participate in every phase of the acquisition process, from 
requirements generation, market research, concept development, system 
design development, installation and fielding.  They [contractors] work as 
integral parts of our Integrated Product Team.  Documentation created by 
imbedded contractors runs the gamut from annexes, J&A’s [Justification and 
Approval] to SOW’s and CDRL’s [Contract Data Requirements List] and 
[more].   
While respondents answering “No” were not specifically requested to qualify 
their responses, several did.  One respondent indicated that their office had utilized 
contracted personnel in the past, but that they were, “not well received.”  Some other 
“No” respondents qualified the response with statements indicating they were not 
aware that procurement functions were being contracted out.   
One particularly interesting response indicated that the program office offered 
to fund a contract to provide “buyers” without warrants for support to the contracting 
office due to manpower shortages, but the supporting contracting office declined the 
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b. Reasons for Contracting Out Procurement Functions 
To understand the basic reasons why contracting functions are procured, 
Question 2 asked:  
“If you are contracting out contracting functions, what are the primary 
reasons for doing so?” 
The predominant and predictable reason from contracting personnel for 
obtaining contracting services is the lack of Government personnel to perform all of 
the contracting functions required of the buying organization.  Seasoned 
Government personnel are either retiring or going into the private sector where 
compensation is greater than the Government can afford.  The inability to retain 
personnel in the acquisition workforce means that those remaining are severely 
overworked.   Some suggested that the shortage of resources is the result of a 
conscious strategy to reduce the numbers of Government personnel and, thereby, 
save money.  This shortage is especially prevalent at the intern and junior specialist 
levels.  If you cannot attract and retain young talent, it is difficult to develop a well-
trained and experienced Government acquisition workforce.   
Many stated that hiring contractors is easier and faster than trying to obtain 
qualified Federal employees through the civil service process.  The restrictions and 
lengthy processes placed on the Government make hiring personnel a long, drawn-
out process.  Further, salaries are not flexible enough to allow for the experience 
and quality of an individual.  Companies give adaptability in adjusting the size of the 
workforce on a real-time basis, particularly in surge situations or other rapidly 
changing requirements.  Some expressed that Government employees are far more 
expensive than contractors. 
Numerous respondents were pleased to report that contractors provide a 
significant value added to buying organizations.  They have considerable expertise 
and knowledge in the areas of their support.  They are dedicated and motivated to 
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The Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process was blamed by some as 
causing an organization to lose some of its contract specialists and making it fairly 
difficult to fill vacancies knowing they were moving.  Contractors in these cases are 
desperately needed to augment the civilian workforce.   
Several respondents cited contract closeout as a function frequently 
contracted out.  In most of these offices, the closeout backlog was growing, money 
was being lost, more and more pressure from the Service leadership was focused 
on this area, and the resources to perform this function were dwindling and were 
needed in more urgent areas requiring business acumen and technical skills.  All of 
these aspects, plus the fact that a contractor could concentrate on closeout actions 
which were performed “on the fly” by contract specialists, contributed to the 
outsourcing of this function.   
Air Force respondents indicated manpower shortages and/or lack of organic 
skill sets as the primary reasons for contracting out. Specifically, responses included 
(in order of precedence); 
 Manpower shortages, 
 Lack of skill sets and filling capability gaps, 
 Speeding acquisition processes,  
 Saving money, and 
 Providing program continuity. 
Manpower and capability issues dominated the responses.  Respondents 
indicated that FTE restrictions, civilian hiring freezes, and (when there wasn’t a 
civilian hiring freeze) the low pay scales offered for civilian positions created and 
sustained the manpower, skills and capabilities shortfalls within their organizations.  
Contracting out was a way to capture the personnel and capabilities required to 
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c. Reasons for Not Contracting Out Procurement Functions 
If an organization is not procuring contracting services, it is important to 
understand the fundamental reasons why this is the case.  Question 3 asked:  
“If you are not contracting out contracting functions, what are the 
reasons?” 
Approximately one-fourth of the contracting respondents indicated that they 
were not contracting out procurement functions.  Among these respondents, there 
was a general consensus that, other than administrative tasks, contracting functions 
are predominantly inherently governmental.  Also, the specter of organizational 
conflicts of interest was raised by a few. 
In one organization, most contracting functions were performed by 
Contracting Officers in situations in which it would be difficult and inefficient to 
attempt to separate out the non-inherently governmental functions.  Additionally, loss 
of adaptability and interchangeability of personnel was cited as a reason for not 
contracting out.  In some cases, it was reported that the current workload was 
accommodated by existing personnel resources or that sufficient personnel could be 
made available as needed from other organizations.  Some indicated that as a fee-
for-service organization, they were paid a percentage of the contract value for 
contracting functions they performed, and they were unlikely to turn around and 
place this effort on contract.  A couple of respondents stated that although their 
organization does not currently contract out, they are considering it for contract 
closeout. 
Among Air Force respondents, most replies stated either that contracting 
functions were inherently governmental or contracting out procurement functions 
may create a conflict of interest.   Responses included (in order of precedence): 
 Procurement functions are inherently governmental,  
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 Command desires to maintain managerial and authoritative control,  
 Command is not allowed to contract out and is pushed to keep 
functions “in house.” 
 Costs to contract out are too great (too expensive to do so), 
 Respondent is not too sure why they’re not contracting out. 
Of interest are statements that their commands wished to maintain 
managerial and authoritative control, and there is a push to retain the functions in-
house.    
d. Why Not Using Contracting Out Authority 
In order to specifically hone-in on the reasons organizations might not be 
using their authority to contract out procurement functions, Question 10 asked:  
“Given that you have authority to contract for procurement services, for 
what reasons are you not utilizing this authority when needed? 
_____ Fuzzy area 
_____ Timing 
_____ Lack of protocols to distinguish effort from inherently 
governmental functions 
_____ Organic workforce perception of contracting out these 
functions 
_____ Other” 
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Table 6-2. Reasons for Not Using Authority to Contract Out Procurement 
Functions When Needed? (Multiple responses acceptable) 
Organization Fuzzy 
Area 





Army 1 0 3 1 4 3 
Navy/Marine Corps 5 1 7 9 5 3 
Air Force 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Defense Agencies 1 1 0 0 8 15 
Contracting 
Response Totals 
7 2 10 10 18 22 
AF Prgm 
Mgmt/Tech Totals 
9 0 14 13 9 2 
Total All Surveys 16 2 24 23 27 24 
 
Although several contracting responses to earlier questions claimed 
contracting functions to be inherently governmental, this question made the 
assumption for respondents that they do have authority to contract for procurement 
services but are not currently using that authority.  Although not originally intended, 
this question resulted in multiple answers.  For many respondents, this question was 
not applicable.  For those to whom it might have applied, the most frequent response 
was other than the four reasons provided.  Probably because the question did not 
ask for an explanation of the answer, only a few respondents offered reasons for 
their reply. 
Citing the lack of protocols and the perception held by the workforce, one 
respondent indicated that there are too many hurdles in FAR and other policies that 
need to be eliminated or overcome.  The most frequent responses from those 
checking the “Other” category were “lack of funds” or “no need to contract out at this 
time.”  Another offered that contracting out was a short-term solution that fails to 
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hard to view this as other than personal services since the Contracting Officer must 
work so closely with the contract specialist, on a daily basis, continually providing 
personal direction.   One respondent’s headquarters has a plan to minimize 
contractor support and one individual did not understand the question. 
Air Force program office respondents cited “Lack of Protocols” and 
“Workforce Perception” as the primary reasons for not using authority to contract out 
procurement functions when needed.  The third greatest citation was “Fuzzy Area,” 
indicating a potential lack of clarity on the issue of contracting out the procurement 
function.  The most frequent responses from those checking the “Other” category 
were budget constraints, lack of money and/or funding required, and that contracting 
out these functions did not fit with the long-range strategy of the organization.  
2. Impact on the Contracting System 
Similar to the Policy survey, two questions were asked regarding the affect 
contracting out of procurement functions would have on developing Contracting 
Officers and the options available in procurement decision-making.  Both of these 
were raised in previous studies as areas potentially affected in a negative fashion. 
a. Developing Contracting Officers 
To assess the impact on the Government’s ability to fully develop Contracting 
Officers if organizations contracted out procurement functions, Question 14 asked:  
“Would contracting out of procurement services have either (1) a 
negative affect on or (2) a positive affect on an organizations’ ability to 
develop Contracting Officers? 
_____ Positive   _____ Negative   _____ No affect           Please explain” 
Table 6-3a presents the results categorized by “Department,” comparing 
contracting responses to program management/technical responses.  Table 6-3b 
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Table 6-3a. Would Contracting Out Have a Positive or Negative Affect on 
Developing Contracting Officers? (Categorized by Department) 
Organization Negative Positive No Affect NA Totals 
Army 9 1 0 1 11 
Navy/Marine Corps 11 1 3 2 17 
Air Force 0 0 2 0 2 
Defense Agencies 17 0 7 1 25 
Contracting Response 
Totals 
37 2 12 4 55 
Percentage 67% 4% 22% 7%  
AF Prgm Mgmt/Tech 
Totals 
19 4 7 2 32 
Percentage 59% 13% 22% 6%  
 
Table 6-3b. Would Contracting Out Have a Positive or Negative Affect on 
Developing Contracting Officers? (Total all Surveys) 
Responses Negative Positive No Affect NA Totals 
Number 56 6 19 6 87 
Percentage 64% 7% 22% 7%  
 
Over sixty-five percent of the contracting respondents and almost sixty 
percent of the program office respondents believed that contracting out procurement 
functions would have a negative affect on developing Contracting Officers.   
From contracting responses expressing a negative affect, the principal 
concern was the absence of all the factors considered crucial to the cultivation of 
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of experiences that require a large and diversified skill set.  It takes a significant 
amount of time to become an effective journeyman contract specialist and, 
ultimately, a Contracting Officer. In order to be an effective Contracting Officer, you 
must gain experience through the work that you have encountered during your 
career as a contract specialist.  This is what knowledge is built upon and critical in 
making sound business decisions.  Experience, mentoring, and emulation from good 
leadership establish excellent Contracting Officer capabilities.  Courses alone cannot 
develop the necessary skills.  As young and less-experienced Government 
employees become key decision-makers, the agency assumes greater risk that 
mistakes will occur resulting from inexperience and lack of mentoring.  It is already 
difficult to develop and grow our Contracting Officers under the current conditions. 
Agencies that rely on contract personnel to perform the day-to-day workload 
fail to provide on-the-job training and experience that good Contracting Officers fall 
back on.  Contracting out procurement functions means that pieces of the 
procurement process may not be available for contract specialists to perform, thus 
providing them no experience in these areas. Said one, “Working in a ’cradle-to-
grave’ contracting office has taught me every aspect of the contracting function.  If 
some of the procurement functions were given to another, there would be less 
opportunity to learn where my duties fit into the big picture.  Fragmentation of duties 
does not help in creating a well-rounded Contracting Officer.” One mentioned the 
“trust” factor with contracted out specialists and suggested that there is no incentive 
to teach lessons to persons that one is uncertain he can trust. 
Some felt the Government needs to focus on methods to attract, retain and 
develop qualified Government acquisition personnel who will be future Contracting 
Officers.  If not, do you hire from an agency that doesn’t contract out?   There is no 
incentive for fresh contract specialists to come into the Government workforce.  The 
training and certification requirements for contract specialists would not be there if all 
future specialists only worked through the contracting out of procurement functions 
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The only way to fix this is to make sure we organically grow our contract 
support and that would include getting rid of contractors and using such 
methods as the Outstanding Scholars Program, Internship Programs, and the 
Presidential Management Fellows Program.  This would then require less 
reliance on contractor support. 
The position of Contracting Officer is an inherent Government position and 
cannot be delegated to a contractor.  The goals and objectives of contractors and 
Government personnel are different.  Agencies that contract out procurement 
services can lose focus on mentoring Government people.  Oftentimes, we get so 
wrapped up in the day-to-day operations of the agency and mission, that mentoring 
is put on the bottom of the list.  Since it is so easy to obtain the talent and expertise 
that is needed through the contractor, the Government takes that option instead of 
taking the time to teach and grow intern/junior level personnel who are interested in 
making a career in contracting. 
With fewer and fewer Government contract specialists, there is a smaller pool 
of Government employees to “grow” into the Contracting Officer role.  Without a 
sufficient number of junior Government employees to mentor, that pool of 
Contracting Officers is rapidly decreasing.  One respondent stated that there is an 
inverse triangle of Government personnel in their organization.  The contracting 
office is very top heavy with Government personnel but has no base of contract 
specialists from which to draw.  Another stated that if the Government is paying to 
contract out some procurement services, this, in itself, would impede the progress of 
developing Contracting Officers.  If there were enough contract specialists and 
interns available, there would be no requirement for contractor employees, with the 
exception of some to perform administrative functions.  Said one, “This is a vicious 
cycle.  We’re relying on support contractors to fill positions because we don’t have 
Government employees to do it, but we also don’t have Government contracting 
employees because we’re hiring contractors to do specialist work that would usually 
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Other respondents cited inequalities in pay and benefits that will encourage 
people to go where it is most advantageous for them.  There can be a negative 
affect if there is a perception that there is a pay inequality with little contractor 
accountability for decision-making. 
Even some of those who checked “No Affect” leaned toward a negative 
impact in their comments.  Though they stated that Government personnel still need 
to remain knowledgeable about how the work is accomplished, there was 
acknowledgment this could diminish under contractor support.   
On the positive side, one respondent stated that contractors can serve as 
mentors and guides for Government contracting personnel while developing a better 
team.  In explaining both the pros and cons, one respondent thought that utilization 
of contractors provides a consistent, knowledgeable framework for developing 
contract specialists and that they bring a broad range of expertise and experience to 
support the contracting mission.  One individual who felt there was no affect 
explained that their organization uses contractor support to supplement the 
workforce, not replace it.  Another suggested that if managed properly, the 
contractors could assist in developing Government Contracting Officers. 
Among the Air Force program office participants, there was a clear majority 
who believed that contracting out procurement functions would have a negative 
affect on developing Contracting Officers. Comments from respondents indicating a 
“negative” affect cited some common themes and qualifications of their responses. 
These include: (1) disengagement from process weakens the entire capability to 
develop personnel, (2) skills are developed over time with considerable experience 
an essential component of good Contracting Officers, (3) PCO functions are very 
complex and require organic capabilities, and (4) organic capability provides the 
“biggest bang for the buck.” 
Several respondents indicating that contracting out procurement functions 
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permanently contracted out or were done so on a temporary basis.  If contracts were 
temporary, there would be no appreciable negative affect; but if they were deemed 
long-term, there likely would be a negative affect on developing Contracting Officers. 
b. Procurement Options 
To determine the affect on the Government’s procurement decision-making 
ability, Question 15 asked:  
“Could contracting out of procurement services either (1) limit or (2) 
expand an organization’s decision-making ability to develop and 
consider procurement options? 
_____ Limit   _____ Expand   _____ Neither            Please explain” 
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Table 6-4a. Could Contracting Out Limit or Expand an Organization’s Decision-
Making Ability Regarding Procurement Options? (Categorized by Department) 
Organization Limit Expand Neither NA Totals 
Army 1 4 6 0 11 
Navy/Marine Corps 6 6 4 1 17 
Air Force 0 1 1 0 2 
Defense Agencies 6 7 8 4 25 
Contracting 
Response Totals 
13 18 19 5 55 
Percentage 24% 33% 35% 9%  
AF Prgm 
Mgmt/Tech Totals 
10 14 4 4 32 
Percentage 31% 44% 13% 13%  
 
Table 6-4b. Could Contracting Out Limit or Expand an Organization’s Decision-
Making Ability Regarding Procurement Options? (Total all Surveys) 
Responses Limit Expand Neither NA Totals 
Number 23 32 23 9 87 
Percentage 26% 37% 26% 11%  
 
One third of the contracting respondents believed that contracting out 
procurement services would expand an organization’s decision-making ability.  
Those who maintained that options would be limited expressed concern regarding 
the extent to which objectivity would be applied by contractors.  A contracted out 
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They work for a company that has shareholders to whom they must remain loyal.  
Further, they are not delegated decision authority but rather primarily function on 
contract execution with guidance from the Contracting Officer.  
Supporting the position that procurement options would be expanded, 
contracting respondents felt that contractors would bring fresh ideas with respect to 
acquisition strategies.  Firms can bring the industry perspective to the table when 
considering solutions.  They are responsive, focused and conscientious, and draw 
on diverse expertise.  They can be hired to meet specific needs, so skill sets can be 
more closely aligned with mission requirements.  Contractors may have more 
experience and ability than that possessed by Government organizations.  With so 
many civil servants retiring over the past few years, the experience level of people 
applying for Government jobs is very low.  Some respondents felt that the options 
were expanded because more resources are available to complete the mission.  
Contracting out allows the Government workforce to concentrate on truly “inherently 
governmental functions” (such as decision-making) and on mission essential and 
core efforts.  Another suggested that with contractor support in administrative areas 
of a contract specialist’s functions, the latter would be able to spend more time on 
effective strategic planning.  One replied that it depended on how contractor support 
is used.  Contractors have years of experience and if they are used as acquisition 
strategy advisors and contract specialists for higher and more complex actions, then 
their expertise expands an organization’s procurement options.  If, however, they are 
used for low-level tasks, such as administrative duties and contract closeout, 
contractor support is not adding much to the overall process.  One respondent felt 
that it would definitely expand, but might have unintended consequences.  The 
contracts office is a “sounding board” for other codes in the organization in 
attempting to ensure everyone stays out of jail.  Would that same due diligence be 
there from contractor specialists?  It is difficult now for contractors to say no to 
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In explaining why contracting out would limit options, one respondent stated 
that he has problems with a partially contracted out workforce, such as conflicts of 
interest and other potential issues that would limit solutions.  Correspondingly, with 
an all Government workforce, he is limited only by laws and regulations, as well as 
his own imagination, in crafting approaches and solutions to contracting issues.  
Another stated that trying to manage the firewalls required to ensure procurement 
integrity would severely limit the organization’s decision-making and options.  Yet 
another respondent felt that contracting out procurement services could lead to 
limited use of best business practices, standardization, and not lend itself to flexibility 
in the workforce to move personnel where they are needed.  This respondent added 
that if a contractor is performing poorly, the Government has the right to default and 
get consideration but, that process will greatly interfere in timely awards for the 
stakeholders waiting for their procurements to be completed.  Another respondent 
stated that, in their experience with contractor personnel, they contracted personnel 
really do not offer options but merely wait to be told the strategy and then execute it 
on paper.  Others worried that the expertise within the Government is impacted.  If 
contractors have been performing all of the functions, when it comes time to 
recompete, who is going to develop the requirement, acquisition plans, perform the 
source selection and other functions? 
Thirty-five percent of the responses cited “Neither.”  The comments 
supporting this answer centered primarily on an individual’s capability and talent 
regardless if they were employed by the Government or a contractor.  Can a person 
think outside the box?  Are they and the organization open to change and 
innovation?  Differing backgrounds provide a broader experience base and will yield 
further options, but both would be available from either a contracted out workforce or 
an organic workforce.  One respondent felt that contractors should not be made part 
of the decision process because it is strictly a Government function.  Another offered 
that although contractor personnel providing input are bright and talented, success 
depends upon how the Government manager acts on that advice, if at all.  Echoing a 
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really depends on which services are contracted out, what experiences the 
contractor brought into the organization, and how well the contractor performs those 
services.  If the contractor is filling gaps in internal resources, then the contracting 
office may be able to focus on innovative acquisitions, solutions, and improvements 
to the process in lieu of solely focusing on expediency and efficiency.  Believing the 
issue might be that of Government workforce capabilities, one respondent felt that if 
there is a problem with Government employees not being creative enough, perhaps 
their management should become more involved with the process.  Hiring private 
firms will not be a panacea.  They will not be any better equipped to handle complex 
contracting decisions than Government employees.  In order for private firms to be 
more creative than Government employees, they will need to take short cuts and will 
eventually disregard the laws that govern competition, social programs and labor 
rights. 
Air Force program office respondents generally believed that contracting out 
could expand an organization’s decision-making ability regarding procurement 
options.   Participants indicating “expand” commented that contractors bring new 
ideas and options to the table because they may traditionally operate in competitive 
environments that reward innovation.  One respondent stated, “We are largely 
limited by our ability to expand or contract our organizations due to end strength, 
hiring freezes, personnel system limitations, [and] skill mix required.  Use of 
additional contracting out would afford an ability to react to short - and long-term 
needs.”  Another indicated, “It could expand because contractors could bring 
different perspectives to the table.  The Government tends to train people in a stove-
pipe mind-set; so I think it would be good to have a fresh look at things.”  
For those indicating that contracting out could “limit” decision-making ability, 
several made comments that the ability to know the customer and develop a working 
relationship could create this limitation.  One respondent stated, “A buyer earns trust 
and accountability—a bought contractor would not stay in the game long enough to 
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that the loss of interaction on requirements would eventually cause harm to a 
program either due to cost creep or other misunderstandings of the requirement.  
“An isolated Contracting Officer doesn’t see the bigger picture.”   
3. Integrity of the Contracting Process 
Understanding that the integrity of the contracting process should be an upper 
most consideration in any procurement action, a question regarding the manner in 
which it can be safeguarded when contracting services are procured was felt to be 
essential.  This same question appeared on the Policy survey.  Question 16 asked:  
“What steps should be taken to ensure the integrity of the contracting 
process is protected when contracting for procurement functions?” 
Many contracting respondents highlighted the need for Government 
personnel that are adequately trained, particularly regarding responsibilities that 
cannot be transferred to contractor personnel.  Awareness training for both 
Government and contractor personnel regarding the limitations on authority, 
restrictions as to the functions contractors can perform, and what constitutes 
inherently governmental functions is critical.  They must be well-versed in OCIs, 
procurement integrity, ethics and personal services requirements, and must ensure 
appropriate policies and FAR rules are in place. Likewise, agencies must establish a 
verification process to detect if contractors are performing IGFs.  The ultimate 
authority to commit the Government should remain securely within Government 
control.  Contractors should never be given signatory authority as warranted 
Contracting Officers.  Likewise, all contractor personnel must be knowledgeable of 
the restrictions and understand and adhere to appropriate behavior and controls.  
Some felt that contractors should not be physically located in the same offices as 
Government procurement personnel, but if they must, they should be required to 
wear different colored badges that provide clear differentiation. 
In obtaining support contractors, it is essential that such acquisition be 
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separate location from any contractor with all documents maintained under lock and 
key.  A sound Statement of Work with clear requirements must be crafted that 
clearly calls out tasking and specifies the non-inherently governmental functions for 
which contractor support personnel are responsible.  We in the Government, must 
pay close attention to contractor support capabilities and make sure that contractor 
people brought onboard are the right fit for the particular position they are filling.  
Several respondents cited the need for non-disclosure statements, financial 
disclosure, ethics and conflict of interest certifications, performance surveillance, 
OCI clauses, and robust firewalls as essential.  Perhaps the Government requires 
very strict non-disclosure clauses that go beyond what is commonly used today.  
Companies merge with such frequency that the integrity of the competitive process 
is vulnerable to compromise.  Further, we need statutory authority to bring criminal 
and civil sanctions against contractor employees for violating the same trust issues 
to which we hold Government employees accountable.  Some respondents are 
concerned about the significant amount of oversight needed to protect the 
Government.  Someone would need to be accountable and knowledgeable enough 
to conduct valid surveillance and understand what constitutes an acceptable 
deliverable.  Some thought that, ultimately, this could become a very cumbersome 
process. From a slightly different vein, the integrity of the process is completely 
dependent on the integrity of the personnel, whether they are Government or 
contractors.  The steps taken by the Government should be the same regardless of 
who is involved in the process.  Some viewed it from a political standpoint.  It 
depends on how closely you want to mange the public’s perception of having “for 
profit companies” involved in spending their tax monies.   
One respondent suggested requiring an “Integrity Plan” from all bidders to be 
used in the evaluation process.  The plan would require bidders to address all the 
issues present in a contractor-Government work environment.  Since most of the 
competitors involved in one area also compete for Government contracts in several 
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“Integrity Plan.”  Requiring and evaluating plans would open the doors to other, non-
traditional companies to bid on this type of work. 
Some responses focused internally and stated that to protect the integrity of 
the contracting process, the Government needs to recruit better people, hire more 
employees, improve management, continue training people in their own field and 
across other disciplines, and increase the use and dollar amount of bonuses. 
A couple of respondents stated that the safest course of action is to not 
contract out the contracting process at all.  “You run too high a risk of inviting the fox 
into the hen house.”   Integrity may not be maintained if contracting were taken out 
of Government employees’ hands.  One respondent felt that the Government should 
hire quality assurance and quality control personnel to monitor the process. 
Air Force program office personnel expressed a number of steps that should 
be taken to ensure the integrity of the contracting process.   Among those indicated 
were, in order of precedence based on the number of specific citations: 
 Maintaining open communications between Government and 
contracted personnel,  
 Clearly defining roles and responsibilities of all workplace participants,  
 Enforcing a certification program (similar to or the same as DAWIA), 
 Establishing and enforcing credentials for contracted personnel,  
 Training participants (both contracted and Government personnel), 
 Utilizing only Government personnel for contractor oversight (for those 
contractors executing procurement functions), 
 Clearly defining deliverables in task orders and contracts for 
procurement functions, and, 
 Limiting contractor authorized functions to administrative duties only. 
Air Force personnel strongly believed that communications, clearly defined 
requirements, and the establishment of credentialed and well-trained contracting 
personnel can all contribute to ensuring the integrity of the contracting process.   
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organic personnel, should be enacted.  Of note is that in response to this question, 
none of the thirty-two program office respondents specifically mentioned having an 
established ethics policy with enforcement provisions.   
4. Personal Services 
As noted earlier, contracts for personal services are prohibited with certain 
exceptions and a contract for procurement functions does not meet the requirements 
for an exception.  Because the execution of a services contract is the period during 
which a personal services relationship is likely to arise, Government organizations 
must be particularly attentive to this issue during contract performance.  To 
determine if organizations have sufficient controls in place, Question 9 asked:  
“What specific policies and/or protocols exist in your organization to 
ensure that contractor personnel are not performing personal 
services?” 
Approximately twenty-five percent of the contracting respondents indicated 
that they were unaware of any policies or protocols to prevent personal services 
situations in their organization.  A couple were new to the organization and felt they 
would learn in time, while others said that even though no policies existed, they had 
been briefed by management or had been in discussions with legal and other 
contracting personnel about this issue. 
Some respondents were quick to point out that personal services are strictly 
prohibited and that their contracts were not for this purpose.  They only awarded 
contracts for non-personal services.  This was followed up by their assertion that 
strong and effective ethics and procurement integrity training is mandatory for all 
Government employees. 
Some respondents indicated that the Statements of Work are critical.  First, 
they must be scrutinized to ensure they do not contain inherently governmental 
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set forth in the SOW.  These steps are followed by performance measures applied 
by Government contracting personnel who have the necessary expertise and 
integrity themselves.  Respondents also indicated appropriate training for both 
Government and contractor employees, screening and oversight by management, 
legal review, and a determination of non-personal services for the file before contract 
award and performance reviews after contract award were all mentioned as 
important controls.  One respondent indicated that the severability of the 
requirements for the contract closeout function from other contracting functions 
performed by the organization was the key to avoiding personal services situations.  
Another respondent pointed to a Government-Contractor Relationship Guide that 
spells out the roles and responsibilities of the various parties.  One said they listen to 
what people say; you can be amazed as to what they tell you. 
Several respondents cited the strict relationship between Government and 
contractor that is managed and monitored by the Contracting Officer’s 
Representative (COR).  In some instances, the COR is the only one who deals 
directly with the contractor.  All assignments go to the contractor, who then tasks its 
personnel.  One respondent stated that multiple CORs have been appointed that are 
knowledgeable of what constitutes personal services and are aware that our 
contracts are for non-personal services. 
Although the question focused on what Government controls existed, several 
respondents expressed what contractors are doing.  Some mentioned that the 
contractor has an on-site supervisor or program manager who is responsible for 
direct supervision of the contractor’s employees.  All assignments are handled by 
the program manager who acts as the liaison between Government and contractor 
personnel.  The contractor has established team leads who work closely with 
Contracting Officers and higher-level Government personnel in making workload 
assignments.  In some cases, the team lead reviews the work products of the team 
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continued employment within the contractor’s firm are controlled by the contractor’s 
appointed supervisors. 
Air Force program office personnel presented several responses to this 
question.  Among the most prominent were (in order of precedence): 
 Having a written policy regarding personal services on Government 
contracts,  
 Clearly defining contract requirements, task orders, and deliverables, 
 Government monitoring, auditing, and conducting oversight of contract 
functions to ensure compliance,  
 Training (to ensure understanding and compliance), and, 
 Don’t know of any policy and/or protocol.   
Several respondents stated that this issue of personal services was 
problematic.  Many were not aware of any policy or protocols in-place regarding 
personal services.  Nearly one-third of the respondents either did not know of any 
particular policy or protocol or did not think one applied to their workplace.  Some 
personnel believed that personal services were being performed at their sites, 
despite having specific protocols and policies in place to help prevent such services 
from occurring.  For example, contractor personnel attended command functions, 
such as parties, ceremonies, and retirement parties, despite the existence of a clear 
prohibition.   
5. Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act Requirements 
The DAWIA requirements were briefly explained in Chapter IV.  The survey 
sent to policy and senior management personnel asked if there were DAWIA 
implications, and should DAWIA or “DAWIA-like” requirements be imposed on 
contractors performing contracting services.  The survey sent to management and 
operating personnel assumed that such certification requirements could be imposed, 
and sought to identify how difficult such a requirement would be to enforce.  
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“How difficult would it be to enforce DAWIA or “DAWIA-like” 
certification requirements on contractors who are awarded contracts to 
perform procurement functions? 
_____ Very Difficult    _____ Difficult   _____Easy” 
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Table 6-5a. How Difficult Would It Be to Impose DAWIA Requirements on 
Contractors? (Categorized by Department) 
Organization Very Difficult Difficult Easy NA Totals 
Army 2 4 5 0 11 
Navy/Marine Corps 6 1 9 1 17 
Air Force 0 1 1 0 2 
Defense Agencies 4 5 15 1 25 
Contracting Response 
Totals 
12 11 30 2 55 
Percentage 22% 20% 54% 4%  
AF Prgm Mgmt/Tech 
Totals 
5 9 13 5 32 
Percentage 16% 28% 41% 16%  
 
Table 6-5b. How Difficult Would It Be to Impose DAWIA Requirements on 
Contractors? (Total all Surveys) 
Responses Very Difficult Difficult Easy NA Totals 
Number 17 20 43 7 87 
Percentage 20% 23% 49% 8%  
 
A majority of the contracting respondents believed that it would be easy to 
require contractors to comply with DAWIA requirements.  The question did not ask 
for an explanation, but a significant number of those who choose to elaborate on 
their responses felt it would be “Difficult” or “Very Difficult” to achieve.  These 
answers focused principally on the costs to the Government.  Although it would be 
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contract, the expenses incurred by the contractor to train, certify and maintain 
continuous learning would probably be charged to the Government.  Contractor 
personnel might be able to attend DAWIA courses on a space available basis but, as 
one respondent pointed out, “You also need experience and formal education for 
certification completion.”  She was not sure of the ratio of DOD (civilians and 
military) retirees to those hired directly out of college or from other agencies with 
different experience, but it appeared there were probably more contractor 
employees hired without the appropriate certification levels.  Therefore, it would be a 
large investment for the Government, not to mention the expense and time for these 
employees and an agreement to retain such employees for a period of time after the 
training.  A couple of respondents stated that most contractor employees who are 
former Government personnel either separated or retired before implementation of 
DAWIA or were grandfathered into the system.  There may not be the incentive for 
these people to take the required courses to meet DAWIA certifications.  Others 
cited the Government’s difficulty in monitoring and verifying the requirement, 
especially since the contracting staff is already overburdened and needs contract 
personnel to supplement them.  One respondent pointed out that in recent years, the 
Government has emphasized the use of commercial practices and performance-
based Statements of Work.  The focus should be on the desired outcome and 
allowing contractors maximum flexibility on how they will deliver that desired 
outcome.  The guidance is that only rarely should professional certifications be 
mandated, thus, there would have to be a cultural change to implement this 
requirement. 
Those who felt it would be relatively easy stated that either: (1) most of the 
contractor employees are retired or former Government contracting professionals 
who are already certified at Levels II or III and tend to be well-educated with 
professional association certifications, or (2) this is not unlike similar requirements 
placed in ID/IQ contracts.  One respondent felt that it would be easy to incorporate 
training requirements in the contract, but that this does not take the place of people 
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out that contractors generally are eager to comply in order to obtain Government 
business.  Because most contractor employees are professional and well-educated, 
they would probably be most cooperative in meeting DAWIA requirements. 
Air Force program office personnel expressed mixed opinions on how difficult 
it would be to impose DAWIA requirements on contractors.  Nearly forty-five percent 
of respondents stated that it would be “Very Difficult” or “Difficult,” while forty-one 
percent stated that it would be “Easy”.   Many respondents qualified their responses, 
making it easier to place the responses with a rationale for the position being 
chosen.   
First, among those indicating that it would either be “Very Difficult” or 
“Difficult,” were several reasons as follows: 
 Contract-mandated DAWIA requirements would have to be a “top 
down” mandate.  
 The Government would either directly or indirectly pay for any DAWIA 
or DAWIA-like requirement imposed through contractual provisions.  
 The availability of DAWIA courses is already limited, so the programs 
would have to be enlarged to accommodate additional persons 
requiring the credentials. 
Second, those indicating that DAWIA requirements imposed on contractors 
would be “Easy” to enforce included:  
 There’s a large pool of DAWIA-qualified retired military and civilians 
available.  
 It would be easy to include mandatory contractual language to enforce 
DAWIA if the AF had the money to do it. 
In both those responses indicating difficulty and those indicating ease of 
implementing a DAWIA requirement on contractors, cost and availability of courses 
was an issue expressed.  Additionally, two respondents qualified their statements 
that even if the Government were to place a DAWIA requirement in its contracts, 
DAWIA statutory language doesn’t allow for non-Government personnel access to 
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however, the Government would have to allow contractors access to classes, rates 
would increase (thus cost the Government more) and when would they take the 
classes (within the 8 hours they are working for us, or in addition to that)?“  
6. Contract Effectiveness 
One of the principal facets of this research has been to assess the 
effectiveness of contractors’ performance in the delivery of contracting services.  A 
series of questions were posed with the intent to elicit respondents’ opinions and 
ideas regarding how effective such contracts have been, the positive and negative 
aspects of such contracts, and the measures used by organizations to evaluate 
contractor effectiveness.   
A distinction must be made between measurements of efficiency and 
effectiveness.  The former indicates the extent to which an organization utilizes its 
resources to accomplish its responsibilities and is usually expressed in quantitative 
terms.  The latter refers to how well an organization performs the tasks to execute 
their responsibilities and is often measured in qualitative terms.   
a. Level of Effectiveness 
To assess effectiveness, Question 4 asked:  
“In your organization and to your knowledge, how effective have 
contracts which procure contracting functions been? 
___ Highly Effective ____ Somewhat Effective     
___ Not Effective  ____ Very Ineffective” 
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Table 6-6a. How Effective are Contracts That Have Been Used to Procure 










Army 2 6 0 0 3 11 
Navy/Marine 
Corps 
3 1 1 0 12 17 
Air Force 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Defense 
Agencies 




19 16 1 0 19 55 
Percentage 35% 28% 2% 0% 35%  
AF PMs/Tech 
Totals 
4 9 1 2 16 32 
Percentage 13% 28% 3% 6% 50%  
 
Table 6-6b. How Effective are Contracts That Have Been Used to Procure 
Contracting Functions?  (Total all Surveys—Combined Results) 









Number 23 25 2 2 35 87 
Percentage 26% 29% 2% 2% 40%  
 
Of the contracting respondents who chose to answer this question, only one 
suggested that procurement services contracts were not effective.  All respondents, 
except for those who felt this was “Not Applicable” or did not answer the question, 
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effective.  Some respondents cited examples that demonstrated effectiveness.  One 
respondent provided an instance in which a policy office had been contracted out.  
After three years, this function was moved in-house and performed, once again, by 
Government personnel.  The reasons, however, did not involve effectiveness.  The 
cost of the service, as well as the cost to perform surveillance on the contract, 
became too high. 
One respondent stated, “Contractors ‘fill the gap’ for resources that are not 
available internally.  By making them responsible for the price/cost analysis of 
proposals and cost performance reports, contract specialists are able to focus on 
negotiation, execution of contracts and task orders, administration/monitoring- core 
duties of contracting personnel.”   
A majority of the Air Force program office respondents expressed no specific 
opinion on the question of how effective contracts for procurement functions have 
been.  Eighty percent of this population rated effectiveness as either highly effective 
or “Somewhat Effective”.  Only three respondents indicated that contracting out of 
procurement functions was “Not Effective” or “Very Ineffective”, which equates to 
less than ten percent of the population expressing a qualitative measure. 
b. Positive Contractor Performance 
In order to obtain thoughts as to the positive characteristics of contractor 
performance, Question 5 asked:  
“For contracts in progress in your organization, identify and discuss 
three positive aspects of contractor performance of contracting 
functions.” 
Responses from contracting personnel included the following: (1) personnel 
costs are reduced; (2) performance metrics can be established that must be met; (3) 
contractor employees are trained and qualified; (4) certain functions, such as 
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awards; (5) valuable assistance is provided during periods of work surges; (6) 
contractors are excellent sources for analytical support; (7) they help increase the 
efficiency of operations and meet mission requirements; (8) it allows the contracting 
workforce to concentrate on more difficult contract actions; and (9) contractors 
acknowledge the work and help keep the workload current. 
The answer to this question from Air Force personnel is predicated, in large 
part, on the respondent’s answer to Question #1, “Are procurement functions being 
contracted out in your organization?”  Question #1 had eighteen “yes” responses 
and fourteen “no” responses.   Of the fourteen respondents able to answer this 
question, several common themes emerged including (in order of precedence): 
 Expertise delivered by contracted personnel,  
 Flexibility to meet surge in demand and/or meet requirements,  
 Delivery of greater capability (cited also as contractors are more 
focused),  
 Willing to tackle routine administration tasks viewed as burdensome by 
organic workforce,  
 Contractors bring “continuity” to programs that otherwise would be 
absent, and,  
 Documentation for performances by contractor is superior to that of 
Government personnel. 
The researchers tallied common-thread themes mentioned and determined 
that comments and narratives of respondents clearly cited “expertise” as the primary 
positive aspect of contractor performance, while flexibility to meet requirements 
came in a close second.  Nearly seventy percent of respondents cited the expertise 
of contractors as the most positive aspect of contractor performance.   Many 
indicated that contractors are more focused on the tasks required, and not burdened 
with many of the same administrative duties of organic personnel.   Lastly, and 
interestingly, several respondents stated that contractors were tackling routine 
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menial task by organic personnel.  Having contractors perform these tasks provided 
a morale boost to the civilian employees otherwise burdened with these tasks.   
c. Negative Contractor Performance 
In order to obtain thoughts as to the negative characteristics of contractor 
performance, Question 6 asked:  
“For contracts in progress in your organization, identify and discuss 
three problems associated with contractors performing contracting 
functions.” 
Responses from contracting personnel included the following: (1) blurring of 
lines between contactor and Government personnel; (2) potential treatment of 
contractor personnel as personal services employees; (3) Coordinating of 
contractors’ efforts and activities with those of Government personnel; (4) 
contractors ineffectiveness in supporting more complex contracts; (5) less reliabile 
than Government staff because better contractor personnel move on to more 
important contracts; (6) labor cost increases; (7) contractors will do everything, and, 
in some cases, exceed scope of work; (8) potential for actual or apparent conflicts of 
interest; (9) the fact that OCIs created by contractor mergers and acquisitions are 
decreasing the competition; (10) reliance on private sector impacts the 
Government’s level of expertise to recognize when solutions offered by contractors 
during pre-award phase are less than optimal; (11) lack of knowledgeable 
Government employees makes reliance on CORs for acceptance of services a 
concern; (12) interns no longer learn  to perform these functions; and (13) valuable 
Government resources allocated to monitor contracts. 
Air Force respondents provided several common themes as follows (in order 
of precedence):   
 Agent relationships and blurring of lines between contractor and 
Government personnel,  
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 Lack of knowledge,  
 High cost to contract out procurement functions (it’s expensive),  
 Contractor employee turnover rates (too high), and learning curve 
effects (negative aspects) 
 Oversight requirements (too much and too expensive),  
 Negative perceptions among organic employees, 
 Loss of organic capability and development of organic workforce, 
 Contractors working out of scope (not under specific contract 
provisions) and,  
 Potential for collusion. 
Of the eighteen respondents indicating that their organizations did contract 
out procurement functions, one-third of those respondents stated that the blurring of 
lines between contractor and Government personnel was a negative effect.  Tied for 
the next highest number of negative citations, at nearly twenty-eight percent of 
respondents, were the lack of experience and/or skill sets provided by contractor 
personnel, lack of knowledge, high turnover rates of contracted personnel, and high 
costs to contract out procurement functions. 
d. Measures of Effectiveness 
The heart of contract administration is the measurement of contractor 
performance to ensure protection of the Government’s best interests.  If 
performance is not in accordance with the contract’s terms and conditions, corrective 
action may be necessary.  This could include corrective actions by both the 
Government and the contractor.  Measures of effectiveness can be either qualitative 
or quantitative, the former being more subjective while the latter tend to be more 
objective in nature.  In order to understand what measures are being used to gauge 
contractor performance, Question 7 asked:  
“In your organization, what measures of effectiveness are used to 
evaluate contractor performance of procurement services?” 
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 Statement of Work tasks completed 
 Resource control 
 Management 
 Schedule and Timeliness 
 Quality of Performance 
 Reduction of backlog orders 
 Number of expedite actions worked 
 Number of Purchase Orders awarded vs contractor effort 
 Number of closeouts performed 
 Performance work specification 
 Performance-based contracts 
From Air Force respondents, two common themes emerged, both of which 
were cited by approximately forty-five percent of those respondents whose 
commands were contracting out procurement functions.  The responses by the Air 
Force program office personnel indicated a high degree of uncertainty on how 
exactly to measure effectiveness. 
First, many respondents stated that identifying a specific measure was “too 
subjective” and that they could not really define how to measure these functions.  
Secondly, just as many respondents indicated that the response could not be given, 
without rationale provided.   
 Too subjective to provide a definitive answer, and 
 Did not answer (with no specific rationale provided). 
Other less frequently cited responses included: 
 CPARS (Contractor Performance Assessment Review System) 
evaluation reports,  
 Error rates (for administrative functions), 
 Number of actions completed,  
 Dialog at meetings,  
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 DCMA does this (not our function). 
These responses are in sharp contrast to those provided earlier from 
contracting personnel.  Contracting office personnel were more specific about how to 
measure the effectiveness of these functions.  An analysis of these differences will 
be included in the next chapter. 
e. Measuring Contracting Data 
In assessing performance, evaluators sometimes find themselves assessing 
data that are easily captured and for which data bases exist rather than the most 
appropriate data for the actions at hand.  In order to determine if Government 
evaluators felt they were using the most suitable data, Question 8 asked:  
“In your organization, do you believe you are measuring the appropriate 
(correct) data, events, etc. as part of your responsibility to manage 
contractors? _____ Yes   _____ No     Please explain” 
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Table 6-7a. Measuring Appropriate Data in Managing Contractors? 
(Categorized by Department) 
Organization Yes No NA Totals 
Army 6 3 2 11 
Navy/Marine Corps 6 0 11 17 
Air Force 2 0 0 2 
Defense Agencies 15 1 9 25 
Contracting Response 
Totals 
29 4 22 55 
Percentage 53% 7% 40%  
AF Prgm Mgmt/Tech 
Totals 
12 11 9 32 
Percentage 38% 34% 28%  
 
Table 6-7b. Measuring Appropriate Data in Managing Contractors? (Total All 
Surveys) 
Responses Yes No NA Totals 
Number 41 15 31 87 
Percentage 47% 17% 36%  
 
The majority of contracting respondents felt they were using the most 
appropriate data for their assessment of contractor performance.  Very few 
respondents explained their answer to this question.  One respondent felt that a 
good measure was that missions are completed on time and satisfactorily, but also 
explained that because Government expertise is suspect, the appropriateness of the 
measurement approved and solution offered is suspect.  Another relied on the 
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relationship between the technical department, the contractor, and contracts 
personnel. 
Air Force program office personnel provided mixed responses to the question 
of the appropriateness (correctness) of data, events, etc., as part of their 
responsibility to manage contractors.  Most respondents indicated a “Yes” answer.  
However, some of the “Yes” responses were qualified in some manner, such as in 
the following: 
 CPARS data were sufficient. 
 Contractor had their own self-assessment system (with reports). 
 EVM data were sufficient.  
 Deliverables as defined in the contract were measured as appropriate. 
In close second place were the “No” responses.  Several qualified answers 
were provided, including: 
 No data were collected at all (no assessment was being made).  
 Deliverables were monitored, but qualitative measures were not being 
collected. 
 Meetings were monitored for interaction, but no specific measures 
were produced.  
 Additionally, one respondent stated that there is a “Gross lack of 
measurements.”   
The number and qualifications presented by the Air Force program office 
personnel answering “No” responses are in sharp contrast to the answers provided 
by contracting personnel.  The majority of contracting respondents felt they are using 
the most appropriate data for their assessment of contractor performance. 
7. Limits on Contractor Participation 
The DAU study recommended that each contracting activity be limited to no 
greater than twenty-five percent of their workforce that may be contracted out in 
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a. Percentage Limitations 
To determine how personnel viewed the notion of limiting the percentage of 
the contracted out workforce, as well as a percentage of the workload, or any other 
measurement, Question 12 asked:  
“If you were to limit the percentage of the effort an organization would 
contract out, what should be the maximum limitation on that 
percentage? (Circle appropriate %) 
Workforce (end strength): <10%, 10-25%, 26-50%, 51-75%, >75%, 
unlimited 
Workload: <10%, 10-25%, 26-50%, 51-75%, >75%, unlimited 
Other Factor _________ : <10%, 10-25%, 26-50%, 51-75%, >75%, 
unlimited” 
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Table 6-8a. What Percentage Limitations Should be Placed on an 
Organization’s Authority to Contract Out the Workforce to Perform 







>75% Unlimit NA Tot
Army 5 2 1 0 0 0 3 11 
Navy/Marine Corps 3 6 1 0 0 1 6 17 
Air Force 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Defense Agencies 6 4 9 1 2 1 2 25 
Contracting 
Response Totals 
14 13 11 1 2 2 12 55 
Percentage 25% 24% 20% 2% 4% 4% 22%  
AF Prgm 
Mgmt/Tech Totals 
7 11 8 1 1 1 3 32 
Percentage 22% 34% 25% 3% 3% 3% 9%  
 
Table 6-8b. What Percentage Limitations Should be Placed on an 
Organization’s Authority to Contract Out the Workforce to Perform 







>75% Unlimit NA Tot
Number 21 24 19 2 3 3 15 87 
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The Workload results are displayed in Tables 6-9a and 6-9b. 
Table 6-9a. What Percentage Limitations Should be Placed on an 
Organization’s Authority to Contract out the Workload to Perform 







>75% Unlimit NA Tot
Army 5 2 1 0 0 0 3 11 
Navy/Marine Corps 4 3 3 0 0 2 5 17 
Air Force 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Defense Agencies 4 4 9 1 2 2 3 25 
Contracting 
Response Totals 
13 10 13 1 2 4 12 55 
Percentage 24% 18% 24% 2% 4% 7% 22%  
AF Prgm 
Mgmt/Tech Totals 
6 10 7 0 0 3 6 32 
Percentage 19% 31% 22% 0% 0% 9% 19%  
 
Table 6-9b. What Percentage Limitations Should be Placed on an 
Organization’s Authority to Contract out the Workload to Perform 







>75% Unlimit NA Tot
Number 19 20 20 1 2 7 18 87 
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The Other Factor results are displayed in Tables 6-10a and 6-10b. 
Table 6-10a. Other Factors to Consider in Placing Percentage Limitations on 
an Organization’s Authority to Contract out to Perform Procurement 







>75% Unlimit NA Tot
Army 1 0 0 0 0 0 10 11 
Navy/Marine Corps 0 0 0 0 0 1 16 17 
Air Force 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Defense Agencies 1 2 0 1 0 0 21 25 
Contracting 
Response Totals 
2 2 0 1 0 1 49 55 
Percentage 4% 4% 0% 2% 0% 2% 89%  
AF Prgm 
Mgmt/Tech Totals 
1 2 0 0 0 1 28 32 
Percentage 3% 6% 0% 0% 0% 3% 88%  
 
Table 6-10b. Other Factors to Consider in Placing Percentage Limitations on 
an Organization’s Authority to Contract out to Perform Procurement 







>75% Unlimit NA Tot
Number 3 4 0 1 0 2 77 87 
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This question did not call for an explanation and only four contracting 
respondents decided to elaborate on their answers. The comments included a 
suggestion to limit contracting out to the contract closeout function, to limit the type 
of effort contracted out, and an assertion that the contracting out concept is flawed.  
Regarding workforce, over sixty-five percent of the respondents felt it should be 
limited to less than fifty percent of the employees in the office while a little less than 
sixty percent believed it should be limited to fifty percent or less of the workload.  
Fewer than fifteen percent felt other factors should be considered. 
Air Force program management personnel were resolute in placing 
restrictions on the amount of the workforce and workloads that could be contracted 
out. These respondents felt a strong tendency toward limiting the numbers of both 
the workforce and workload contracted out to less than fifty percent each.  In fact, 
eighty-one percent of respondents expressed a desire to limit workforce levels to 
below fifty percent of the total.  Seventy-two percent suggested that workload figures 
should be limited to below fifty percent of the total workload.  Other factors were not 
identified with any significance; eighty-eight percent declined to express any 
limitation preference when considering other factors to limit.  
 Although these responses did not expressly require a qualification to the 
response, three Air Force respondents stated that limits were needed to maintain the 
organic workforce capability.  This small group expressed concern that without 
limitations, the organic workforce could experience a detrimental loss of valuable 
skills.  
The Air Force program office responses were noticeably different than the 
contracting population surveyed, wherein respondents were varied regarding 
limitations on the percentage of the workforce and the workload that should be 
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b. Physical Location 
One of the issues associated with the problem of personal services relates to 
the integration of contractor personnel with Government employees at Federal 
facilities.  In order to determine the extent to which survey respondents felt that 
contractors performing contracting functions should be located away from 
Government personnel, Question 13 asked:  
“Should contractor employees performing procurement services be 
physically separated from Government employees? 
_____ Yes   _____ No   Please explain” 
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Table 6-11a. Should Contractor Employees Be Physically Separated from 
Government Employees? (Categorized by Department) 
Organization Yes No NA Totals 
Army 3 7 1 11 
Navy/Marine Corps 7 9 1 17 
Air Force 1 1 0 2 
Defense Agencies 4 20 1 25 
Contracting Response 
Totals 
15 37 3 55 
Percentage 27% 67% 6%  
AF Prgm Mgmt/Tech Totals 5 25 2 32 
Percentage 16% 78% 6%  
 
Table 6-11b. Should Contractor Employees Be Physically Separated from 
Government Employees? (Total all Surveys) 
Responses Yes No NA Totals 
Number 20 62 5 87 
Percentage 23% 71% 6%  
 
Sixty-seven percent of the contracting respondents believed that contractor 
personnel performing procurement functions should not be physically separated 
from Government contracting personnel, while almost eighty percent of program 
management personnel expressed this opinion.  The reasons for this position 
primarily included the professional interaction and synergy needed to efficiently 
perform procurement functions and the need to be close to the customer for effective 
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stated that the Government-contractor employees were a team and should be 
building a solid working relationship.  Those performing contracting functions should 
not be separated because they learn from each other.  One respondent felt a 
Government contract specialist might pay more for an item than their contractor 
counterpart because the former did not have the procurement knowledge possessed 
by the latter, ultimately costing the Government more.  Separation would not create 
a very conducive work environment or atmosphere and would tend to develop an 
“us” versus “them” mentality.  With multi-functional Government teams, it would be 
detrimental to segregate the contractor employees.   
Several respondents suggested that communication is a key ingredient to 
effective contracting, especially if it is face-to-face. Physically separating 
Government and contractor employees hampers communication. Services involve 
personal interaction and relationships, and physical separation simply artificially 
complicates performance of a cohesive objective.  One respondent related that 
contractor employees were originally physically separated but were relocated to their 
facility because the ability of Government personnel to interact with contractors was 
very difficult.  Some respondents answered “No,” but explained that contractor 
personnel should not be part of the Government organization; they should clearly 
identify their workspace with separate e-mail accounts, phone identification, badges, 
and other similar administrative structures.  Another answered “No,” but explained 
that contractor employees have a different set of obligations and personnel rules 
than Government employees. 
Those responding positively to this question generally pointed to the potential 
for direction by the Government to lead to personal services, or to the access 
contractor employees would have to procurement sensitive information that might 
give them an unfair advantage.  Actual conflicts of interest, or at least the 
appearance of such conflicts, was also cited. An example was a contractor 
performing closeout functions who was also competing on another contract effort 
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emphasize that private industry personnel must have a supervisor so that 
Government personnel are not managing and directing contractor employees.  The 
supervisor is also needed to ensure the contractor employees are not working 
outside the scope of the contract.  A COR must be assigned to review the 
“deliverables,” which would have to be an 1102 type in order to understand if the 
“deliverable” is acceptable. One respondent suggested that physical separation 
would assist in the perception that the services were not personal but wasn’t sure 
about its practicality.  One said that “no way should the contractor have access to 
quotes or other proprietary data sent to contract specialists in the mail, left on their 
desks or discussed in their offices.” 
A majority of the Air Force respondents, seventy-eight percent, believe that 
contractor personnel performing procurement functions should not be physically 
separated from Government contracting personnel.   Those qualifying their “no 
separation” positions expressed common themes, including (in priority order): 
 Contractor personnel must be part of the Government team.  
 Co-location is required for conducting adequate oversight.  
 Greater efficiencies result from co-location.  
 Command, control, and communications require co-location.  
Those responding “Yes,” which indicates a need to be physically separated, 
cited the potential for creating personal services situations, security concerns, and 
conflicts of interest.  However, it must be noted that within this survey population 
group, the “separatists” were only fifteen percent of the total.  Hence, an overall 
majority believed that the contractors and Government personnel should be co-
located.  
8. General Remarks 
Question 17 solicited comments not covered by any of the other questions 
on the survey.  Hopefully respondents would speak freely regarding their opinions 
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About twenty-five percent of the respondents provided comments under this 
question.  One individual felt that before any contracting function performed by 
Government personnel is contracted out, a commercial activities study under A-76 
needs to be performed.  She cautioned not to downplay the divisive affect this might 
have on the workforce.  Another respondent believes that contractor support is 
another tool for the Government to accomplish its mission when specialized 
assistance is needed during surge conditions.  Others felt that the shortage of 
Government contracts personnel will have to be accommodated by contractors.  
One suggested that the issue could conceivably come down to an issue of public 
trust.  Would the taxpayer be comfortable with contractors directly involved in 
making decisions about how their money is spent and with whom?  Another stated 
that he personally believes the Government needs to contract out fewer 
procurement functions.  There are certain areas that may be conducive, but overall 
the Government needs to be accountable and responsible for contracting.  
Sometimes the tendency is to rely on using contractors rather than incentivizing 
people to become Government contracting personnel.   
Facing reality, one respondent said that procurement continues to become 
more complex and the workload expands constantly.  Government Contracting 
Officers have an impossible and often thankless job.  Strong and consistent expert 
contractor support would stabilize the work environment.  “My preference would be 
to have a strong intern program and continue to utilize only Government contracting 
professionals, but I don’t think that’s practical or possible in today’s world.” 
One individual stated that some Government procurement officials say that 
contracting functions should never be contracted out because contractors have 
access to other contractors’ data, and the information can be used to gain a 
competitive advantage.  However, Government employees have access to the same 
data, and those individuals can use that data in an unethical way that causes harm 
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person is in the Government, doesn’t mean they are better at protecting sensitive 
data. 
Commenting on the implementation of DAWIA and its affect on the workforce, 
one individual stated: if DAWIA, as initially intended, had been completed, there 
would probably be less shortage of Government interns and contract specialists.  
The purpose of this Act was to professionalize the acquisition series through specific 
training, on-the-job experience and completion of formal education in business-
related fields.  Subsequently, the acquisition employees should have been provided 
a special pay above that of the general schedule, such as for engineers, teachers, 
etc.  Since the increased pay has never been implemented, there is just too much 
workload on the acquisition professionals, especially those in contracting.  The 
younger generations want to know that they will get paid more competitively in 
exchange for meeting the DAWIA requirements and carrying the heavy workloads.  
It is difficult for the Government to compete with industry based upon 
disproportionate salaries for similar career fields.  The Government salaries continue 
to lag farther behind that of the industry counterparts, as laws have not been 
enforced to bring the Government salaries on par.  Thus, Government employees in 
acquisition career fields, especially contracting, are becoming more scarce as 
people continue to go to industry for better pay and benefits. 
In a well-crafted statement, one respondent said:  
Contracting, which is a small part of the acquisition process, is based on 
regulations and is an actual process that can be defined and measured.  
Contracting is just one of many dots on the Acquisition Process Line.  This 
should not be considered for outsourcing, unless there is significant data to 
prove that value has been added and that it is cost effective.  What you make 
up in retirement savings, you spend in contract surveillance.  If poor 
performance should occur under an outsourced scenario, the Government 
has its rights to take action, but the action will only aid in the delay of supplies 
and services that may be needed to support our warfighters, or a significant 
program that may fall under a non-DOD agency.  You cannot take the time to 
take action on poor performance and allow the procurement process of critical 
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One individual stated:  
I do not believe that contractors (private firms) should be performing any 
portion of the contracting function.  If the contracting function is contracted 
out, the Government will eventually become embroiled in allegations of 
improper or illegal short cuts, nepotism, and corruption.  Private firms are not 
held to the same standards as Government Contracting Officers, and always 
make allowances that increase their profits.  If the Government feels that 
Contracting Officers cannot perform their duties fast enough, then it is up to 
the Government to target problems and improve their management.  Hiring 
private firms to accomplish inherently governmental tasks will become our 
future headaches and headlines. 
Among Air Force comments were those expressing concerns that too much 
contracting out was occurring.  Specific comments were that contracting and 
procurement functions are too critical to have contractors performing those 
functions, and in some cases, it was too expensive to do it at all.  
Others expressed opinions that contracting out procurement functions is 
perfectly acceptable to meet emerging needs and challenges, provided there is 
proper decision-making authority and oversight.   
C. Chapter Summary 
This chapter has summarized and reported the results of surveys and 
interviews conducted with Management and Operating Level personnel from both 
the contracting and program management communities.  Although the contracting 
surveys were received from individuals around the country in all Services and 
selected Defense Agencies, acquisition personnel in the program management and 
technical areas located at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, were specifically 
targeted for this research.  This was done in order to obtain program office 
perspective and insight on the issues associated with contracting for procurement 
services.   
Briefly, the following areas were presented and discussed: respondents’ 
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or are not contracting out, the protocols used by organizations to avoid personal 
services relationships, the difficulty of applying DAWIA or DAWIA-like requirements 
to contractor employees, the effectiveness of contracts used to procure contracting 
functions and the positive and negative aspects of contractor performance, the 
metrics or measures of effectiveness used to monitor and evaluate contractor 
performance, the likely impact of contracting out on the Government’s ability to 
develop Contracting Officers and to consider various procurement options, how the 
integrity of the contracting process can be protected, any limitations regarding the 
numbers or percentages of contractor employees that should be permitted in any 
one buying organization, and if co-location of contracter and Government employees 
should be allowed. An analysis of all these areas, together with responses from 










This chapter will analyze and attempt to develop some perspective regarding 
the issues brought out in the surveys, interviews and pertinent literature set forth in 
previous chapters.  For some participants, contracting out is an emotional issue.  Not 
only can it affect whether and/or how an individual will be employed by an 
organization, but it goes to the heart of membership in a professional community.  
This is true for individuals in both Government service and private industry. 
The first area to be explored is the range of statutory and regulatory issues 
affected by contracting out, including: inherently governmental functions, personal 
services relationships, conflicts of interest, legal issues, and ethics.  The second 
area to be discussed involves the various acquisition issues including: procurement 
functions contracted out, the effectiveness of contracted services, limitations on 
contracted support, experience and training requirements, the impact on the 
contracting system, the integrity of the contracting process, and procurement policy. 
B. Statutory and Regulatory Issues 
1. Inherently Governmental Functions 
“The contracting function is inherently governmental.”  This is what one 
frequently hears when asking why contracting functions are not contracted out.  
Because contracting is viewed by many as a core capability that must be performed 
by civil servants, there has been significant resistance to the thought of contracting 
out any part of the Government’s responsibility involving contracting.   
Recent studies have suggested that although the overall contracting function 
may be inherently governmental, there are certain tasks within this broad framework 
that might possibly be non-inherently governmental.  Born out of necessity, some 
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tasks appear to many individuals to far exceed the boundaries of acceptability.  
Although not precisely inherently governmental, many say several contracting tasks 
are so closely related to Government decision-making that they ought not be 
performed by anyone other than public employees.  Other tasks are perhaps more 
suitable for performance, if necessary, by other than Federal employees.  The tasks 
that a majority of the contracting community agrees could be contracted out tend to 
be of a low-risk, administrative, and routine nature that require very little, if any, 
contracting knowledge or expertise.  The debate continues.   
This research focused on whether respondents were aware of any functions 
considered to be inherently governmental or exempt from competition that are, in 
fact, being contracted out and the extent to which capability deficiencies forced 
organizations to identify their interpretation of inherently governmental functions.  
Lastly, from a very limited list of functions, survey participants were asked to 
distinguish those they felt were inherently governmental as opposed to those that 
were not.   
Forty percent of the respondents stated that a capability deficiency had 
caused their organization to assess whether or not a contracting function was 
inherently governmental.  The shortage of FTEs due to various forms of attrition has 
been exacerbated in recent years.  Retirements and personnel transfers (with the 
resultant loss of corporate knowledge and expertise) have forced organizations to 
rethink their position regarding tasks contractors can perform.  The sixty percent that 
said they had not made this assessment are from organizations that long ago 
decided that certain contracting tasks were non-IGF, have decided the entire 
function is off limits to contracts, or have had sufficient resources to meet workload 
demands.  The number of organizations in this last category seems to be dwindling. 
When asked if they knew about inherently governmental functions that are 
being contracted out, slightly fewer than twenty percent acknowledged that this is 
happening.  Although this may seem like a small number, it points out that there are 
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part of this is probably due to the disparity between those who believe that some 
contracting tasks are IGFs and others who do not. 
In analyzing responses to the list of functions, survey respondents were 
asked to classify as either IGF or non-IGF, three categories have been established: 
(1) “unanimously” or predominantly IGF, (2) predominantly non-IGF, and (3) “middle 
ground.”  If no more than seventy-five percent or no fewer than twenty-five percent 
selected a function for either IGF or non-IGF, the function was placed in the “middle 
ground” and remains widely open to interpretation.  Table 5-3 in Chapter V 
presented the raw data regarding responses, while Table 7-1 below displays the 
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Table 7-1. Senior Contracting Personnel Views of Inherently Governmental vs Non-
Inherently Governmental Functions 
Inherently Governmental “Middle Ground” Non-Inherently 
Governmental 
Requirements determination   
 Developing Statements of Work  
 Structuring market research  
  Conducting market research 
 Performing acquisition planning  
 Developing solicitation documents  
 Issuing solicitation documents  
 Developing and applying evaluation criteria  
 Member of  Source Selection Evaluation 
Board  
 Evaluation of proposals/offers  
 Performing cost and price analysis  
Negotiating contract prices, terms 
& conditions  
 
Structuring & approving incentive 
plans 
  
 Preparing price negotiation memoranda  
Awarding contracts   
Negotiating contract modifications   
Determining cost allowability   
Exercising options   
 Assessing contractor performance  
Implementing action based on 
contractor performance 
  
Accepting or rejecting goods & 
services 
  
Terminating contracts   
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All of the IGFs cited above involve some type of Contracting Officer 
determination and/or decision which are considered by almost everyone to be within 
the Government’s purview.  The two functions identified as essentially non-IGF have 
been performed by contractors for several years and now seem to be the accepted 
norm.  The “middle ground” functions are basically the area of debate.  Functions 
listed close to the left of the box received the majority of IGF responses, while those 
functions close to the right received the majority of non-IGF responses.  Structuring 
market research is closely related to conducting market research and developing 
solicitation documents can easily be distinguished as a support effort.  These two 
functions could have easily slipped into the non-IGF category.   Performing cost and 
price analysis is the function that seems to generate the most heated debate.  Many 
believe it to be integrally involved in either the negotiation process or a Contracting 
Officer’s determination of price reasonableness, or both, and that it should not be 
contracted out.  Further, considered by several to be a core capability, it is also 
judged to be one of the weakest skills held by the Government and badly in need of 
significant training and hands-on experience.  Although tending toward the IGF side, 
acquisition planning, evaluation of offers, and preparing price negotiation 
memoranda are just as easily viewed by many as non-IGF.   
Perhaps a helpful process would be the development of a hierarchy of 
functions that starts with absolutely inherently governmental functions and ends with 
functions almost no one would object to contracting out.  A pyramid that suggests a 
conceptual approach is presented in Figure 7-1.  This hierarchy serves somewhat as 
a taxonomy of functions or tasks in that it allows users to identify the characteristics 
they want to use to distinguish or differentiate functions for various purposes.  Once 
the objectives of classification have been defined, the users may then proceed to “fill 
in” the various levels of the pyramid with appropriate contracting tasks.  Justification 
for placement into the various levels should be explicitly supported, thus allowing 
comparison among various organizations as to where a function is classified and the 
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Figure 7-1 displays four different categories of contracting functions in color 
coded format.  Functions determined to be inherently governmental reside in the top 
level and are coded red to indicate they are not to be contracted out.  Functions so 
closely intermingled with IGFs as to demand performance by civil servants is 
presented in the second tier in yellow to connote severe caution in attempting any 
contracting out.  Functions that are potential candidates for competitive sourcing are 
at the third tier and are color coded blue to indicate the possibility these could be, 
with careful consideration, performed by contractors.  The next tier consists of 
functions widely accepted for contractor performance and, in many cases, are 
already being accomplished by contractor personnel.  This tier is color coded green 
to indicate these functions are extremely good candidates for contracting out.  The 
last tier is actually not in the pyramid, but rather is the base or support for the 
framework to imply that the administrative tasks performed by non-contracting 
personnel are a significant component of the overall contracting process. Examples 
of contracting functions that could be placed into each of these categories are found 
in Figure 7-1.  Arrayed next to the pyramid are some of the skills needed to perform 
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Figure 7-1. Hierarchy of Contracting Functions 
 
2. Personal Services Relationships 
As noted in Chapter V, over eighty-five percent of the respondents believe 
there are potential problems with personal services relationships when contracting 
for procurement services.  On the one hand, as will be noted later in this chapter, 
there is an overwhelming indication that contractor employees need to be co-located 
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On the other hand, this close proximity presents the very ingredients that lead to 
personal services situations.  Many of the respondents felt that because 
Government and contractor specialists had to work together so intimately to perform 
their responsibilities that such a relationship was inevitable.  
Not directly causing a personal services dilemma but linked to the close 
working relationship are the circumstances involving “acceptance” of the service or 
work product performed by contractors.  Products or goods have a very definitive 
acceptance or rejection process that requires specific Government action.  Services 
do not have similar acceptance procedures.  In the case of contracting functions, 
who is accepting the contractor’s work product, and how formal is the process?  If 
the Government proceeds to use work packages submitted by contractors, de facto 
acceptance has probably occurred without an overt action.  At this point, the 
Government would certainly be liable for the decisions made based on the 
contractor input that later proved to be faulty and damaging.  A test of this situation, 
to the researchers’ knowledge, has yet to occur, but the potential certainly exists 
The Acquisition Advisory Panel (2007) found that the prohibition on personal 
services contracts has compelled agencies to create unwieldy procedural 
safeguards and guidelines to avoid such contracts.  They suggested the 
administration of these contracts could be inefficient and recommended the 
restriction on personal services contracts be removed, thus allowing Government 
supervision up to the point of hiring, approval of leave, promotion, performance 
ratings and other similar supervisory responsibilities.  The Panel concluded that 
Congress should statutorily resolve the ambiguity rather than wait for a regulatory 
revision. 
None of the survey respondents voiced an opinion that the prohibition on 
personal services contracts should be eliminated.  If given a choice, however, it is 
suspected that a majority would willingly agree with the Acquisition Advisory Panel 
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3. Conflicts of Interest 
Conflicts of interest in Government procurement have always been a matter 
of concern.  Because the Government bends over backwards to ensure fairness and 
equity to all parties in the procurement process, any actual or even perceived 
situation in which someone obtains, or appears to obtain, more favorable treatment 
or might be treated unfairly is generally dealt with in a vigorous fashion.  
This research focused on circumstances in which conflicts of interest might 
become a problem when contracting for procurement services.  Survey participants 
responded with numerous situations they believed could easily occur unless 
precautionary measures were instituted.  Access to company proprietary and 
business sensitive information, competing in cases in which firms participated in 
developing requirements, an actual or perceived ability to influence procurement 
actions, biases against certain companies for obvious or even unknown reasons, 
insight into the Government’s requirements process, mergers and acquisitions that 
cause questionable affiliations, and other similar opportunities to inappropriately 
affect Government procurement were cited as potential problems with contractors.  
One step to lessen the potential for conflicts of interest is to establish firewalls within 
the organization that prevent contractor employees from operating outside the 
specific boundaries of their particular project.  In reality, this becomes very 
expensive to structure and enforce.  One drawback is that this does not allow 
contractor personnel to transfer knowledge and freely interact with Government 
contract specialists outside their firewall, which has been cited as a benefit to having 
contractors present in the first place. 
Perhaps even more disconcerting would be a situation in which a foreign 
company acquired interest in a firm performing Government contracting functions.  
Several foreign companies are essentially “nationalized” and, therefore, have very 
close ties with their government.  Just the thought of foreign control over U.S. 
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Some respondents remarked that conflicts of interest could also easily occur 
with civil servants working so closely with contractor employees.  Differences in 
compensation, future employment opportunities, and personal friendships with 
contractor employees that may even have originated when both worked for the 
Government were observed as some of the conflict of interest situations in which 
civil servants could become embroiled.  The Procurement Integrity Act was 
established in the 1980s to address some of the problems leading to personal 
conflicts of interest and violations of ethical behavior.  One requirement of the Act 
concerns steps procurement officials must take if contacted about private 
employment during certain phases of the contracting process.  The Acquisition 
Advisory Panel believes that, because the FAR provides considerable leeway to 
agencies in addressing actual or potential conflicts of interest, and because there is 
a lack of guidance in mitigating such conflicts (leading to inconsistent application of 
the regulations), uniform regulatory language is needed. 
4. Legal Issues 
Although a survey question regarding legal issues was worded a bit differently 
in this research than in the DAU study, the results here seem to vary somewhat from 
their findings.  Over sixty percent of the respondents in that study replied that they 
did not receive any legal limits or concerns in the guidance provided regarding 
contracted procurement services.  This research asked if there are any legal issues 
or impediments, to which over eighty-five percent responded in the affirmative.  
Looking closely at the explanations, however, it is apparent that both groups of 
respondents are concerned about: (1) violating the prohibition against placing 
inherently governmental functions on contract, (2) averting personal services 
relationships, and (3) avoiding organizational conflicts of interest.  As discussed 
earlier, proper non-disclosure agreements, financial disclosure statements, and 
vigorous application of safeguards and security mechanisms are critical to 
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It is well known that civil and criminal penalties await Federal employees if 
they violate statutes prohibiting unethical and improper behavior in the execution of 
their responsibilities.  This is generally not true if contractor employees performing 
procurement functions for the Government act in this manner.  The Acquisition 
Advisory Panel referred to testimony that some have expressed serious concerns 
regarding the inappropriate conduct of individual contractor employees.  Several 
situations concerning contractor personnel involved with financial conflicts of 
interest, impaired impartiality, misuse of information, misuse of authority and misuse 
of Government property have transpired.  There has been some discussion about 
the suitability of changing the laws to make them applicable to contracted employees 
when they are working on behalf of the Government.  Despite the situations 
mentioned above, the Acquisition Advisory Panel… “does not believe the 
requirements imposed on contractors and their personnel—through the contract and 
solicitation clauses or otherwise—should incorporate the extensive and complex 
requirements imposed on federal employees by existing statutes….” (p. 423).  It is 
believed that this recommendation should be reconsidered.  Although extremely 
heightened awareness regarding Federal employees and their behavioral 
transgressions has been publicized, high profile cases continue to occur.  The 
Darleen Druyun affair is a prime example of the continued need to be extremely 
vigilant.  At the very least, contractor personnel should be held liable and 
accountable for actions taken in their capacity as “Government agents.”  Whether 
this is accomplished statutorily or through contractual clauses, some action in this 
direction is absolutely crucial.  There appears to be a wide disparity between the 
actions that can be taken in response to Government transgressions versus 
contractor wrongdoing.  One major incident on the private side similar to Druyun and 
the public outcry will likely be thunderous. 
5. Ethics 
The subject of ethics in Government contracting is complex and difficult.  
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occur, the reaction, from Congress in particular, is to tighten the reins on the 
workforce.  Frequently included under the concept of ethics are considerations 
regarding fraud, waste and abuse; conflicts of interest; standards of conduct; 
improper business practices; and procurement integrity.   
This issue was brought up on the Policy and Senior Management 
questionnaire.  A significant majority of the survey respondents believe that ethical 
issues are associated with contracting for procurement services.  To some, this took 
the form of organizational conflicts of interest, while to others, it involved contractor 
access to procurement sensitive information and the opportunity to take unfair 
advantage of the system.  Most of the respondents expressed concern about 
contractor loyalties and motivations, which might impair their objectivity and 
impartiality when acting as an “agent” for the Government.  The judgment and 
interpretation of the laws and regulations by Government employees should not be 
replaced by contractor personnel.   The best interests of the Government should be 
foremost in any action taken by someone in the contracting process.  Misgivings can 
easily arise when contractor employees are taking these actions. Trust in the system 
can be easily and seriously jeopardized.   
This is not to say that Government employees are above reproach when it 
comes to improper behavior.  The Darleen Druyun case is a glaring example that 
greed and selfishness still exist and, despite even the most robust preventive 
measures, some are willing to give up all sense of self-respect and dignity to attain 
personal benefit.  In a report (GAO, 2005a) to Congress, GAO criticized DOD’s 
ethics program.  It reported that, in general, DOD lacks the knowledge to determine 
whether internal training and counseling efforts are meeting ethics objectives and 
that  DOD’s knowledge of defense contractor efforts to promote ethical standards is 
also limited.   
If the procurement of contracting services is to occur and expand beyond its 
current boundaries, there is a definite need to ensure that ethics and standards of 
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C. Acquisition Issues 
1. Procurement Functions Contracted Out 
a. Extent to Which Procurement Functions Are Contracted out 
In order to determine the extent to which procurement functions are being 
contracted out, both surveys asked if such functions were being obtained on 
contract.  The results from all survey participants are provided in Table 7-2. 
Table 7-2. Are Procurement Functions Being Contracted out in Your 
Organization? 
 Yes No Totals 
Contracting Policy & Senior 
Management 
21 24 45 
 47% 53%  
Contracting Management & Operating 
Level Personnel 
38 17 55 
 69% 31%  
Program Mgmt/Technical Personnel 18 14 32 
 56% 44%  
Totals 77 55 132 
 58% 42%  
 
A bit less than sixty percent indicated that at least some procurement 
functions are being contracted out.  Policy and senior personnel have fewer 
situations of contracting out, while management and operating personnel are 
predominantly from organizations that are contracting out procurement functions.  
When isolating the Defense Agencies from the other organizations (observed in 
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looking only at Navy and Marine Corps organizations (also observed in Tables 5-11 
and 6-1a), that number dropped slightly below forty percent.  These findings are 
consistent with the DAU study, which found the Defense Agencies had the highest 
ratio of contracted support services and the Navy and Marine Corps had the lowest. 
b. Types of Functions Contracted Out 
When asked which functions are involved, contract closeout was identified 
with the greatest frequency.  This was true for all Services and the Defense 
Agencies.  Policy and senior management personnel tended to cite market research, 
acquisition planning, drafting policy, developing evaluation criteria, evaluation of 
offers, and requirements development as the predominant functions contracted out.  
Some policy/senior personnel did state, however, that all functions performed by 
1102s, except for inherently governmental functions, are placed on contract.  The 
percentage of management and operating personnel who reported functions 
contracted out in their organizations was much higher and included all functions 
ranging from all pre-award to all post-award phases.  All contract specialist functions 
in support of the Contracting Officer were mentioned.  Most were careful to explain 
that the approvals, determinations and decisions made by Contracting Officers were 
not included in the mix. 
Over recent years, the numbers and types of functions contracted out have 
greatly increased.  Some organizations have become concerned that too great a 
percentage of workforce positions are filled with contractor employees and have 
begun to develop plans to reduce that percentage.  The DAU study recommended 
that organizations limit the percentage of contractor employees to no more than 
twenty-five percent of the total workforce.  
c. Reasons for Contracting out 
As noted in Chapters V and VI, the most prevalent reasons for contracting out 
are the lack of organic resources to meet workload demands and the lack of needed 
skills or expertise in certain areas.  The continual downsizing and freezes on hiring 
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has severely strained the contracting community.  In certain geographical areas, 
there is constant turnover and an inability to fill 1102 vacancies with qualified 
applicants.   In some cases, contractors are used in order to obtain exposure to 
business concepts and insight into commercial practices and technology. 
Adjacent to this reasoning is the fact that hiring contractors is generally easier 
and faster than trying to obtain Federal employees through the cumbersome civil 
service personnel process.  Contractors provide greater flexibility in adjusting to 
workload fluctuations, particularly due to surge situations.  They can also provide 
continuity in those cases in which organizations are experiencing a very high 
turnover of contract specialists.   
d. Reasons for Not Contracting out 
The most common reason for not contracting out procurement functions is 
that the organization believes all aspects of contracting are inherently governmental.  
Even if the organization did not consider contracting inherently governmental, there 
was a preference against contracting out, especially if interchangeability of 
personnel or adaptability was threatened.  In smaller contracting offices, Contracting 
Officers are performing most contract specialist functions, which would be difficult to 
untangle from their decision-making functions.  In some cases, the organization 
claimed that sufficient resources existed to meet workload requirements or that 
outsourcing the functions did not provide any additional advantages.  A few 
organizations indicated that the potential for conflicts of interest or other ethical 
problems has steered them away from using contractors.  In a couple of cases, 
respondents felt contractors were more expensive than Government employees. 
One scenario that has been cause for concern is contractor default.  Buying 
offices that have turned over contract specialist workload to contractor employees 
may be in a difficult situation if the contractor is terminated for default.  It would be 
arduous to explain to the buying office’s customers that procurement actions are 
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workforce consisted of contractor employees, the added burden of contractor default 
may be too overwhelming for the civil servants in the office. 
e. Authority for Contracted Services 
Contracting for services performed by Federal Government employees is 
generally covered by OMB Circular A-76, if they are commercial activities.  Certainly, 
activities that are inherently governmental, by definition, are not commercial 
activities.  As discussed earlier, the problem is that there is not complete agreement 
as to what are or are not inherently governmental functions.  Regardless, the 
researchers wanted to determine what authority or rule governed the acquisition of 
contracting services, particularly since the DAU study concluded that advisory and 
assistance services was the appropriate aegis under which procurement services 
should be obtained.  Approximately one-third of the policy and senior management 
respondents did, in fact, point to A&AS as the authority.  Over half the respondents 
either did not respond to the question or stated it to be not applicable.  It appears 
that those who choose to answer the question are, by and large, familiar with the 
A&AS contracting.  This question was not on the management and operating level 
personnel survey. 
This research has not found that A&AS contracts are an inappropriate vehicle 
for obtaining contracted services, however, a careful reading of FAR 37.2 does 
seem to indicate that some of the reasons contracted services are being acquired 
may be inconsistent with the language and intent of A&AS.  Several organizations 
remarked that procurement functions are being contracted out because they do not 
have the human capital resources to meet workload demands.  Is this inconsistent 
with the requirement that A&AS shall not be used to bypass or undermine personnel 
ceilings?  Further, as will be discussed in the next section, the FAR language 
discussing appropriate use of these contracts appears to expect a temporary 
contractual relationship to obtain specific support, advice, and opinions rather than 
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2. Effectiveness of Contracted Services 
a. Views of Effectiveness 
Management and Operating Level personnel expressed overwhelmingly that 
contracts for procuring contracting functions were highly effective or somewhat 
effective.  A deeper analysis of the results, however, show that most of the 
respondents indicating a positive effectiveness of contracts based their evaluation 
on a simple objective set of metrics. First, did contractor performance allow the 
command to meet its mission? And second, was overall performance good enough 
to consider the contractor for future work?  The heart of the rudimentary metric gets 
at the most basic rationale for contracting out any function: getting the job done and 
getting it done satisfactorily. Responses are based primarily on criteria that find their 
basis in whether the contractor allowed the activity or business unit to achieve its 
mission or productivity goals, and additionally, whether the contractor had any 
significant performance problems that would preclude it from being considered as a 
candidate for future award of similar work. 
What was striking to the researchers about the responses is that no other 
criteria for measuring effectiveness were being systemically applied.  Examining the 
responses in the context of several of the framework elements presented earlier in 
this research, none of the personnel offered any clearly defined metrics that are 
actually being used.  This rudimentary approach to determining effectiveness should 
not be discounted, however.  Whether a contractor allows an entity to meet its goals, 
and whether that contractor’s performance is good enough to be considered for 
repeat business is at the heart of any sound criteria for effectiveness.  The 
researchers use an analogy of a private individual having a car repaired at a local 
repair shop.  The bottom line criteria most people would use to assess the 
performance in that instance are whether the car was properly repaired (mission) 
and whether the business did its work in a manner that makes one want to use that 
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What is challenging for contract managers is that these types of metrics are 
difficult to capture in any detailed objective format.  The subjective nature of this type 
of assessment by the population surveyed is very common.  It is, in fact, a measure 
that can be captured by Past Performance Information (PPI) systems and the 
Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) currently in use 
within  DOD.  These systems are not without their deficiencies, however.  First, they 
are subject to dilution—wherein a preponderance of positive evaluations can 
obfuscate a small number of negative evaluations, even when the negative 
evaluations should be preeminent in the decision process for future award.  Second, 
there is grade inflation in the reporting system, often resulting from the rebuttal 
process accorded to contractors that receive negative or detrimental evaluations.  
Often, evaluators will provide a neutral or positive evaluation to avoid contentious 
rebuttals.  Third, the criteria may be measured against unclear and arbitrary 
benchmarks, as clearly objective criteria are often not being utilized on a systemic 
basis.  
b. An Analytical Model 
Given the obvious limitations of existing measures, the researchers contend 
that a clear framework or model should be utilized to examine contracting out 
procurement functions.  It is proposed that a hybrid three-dimensional model 
incorporating elements from: (1) the Lehner 12-phase acquisition process; (2) the 
three application metric concepts of process, workforce, and outputs; and (3) the 
qualitative and quantitative elements of metrics.  All three of these were presented in 
Chapter IV. 
The first dimension of the framework incorporates the six contracting phases.   
The second dimension is the application association of the metric: process, 
workforce, and outputs.  The third dimension is the nature and type of metric, either 
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Figure 7-2. Metric Analytical Model 
 
Recommended metrics for each of the six contracting phases are presented 
in Appendix C.  The recommendations span the three dimensions and should be 
utilized as an aid to developing additional tailored metrics uniquely suited to the 
application and requirements of the contracting activity.  Any such tailoring should 
incorporate performance goals and benchmark standards to ensure proper 
alignment to strategy and mission.   
Contracts for contracting out any or all of the functions within the six phases 
should have metrics to gauge effectiveness and efficiency of the processes, 
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quality (subjectively).  The three dimensions of metrics should be structured with 
enough diversity as to elicit useful statistical information, managerial and actionable 
data, and motivation and incentives to perform to desired parameters.   
Each of the six contracting phases are presented with the secondary and 
tertiary dimensions discussed within each phase.  The reader should note that the 
metrics recommended within each phase are key representatives of the metrics that 
should be generated.  Metrics should be tailored, using this framework, to the unique 
requirements of the activity awarding the contract.   Also note that throughout these 
examples presented, qualitative adjectives of excellent, good, and poor are utilized, 
but, any meaningful rating system can be used, such as color coding, adjectival 
assessment, or numeric scoring. 
The three-dimensional model’s first dimension is the six contracting phases, 
consisting of: (1) acquisition planning, (2) solicitation, (3) evaluation of offers, (4) 
negotiation, (5) contract award, and (6) contract administration.  These six phases 
make up the backbone of the model.   The metrics will be structured to meet the 
unique requirements of each of these phases.  Within each of the phases are the 
secondary metrics related to process, workforce, and outputs, and the tertiary 
metrics related to quantity and quality. 
1. Acquisition Planning   
The contracting process really begins in the acquisition planning phase, in 
which the strategy and elements for a sound contract begin to materialize.  The 
acquisition plan is where all the personnel responsible for an acquisition are 
coordinated and integrated through a comprehensive approach for fulfilling the 
requirement in a timely manner and at reasonable cost.  It is literally a roadmap that 
contains all the “who, what, where, when, why and how” elements required in 
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2. Solicitation    
The solicitation phase brings the contracting strategy defined in the 
acquisition planning phase into action.  The requirement, which has been 
transformed into solicitation format and language, is released to the public. It 
includes all proper business protocols that may be unique to the strategy and 
process defined in the acquisition plan.  For example, if FAR Part 12 for commercial 
item acquisition is utilized, it garners a unique set of protocols that will be followed 
throughout the solicitation and subsequent phases.  Creating sound metrics for 
determining the effectiveness of this process is essential. 
3. Evaluation of Offers    
The evaluation of offers is both art and science in that strict adherence to 
established statutory and regulatory requirements, while maintaining an objective 
and unbiased evaluation of proposals against the criteria published in the solicitation 
is critical.  At any time prior to award, and up to ten days after the announcement of 
the award, any party with a material interest in the outcome of the award may file a 
protest.  Normally, protests are sustained based on the Government’s failure to 
conduct the evaluation process in accordance with established statutes and 
regulations and/or failure to follow the prescribed evaluation criteria.  Additionally, 
bias in the process can materially alter outcomes, resulting in potential protest or 
loss of process integrity.  There are myriad actions that occur within this phase, all of 
which can have associated metrics assigned.  For example, determining a 
competitive range and conducting debriefings are actions that could be measured.   
Metrics for contractors performing evaluation of offers are essential to ensure the  
processes and outputs are effective.   
4. Negotiations    
Conducting discussions with offerors may be required in certain, but not all, 
circumstances.  Even when FAR 15 provisions are utilized, some solicitations may 
use a clause reserving the Government’s right to award without discussions.  When 
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This function requires metrics that measure the skill and abilities a contract 
negotiator is able to bring to the negotiating table.  Critical thinking skills, verbal 
expression, objectivity, analytical ability, tolerance for ambiguity, ability to listen, and 
many more are all elements that need to be measured. 
5. Contract Award   
The award of a Federal contract is inherently Governmental, thus, the 
ultimate decision to award belongs to a warranted Contracting Officer.   However, 
there are supporting roles and tasks that could be candidates for contracting out, 
such as the preparation and presentation of debriefs for unsuccessful offerors, post-
award orientation preparation, file documentation, and administration.  FAR 42 
suggests that post-award orientation is an administrative function, but  preparation 
for the orientation often occurs within the award phase so that timely 
commencement of performance can occur.  Since protests can be filed up to and 
including ten days after the contract award, the vigilance towards process integrity 
and accountability remains paramount.  Within this realm, metrics for effectiveness 
can be assigned appropriately.  
6. Contract Administration    
Many people would argue that the post-award phase of contract management 
and administration is actually when the quality of all previous phases become 
evident.  Any latent defects in construct or protocol tend to surface in this phase.  
Contract administration could have myriad criteria, simply because the universe of 
management and administrative functions is so large and diverse.  Contracting 
organizations are inclined to contract out some of these functions if either the 
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) or organic personnel are not 
available or capable of accomplishing the task.   
FAR 42 presents many of the most common functions required for contract 
management and administration.  There are seventy functions specifically 
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orientation conferences, determining the allowability of costs suspended or 
disapproved as required, issuing work requests under maintenance contracts, and 
performing property administration, to name only a few.  When a contract is 
assigned for administration, the contract administration office (CAO) perform 
functions in accordance with 48 CFR Chapter I, the contract terms, and, unless 
otherwise agreed to in an interagency agreement, the applicable regulations of the 
servicing agency.  Contracting Officers normally delegate these functions to the 
DCMA unless the agency has requested the Contracting Officer to perform them.    
Many respondents to the surveys indicated that since these were normally 
DCMA functions, they were unaware of the metrics that were utilized to determine 
effectiveness.  However, contracting out these functions requires a metric set that 
will allow the agency or activity to manage the contractor performing these functions. 
It is important to note that when constructing and utilizing metrics, there must 
be an appropriate balance, or diversity, within the metrics.  The balance and 
diversity helps to identify and offset any negative organizational and process 
behaviors that can result from matching outcomes to specific metrics.  For example, 
a number of years ago, the Navy utilized a financial reimbursement mechanism for 
contracting activities known as the Productive Unit Resourcing System (PURS).  
This system allocated funds for use by contracting activities for personnel allocation 
based on the type and complexity of the contract actions it awarded.  One of the 
metrics allocated dollars for the number of modifications that the command awarded.  
The researchers witnessed phenomena on a contracting production floor directly 
related to the metric in that a very large modifications section was created, with 
several employees creating hundreds of modifications each month.  Often, the 
modifications were simple administrative corrections with little to no real value.  The 
metric was driving behavior in an unacceptable manner.  This example is cited to 
illustrate that metrics must be monitored and have diverse balance to ensure desired 
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c. Metric Conclusion    
There was universal belief among respondents that contracts used to acquire 
procurement functions were either “Highly Effective” or “Somewhat Effective”.  The 
primary means for the determination of effectiveness was based on whether the 
contracting function was able to meet its mission, and whether the contractor would 
be considered for future award.  The metrics currently utilized present a very limited 
picture of effectiveness.  They lack clear criteria and dimensions essential to 
effectively gauge the broader dimensions of the contracting processes normally 
contracted out.   
3. Limitations on Effort Contracted out 
Three aspects of limitations on contractors performing procurement functions 
were explored.  First was the length of contracted support effort.  This area was 
queried on the Policy surveys.  Next was whether contractors should be physically 
located with Government personnel performing the same tasks or if contractors 
should work in separate facilities.  Last was the extent to which a percentage of the 
procurement effort could be contracted out.  The latter two areas were presented on 
the Management and Operating Level personnel surveys. 
a. Duration of Contracts 
There is widespread belief that acquiring contracted procurement services is 
governed by the policies and procedures for advisory and assistance services 
(A&AS) in FAR Part 37.  Although the FAR language does not now place limits on 
the duration of contracts for such services, the original policy did envision these 
contracts would be of a temporary nature.  Many senior acquisition managers were 
brought up with this position.  As reported in Chapter V, over sixty percent of the 
respondents believe these contracts should be of a temporary nature.  Interestingly, 
organizations which tended to currently have more procurement functions contracted 
out were split over the idea of temporary versus permanent.  The proponents for 
temporary contracts feel it should only be used for surge or emergent requirements 
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more permanent duration feel it will be several years, if ever, before Government 
resource requirements are met, thus, they feel we should accept the reality of this 
situation by expecting a lasting contractual relationship.  Some feel that certain 
tasks, such as contract closeout, have such a low priority they might never be 
appropriately completed without contractor support and should be made permanent 
regardless of in-house resource levels. 
It appears to the researchers that almost all of the reasons cited in the FAR to 
be valid alternatives for the use of A&AS contracts seem to imply temporary 
situations.  Obtaining advice, points of view, opinions, special knowledge, alternative 
solutions, support to improve operations, and assistance with more efficient and 
effective operation of managerial or hardware systems all give the impression that 
agency management would acquire these “consultant” services on an as-needed 
basis. Further, the language does not give the impression that the performance of 
routine tasks on a day-to-day basis is the intent of employing this capability.  If 
management policy is to utilize contracted support only if we must, then certainly all 
contracts for this support should be viewed as temporary until no longer required.  If 
management policy is to leave this up to each individual organization to decide, the 
types of functions they perform and their overall view of the procurement 
responsibility will drive their choice. 
b. Personnel Location 
Closely related to the matter of personal services relationships during contract 
performance is the location of contractor employees when they are carrying out their 
duties.  When a contractor is producing a product or item, unless Government 
facilities are involved, the work is usually accomplished at the contractor’s site.  
When services are being delivered, this frequently necessitates performance at the 
Government’s site.  Given the nature of procurement functions, one might argue that 
they could be performed independently of a Government location. This was not, 
however, the reaction of over seventy-five percent of the respondents to a question 
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Notwithstanding personal services, an overwhelming majority of respondents 
emphatically expressed the need for close communications on a face-to-face basis 
between all members of the acquisition team.  These respondents felt professional 
interaction that will occur through physical proximity outweighs any risks that might 
surface.  Past attempts at separation have shown this to severely hinder smooth 
accomplishment of the contracting functions.  The twenty-five percent who said 
contractor employees should not be in the same spaces as civil servants were not 
denying the benefits of personal interaction, but rather were intimating that the risks 
are more than we should accept.  Access to sensitive and proprietary data, security 
considerations, and the potential for conflicts of interest were of real concern. 
Some of the reasons set forth by those in favor of close proximity seem to 
involve perception.  The perception of being part of the team argues for co-location, 
while the perception of conflict of interest scenarios argues in the negative.  Other 
reasons set forth involve day-to-day working conditions (requiring communication, 
efficient interaction, and responsive feedback/input), and professional interface (to 
advance learning and understanding) seem to necessitate a blended workforce.   
Personal services concerns appear to be diminishing.  The constantly blurring 
lines between Government and contractor seem not to create the same level of 
distress as in years past.  Employees, both buyer and seller, are working closely 
together, and although the personal services line is no doubt crossed on a daily 
basis, no substantial damage appears to have occurred.  The Acquisition Advisory 
Panel has recommended that the policy be changed regarding prohibition of the 
employer-employee distinction in order to reflect realistic methods to accomplishing 
work tasks. 
c. Percent of Effort Placed on Contract 
The last area related to restrictions on the extent of contractor participation 
was the thought of confining the percentage of effort that activities can place on 
contract.  The DAU report recommended that no more than twenty-five percent of an 
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flexibility to react to surge workload situations, probably cause lower priority and less 
sensitive tasks to be assigned to contractor employees, and leave enough 
Government positions to maintain necessary experience and an acceptable 
opportunity to develop future Contracting Officers. 
The researchers decided to ask not only where the percentage limitation on 
the workforce should be established, but also what percentage of the workload 
should be limited.  Lastly, the researchers were looking for other limitations beside 
workforce and workload that might be in use or considered appropriate. 
Regarding workforce, just over fifty percent of the respondents said that it 
should be under the DAU recommended limit of twenty-five percent; up to three-
fourths of the respondents agreed to a fifty percent limitation.  Just over forty-five 
percent of the respondents believe that contracting out should be constrained to 
under fifty percent of the total workload, while that percentage increases to sixty-five 
percent if half of the workload is the limitation.  Although there were a few who cited 
other factors, over eighty-five percent of the respondents marked “Not Applicable” or 
did not answer this last question.  Focusing on the two principal factors identified 
above, workforce and workload, there is a clear feeling that somewhere under fifty 
percent of that factor is appropriate. 
4. Experience and Training Requirements 
The acquisition workforce has been criticized over the years for its lack of 
skills, knowledge and abilities to execute its responsibilities.  The Report of the 
Commission on Government Procurement, the Packard Commission Report and 
several other studies from similar groups have pointed to the need for a professional 
workforce meeting minimum standards established for education, training and 
experience.  Recommendations from these reports served as the impetus that 
created the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) and led to the 
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It would be justifiable to expect that anyone performing contracting functions 
for the Government should meet these standards and qualifications.  Should this 
expectation be extended to contractor personnel performing procurement functions 
for the Government?  And if so, how difficult would it be to impose and enforce 
DAWIA standards on contractors?  This was the issue explored in both surveys.  
The Policy and Senior Management survey asked about DAWIA implications and 
whether DAWIA should be imposed on contractors. The Management and Operating 
Level personnel survey queried participants as to the level of difficulty encountered if 
an attempt were made to compel contractors to comply.  Seventy percent of the 
policy survey respondents felt there are DAWIA implications, whereas about sixty-
five percent felt that DAWIA or DAWIA-like requirements should be imposed.  Forty-
five percent of the management/operating level personnel said it would be “Difficult” 
or “Very Difficult” to impose and enforce DAWIA requirements, while over forty-five 
percent noted that it would be easy.  Although not an overwhelming majority, most 
participants felt that DAWIA is important to the issue of using contracted employees.   
The argument for application of DAWIA includes the beliefs that these 
requirements are critical elements in the performance of complex functions to ensure 
individuals have the ability to think logically, act competently, stay current in the field, 
meet contractual expectations, and perform in a proficient manner.  Contractors 
should have the same level of competence as Government personnel. Those 
opposing application of DAWIA claim that: (1) it will cost the Government an 
additional expense for contractors to meet the standards, (2) most contractor 
employees are former Government personnel and already have these certifications, 
(3)DAWIA is a statutory requirement placed on the Government and not industry, (4) 
some are already using DAWIA standards as an evaluation criterion in source 
selections or use DAWIA language in Statements of Work to describe desired labor 
categories, and it will inhibit competition.     
There appear to be valid arguments on both sides.  Although perhaps 
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of skills and competencies personnel should hold, while the argument against mainly 
suggests that DAWIA qualifications are already being used to a certain extent and to 
push any further would be costly to the Government.   One might suggest that if 
DAWIA is already being used in this environment to one extent or another, full 
application of this qualification should not be a difficult stretch.  Further, one might 
point out that although there may be an added expense to the Government to bring 
contractor employees up to a certain level of competence, failure to do so may be 
even more costly in the less-than-satisfactory performance of contracting functions, 
even though there might be Government oversight. 
If serious thought is given to requiring DAWIA or something similar, it might 
be worth the effort to investigate the extent to which standards already exist that are 
comparable to DAWIA-type requirements.  Professional association certification 
programs, industry association and corporate training programs, and academic 
institution certificate programs are all examples of existing or potential methods for 
meeting DAWIA-type standards. 
5. Impact on the Contracting System 
This research included examination of the affect contracted procurement 
services might have on the contracting system by looking at three aspects: (1) the 
development of future Contracting Officers, (2) the development of procurement 
options by agency management, and (3) the extent to which companies might be 
agreeable to being involved in Government procurement.  The first two areas were 
addressed on both surveys, while the last was asked only on the Policy survey. 
a. Developing Contracting Officers 
One of the principal concerns regarding the contracting out of procurement 
functions has been the potential affect this will have on the development of future 
Contracting Officers.  A question about this issue was asked on both the 
Policy/Senior Management and Management/Operating Level Personnel surveys.  A 
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and program management personnel, is provided in Table 7-4.  Although the 
percentage of the former group believing it to have a negative affect was slightly 
lower than the latter, both were at or above sixty-five percent in their reasoning that it 
could have a damaging impact.  Slightly over twenty percent of all respondents felt it 
would not have any affect, while less than ten percent of the total thought it might 
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Table 7-4. Affect on Developing Contracting Officers 
 Negative Positive No 
Affect 
NA Totals 
Contracting Policy & 
Senior Management 
29 6 9 1 45 
 65% 13% 20% 2%  
Contracting Management & 
Operating Level Personnel 
37 2 12 4 55 
 67% 4% 22% 7%  
Program Mgmt/Technical 
Personnel 
19 4 7 2 32 
 59% 13% 22% 6%  
Totals 85 12 28 7 132 
 65% 9% 21% 5%  
 
The concept involved is the critical need to nurture and cultivate a competent 
and professional workforce to accomplish the acquisition requirements of the 
Federal Government.  Significant experience is needed to progress through the 
basic and intermediate levels to ultimately reach the advanced and expert 
proficiency levels required of Contracting Officers.  It can be argued that one needs 
to be exposed to the broadest cross-section of contracting tasks that permits 
development of the critical thinking skills and competencies so fundamental to 
making complex Contracting Officer decisions. 
Contract specialists need to experience the various avenues one might 
pursue in accomplishing a particular objective.  They need to grasp the underlying 
mechanics and inner workings and, in fact, they need to fail from time-to-time to 
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need to rotate through various assignments in contracting to undergo and be 
exposed to the specific facets these duties have to offer. 
Contract specialists need to be mentored.  Not only must they eventually 
acquire strong managerial skills, but they must also develop leadership capabilities.   
This is true regardless of the level within the organization to which they aspire.  The 
Government acts through its Contracting Officers and, by extension, its contract 
specialists.  They are the “face to industry” with which the Government speaks and 
acts.  They exhibit authority, execute responsibilities, create relationships and 
perform duties all as part of the Government’s side of the buyer-seller relationship.  
All of these abilities are accumulated on the job, integrated with appropriate levels of 
training and education.  Many would argue that the “culturing” acquired through 
mentoring must be achieved by interaction with a Government workforce, while 
others would assert that capable and adept contractor personnel can greatly assist 
to the same degree. 
One frequently hears the notion of being involved in contracting on a “cradle 
to grave” basis.  Many point to this diverse experience as indispensable to their 
career development.  In fact, not everyone in Government procurement is involved in 
the “cradle to grave” aspects of contracting.  Several are involved almost exclusively 
in pre-award actions and, thus, never observe and appreciate post-award difficulties.  
The reverse situation is also true.  The Defense Contract Management Agency 
(DCMA) performs a significant role in some pre-award activities, but the bulk of its 
effort lies in the administration of contracts on a post-award basis. 
It can be rationalized that the existence of contractor personnel working as 
contract specialists in a Government organization can bring new dimensions to the 
performance of procurement duties.  An important ingredient frequently missing in 
buying offices is the sensitivity and understanding of commercial and industrial 
procurement practices that work well, or not, in the business world.  Sound business 
methods and the decisions that result from genuine business thinking are vital to any 
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research has shown that most of the staff employed to perform contracting functions 
are former Government acquisition personnel who have had little, if any, industry 
experience to bring to the procurement table.  Some have even complained that the 
Government contracting knowledge they do bring is outdated and lacks currency. 
The business manager’s role required of contracting professionals today differs from 
the contracting technician’s role of even a few years ago. 
The research thus far has suggested that contractor employees performing 
procurement functions are dedicated, trustworthy and reliable.  Their loyalty to the 
U.S. is unquestioned.  However, because their livelihood is derived from a private 
entity, there could be an inkling of suspicion on the part of Government managers 
that these employees might not always be placing the best interests of the 
Government ahead of all others.  This thought could carry into the interactions 
between Government contract specialists and contractor personnel, in which 
proposed courses of action might not be the most beneficial to the Government. 
Contract specialists, be they Government or contractor, are the backbone of 
the acquisition workforce in both Government and industry.  From intern/entry level 
employee through the senior journeyman level, they perform the day-to-day actions 
that result in the accomplishment of many procurement objectives and goals.  These 
personnel, some with much guidance and others with very little supervision needed, 
choose procedures, plans and even strategies to be embarked upon.  It is in this 
very selection of the direction in which to set out that every viable possibility and 
opportunity should be suitably explored.  Ruling out ignorance or incompetence for 
the moment, some would question that contractor employees would investigate all 
viable alternatives before coming forth with a proposed solution, particularly if one or 
more alternatives were perceived as detrimental to their company.   
b. Developing Procurement Options 
One of the major concerns regarding procurement of contracting functions is 
the long-term affect this would have on the ability of agency management to develop 
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comparison of results, while preserving the distinction between contracting and 
program management personnel, is presented in Table 7-5. 
Table 7-5. Affect on Decision Making Ability to Develop Procurement 
Options 
 Limit Expand Neither NA Total 
Contracting Policy & 
Senior Management 
7 23 14 1 45 
 16% 51% 31% 2%  
Contracting Management & 
Operating Level Personnel 
13 18 19 5 55 
 24% 33% 34% 9%  
Program Mgmt/Technical 
Personnel 
10 14 4 4 32 
 31% 43% 13% 13%  
Totals 30 55 37 10 132 
 23% 42% 28% 8%  
 
Over forty percent of the total respondents believe that this will expand the 
procurement options, while less than twenty-five percent believe it will limit such 
options.  Almost thirty percent feel it would neither limit nor expand the procurement 
options.  Most notably, the greatest number of policy and senior management 
personnel believe that it will enhance options.   
There appear to be several pros and cons on this subject.  Arguments can be 
made for both the notion that options are expanded and the concern that options are 
limited.  Several valid points support the former.  Contractors can bring fresh ideas 
to the discussion; they can expose Government personnel to industry business 
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added tasks; they can come with specific skills and expertise to supplement 
workforce weaknesses; they operate in a competitive environment and, therefore, 
have developed innovative approaches which can be shared with the Government; 
they are not as stove-piped in their thinking and training; and they come at a time 
when in-house resources and capabilities appear to be extremely low.   
Ever since passage of the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) in 1983, the 
Federal Government has been criticized for its inability to perform comprehensive 
market research.  Our knowledge of the various market segments and how they 
operate has been considered minimal at best.  Over the years, training and 
experience have significantly improved our ability to perform market surveillance and 
to utilize the information produced from these efforts to structure our requirements, 
understand potential market participants, develop acquisition strategies, and execute 
the procurement process.  Many would contend this remains one of our key 
weaknesses.   Market research is not a function performed only by contracting 
personnel.  Several other Government officials are, or should be, involved.  
Requirements personnel, program management folks, logisticians, engineering and 
other technical personnel all play a role.  The fact, however, that contracting people 
are the key interface with industry thrusts them into a leadership position and 
frequently finds them to be the only member of the team actively engaged.  It is at 
this very point, contend some, where overworked contracting personnel seem to be 
on their own that contractors with special market research skills become invaluable. 
One of the chief reasons set forth by proponents of the “expand” position is 
that contractor employees bring knowledge of industry best practices and techniques 
that can be shared with contract specialists.  Government procurement has long 
been reproached for its lack of understanding of commercial methods and sound 
business concepts and practices.  This could be a way of introducing commercial 
procedures and actions which might greatly assist in executing a more effective and 
efficient procurement system.  Consider, however, from what source these 
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contractors use former Government civil servants and military personnel, which 
increases their ability to perform contracting functions.  But this almost assures that 
they will have had little industry experience.  Even those individuals who have 
previously worked for companies holding prime contracts with the Federal 
Government have been in the Contracts Division and interfacing directly with their 
Federal counterparts.  Not until someone with experience in the Procurement or 
Subcontracts Department of a company is involved will we find an individual likely to 
be immersed in business practices.  If someone comes from outside this realm, they 
probably have had little “Government” experience with which to execute their 
contracting responsibilities and will most likely have a significant learning curve in 
becoming familiar with the Federal world. 
The prime reasons set forth by those who claim it will limit options involve: (1) 
a belief that a contractor’s objectivity will be questioned because it might not always 
have the Government’s best interests at heart, (2) the restrictive nature of firewalls 
and other safeguards necessary to ensure prevention of conflicts of interest, (3) a 
denial of valuable training and experience for junior Government personnel, (4) 
contractual limitations placed on organizations as to how they can use contractor 
employees, (5) experience with contractors during which little assistance with 
options was provided, and (6) fewer and fewer experienced civil servants available 
to adequately assess and evaluate contractor performance. 
A significant number felt there would be no affect on the ability to develop 
procurement options.  They essentially believe that a talented individual will make a 
considerable contribution regardless of their origin: Government or contractor.   
Further, it is really up to management to decide how to act on specialists’ input from 
whomever provides it. 
c. Market Participation 
The extent to which companies are willing to participate in procurements in 
which one or more other companies are involved in performing contracting functions 
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often measured by the amount and nature of competition.  If companies become 
suspicious of their treatment in Government competitions, their eagerness to 
continue may be dampened.  The result could be that less information is 
forthcoming, particularly confidential and private data, or worse, that companies 
withdraw from Government competitions altogether.  The “large” contractor 
dependent on Government contracts, particularly if it is a sole source, is less likely to 
disengage, but could potentially restrict the flow of information.  Companies with a 
significant amount of commercial business in addition to public contracts could very 
well decide to no longer stay connected with Government procurement.  It is not out 
of the realm of possibility that this might generate protests. 
The results of the question regarding market participation indicate that slightly 
over one-half of the respondents are concerned about the negative impact.  Most of 
the respondents from the Services, over seventy-five percent, believe that a 
negative affect could occur, but no one from the Defense Agencies held this belief.  
Many of those from the Defense Agencies have had experience with contracted 
procurement services and can report their views from actual situations.  The primary 
concern from those expressing a negative impact centers on the fairness and 
objective treatment of competing firms.  The inappropriate use of proprietary data, 
biased evaluations, and undue influence by private companies all can lead to 
distrust in the integrity of the contracting process.  Some would point out that all of 
these abuses could occur with Government personnel as well. But, Federal laws 
impose civil and criminal sanctions on these individuals, which is not the case with 
contractor employees.  
It is unlikely that most companies, if questioned, would cite their distrust of the 
system as the reason for non-participation in a procurement.  It would be interesting 
to pursue this area in-depth with respect to the affect on small businesses and 
foreign competitors.  Some may feel trapped in their need to participate, while others 
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6. Integrity of the Contracting Process 
The integrity of the contracting process was investigated on both surveys.  
Although some of the respondents asserted that the best way to ensure integrity is 
to completely avoid using contractors, most provided thoughts and ideas they felt 
would help to maintain a robust contracting system.  Many pointed to proactive 
efforts that will maintain necessary components of integrity.  Sensible policies that 
discuss the legal, ethical, and practical aspects are critical.   
Integrity has to do with the image and reputation of the system.  The actions, 
or inactions, resulting from “challenges” to the system, such as fraudulent or abusive 
events, shape the character and personality of the system.  How the Government 
handles a breach of our laws and ethics policies, both by civil servants and 
contractors, is highly visible and reaches to the heart of our moral fiber.  It is the 
responsibility of every member of the acquisition team to do their utmost to preserve 
the highest quality of our collective personality and culture. 
Certainly, safeguards and precautions are vital.  Methods to discourage or 
prevent conflicts of interest, illegal actions, and other similar activities must be in 
place.  Internal Government efforts, such as oversight, audits, reviews, surveillance, 
awareness training, and firewalls can and should be used.  External efforts focused 
on contractors are also important and could include non-disclosure statements to 
protect sensitive data, financial disclosure, and ethical and integrity certifications.  
Going a step further, it could be argued that contractor employees who have been 
entrusted with the same responsibilities as civil servants should face the same 
consequences for contraventions of that trust.  Civil and criminal sanctions should 
apply equally to all who are accountable for public endeavors. 
7. Procurement Policy 
Whether DOD or the Services should issue a policy statement concerning the 
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currently exists that is specifically centered on the procurement of contracting 
services, although there are policies concerning the general use of services.   
This topic was broached to the policy and senior management personnel in 
both the surveys and interviews.  Almost sixty percent of the survey respondents 
believe that a policy statement would be extremely helpful in clarifying top 
management’s position on all aspects of this issue.  Respondents’ main concern is 
that there is too much difference of opinion concerning the definition of inherently 
governmental functions and feel a more direct application to contracting functions is 
needed.  The thirty-five percent who do not believe a policy statement is necessary 
noted such on the grounds that sufficient policy and guidance already exists and that 
any further language on the subject would probably serve to make things more 
restrictive. 
Although the main reason for needing a policy was a clearer understanding of 
the boundaries of inherently governmental functions, responses to the key elements 
that should be included if such a policy were published were across the board.  
Respondents felt a policy should be very flexible and include some or all of the 
following: 
 Identification of those to whom the policy applies. 
 Those functions which are considered acceptable for contracting out 
 Safeguards to be used. 
 Sanctions for failure to comply with the policy. 
 Conflict of interest mitigation strategies. 
 A statement as to the acceptability of using contractors. 
 Approvals and approval levels. 
 Emphasis on the fact that contractors have no decision authority and 
cannot commit the Government. 
 Best practices in using contractors. 
 Identification of risks and how to manage them. 
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 Requirement for non-disclosure agreements and financial disclosure 
statements. 
 Metrics to be used in evaluating contractor performance 
 Enumeration of required contractor credentials or qualifications. 
 Extent to which contractors can participate in Government events. 
outside the workplace. 
One of the principles of acquisition is the existence of policies that guide our 
procurement activities.  Policies are shaped and forced by a number of influences, 
mostly of an organizational origin, such as congressional laws, court decisions, GAO 
reports and Comptroller General decisions, and procuring agency actions, to name 
just a few.  Policy formulation is generally a responsibility of the Executive Branch of 
Government and policy tends to appear abstract and theoretical until a specific issue 
is involved.  We have here a very specific issue.  Responsibilities and functions 
thought by many the sole domain of the Government to be accomplished by civil 
servants are considered by others open to execution by private firms.   The question 
of whether these functions should be performed by other than Federal employees 
and, if so, the conditions under which such effort should be assumed is immediate 
and begging to be answered. 
D. Chapter Summary 
This chapter has attempted to analyze the various aspects covered by the 
research.  It assessed the scope and breadth of survey and interviewee responses 
and tried to provide a feeling for the character and attitude surrounding the topic of 
contracting out procurement functions.  This has by no means been an exhaustive 
examination of every facet of this subject, but it has delved into some of the central 
issues and endeavored to capture the sense of opinion in the acquisition community.  
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VIII. Conclusions and Recommendations 
A. Introduction 
This report has covered a variety of subjects related to contracting out of he 
procurement function.  Some of these areas have been addressed in recent studies 
and reports.  This report will confirm and agree with some of the findings and 
recommendations in those studies but will disagree with others.  The researchers 
hope this study can be used as a tool to heighten consideration of the issues and 
lead to effective policy and execution to meet the challenges posed by contracted 
procurement services. 
B. Conclusions 
The following fifteen conclusions have been reached as a result of this 
research effort.  Each conclusion is briefly explained, but the reader is encouraged 
to delve into the appropriate sections in Chapters IV, V, VI and VII to understand the 
full breadth and depth of each conclusion.   
Conclusion 1: Contracting out of procurement functions has been 
effective, however, robust metrics to measure and assess 
contractor performance are lacking. 
Almost all of the respondents stated that contracting out of procurement 
functions was effective.  An analysis of responses, however, reveals that most 
utilized mission attainment (getting the job done) and perceptions of overall 
contractor performance as metrics.  These measures should not be discounted, as 
they are clearly important to the end-user.  However, they represent an ambiguous 
account of effectiveness without clear criteria.   
There were no comprehensive or universal metrics nor framework utilized for 
determining effectiveness across process, workforce, and outputs with regard to 
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specific metrics cited were generally being utilized in an ad hoc and inconsistent 
manner.  In light of capacity and capability shortfalls, the ability to utilize contractors 
to complete essential missions is considered a success.  However, long-range 
assessment of effectiveness against established criteria is not occurring. 
Conclusion 2: The phrase “inherently governmental function” continues 
to be inconsistently interpreted and applied throughout  
DOD. 
This phrase has caused confusion for quite some time.  Attempts through the 
years to improve understanding of just exactly what are inherently governmental 
functions have helped, but differences of opinion still exist.  The FAR, as well as 
OMB Circular A-76, have set forth the definition and examples of what are 
considered to be these types of functions.  The blurred distinctions between 
inherently governmental and non-inherently governmental functions caused by the 
discretionary ability of agencies to decide its borders will continue to trouble the 
acquisition process until clarification has occurred.  The Acquisition Advisory Panel 
(2007) has recommended that OFPP update the principles for agencies to apply in 
determining which functions must be performed by Government employees.  This 
study has served to confirm that such a recommendation is valid and pressing. 
Conclusion 3: Personal services relationships are almost inevitable in the 
close-working circumstances required between 
Government contracting employees and contractor 
personnel performing procurement functions.  
The lines between the buyer-seller relationship and the employer-employee 
relationship have become more distorted than ever.  It has been suggested that 
mechanisms do exist to attempt clear distinctions, such as a well-defined Statement 
of Work, between the two.  However, a performance-based SOW is very difficult to 
develop and implement.  Even if the SOW is written precisely, the danger is that 
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the work done on schedule.  Contract award requires much higher level review and 
interaction with the author of documents.  These exchanges, if done by Government 
Contracting Officers and contractors, could be interpreted as personal services.  The 
co-location of contractor employees in Government facilities certainly creates the 
appearance that they are Government employees, if not the actual treatment as 
such.  Personal services relationships will occur no matter how often people are 
counseled on the “arm’s length” relationship that must be maintained.  The 
contracting functions that might be contracted out are so closely intertwined with 
functions that must be performed by Government personnel, e.g., the Contracting 
Officer, that a personal services relationship will almost certainly develop since it will 
be so easy for the Government to assume the role of “supervisor.” 
Conclusion 4: The contracting community is seriously concerned about 
the potential for conflicts of interest, both organizational 
and personal, when contractors are used to perform 
contracting functions. 
The issue of conflicts of interest has come up on numerous occasions during 
this research.  Legal concerns almost always turn into a discussion of conflicts of 
interest.  Ethical concerns frequently result in the same scenario.  Government 
employees have been so carefully trained over the last several years regarding not 
only inappropriate, but illegal behavior, that they are collectively very sensitive to not 
only actual situations but, just as importantly, the perception of conflicts.  Numerous 
potential situations were cited by respondents in this study as to how conflict of 
interest problems could develop unless precautionary measures were taken.  When 
focused on the contractor side, access to company proprietary and business 
sensitive information, competing in cases where firms participated in developing 
requirements, an actual or perceived ability to influence procurement actions, biases 
against certain companies for obvious or even unknown reasons, insight into the 
Government’s requirements process, mergers and acquisitions that cause 
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Government procurement were cited as potential problems with contractors.  When 
focused on the Government side, differences in compensation, future employment 
opportunities, and personal friendships with contractor employees that may even 
have originated when both worked for the Government are some of the conflict of 
interest situations in which civil servants could become embroiled.  The Procurement 
Integrity Act was established in the 1980s to address some of the problems leading 
to personal conflicts of interest and violations of ethical behavior.  One requirement 
of the Act concerns steps procurement officials must take if contacted about private 
employment during certain phases of the contracting process.  The Acquisition 
Advisory Panel believes that, because the FAR provides considerable leeway to 
agencies in addressing actual or potential conflicts of interest and because there is a 
lack of guidance in mitigating such conflicts leading to inconsistent application of the 
regulations, uniform regulatory language is needed. 
Conclusion 5: Specific measures must be taken to ensure ethical 
standards are maintained and the integrity of the 
contracting process is protected. 
One might assume that so much training and education has gone into 
shaping the ethical character and identity of the acquisition workforce in recent 
years, that this conclusion would be unnecessary.   Not wishing to beat a dead 
horse, the Darleen Druyun affair caused considerable consternation within the 
acquisition community, particularly contracting personnel.  This situation surfaced 
during interviews a few times in the context of ethical principles and an imperative 
need to protect the integrity of the acquisition and contracting processes.  This case 
caused acquisition organizations to “pull back” and re-examine the fundamental 
structure of their ethical climate.  Are the right checks and balances in place to 
prevent or discourage such events?  Does the senior leadership put correct and 
suitable emphasis on ethical principles and moral values?  Are instances of ethical 
and standards of conduct transgressions handled in a vigorous fashion?  Are subtle 
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assured industry, with overt measures, that such irresponsible actions will not be 
repeated?  
A majority of survey respondents deemed that ethical issues are clearly 
associated with contracting for procurement services.  This generally included 
organizational conflicts of interest and contractor access to procurement sensitive 
information and the opportunity to take unfair advantage of the system.  There is 
concern about contractor loyalties and motivations which might impair their 
objectivity and impartiality when acting as an “agent” for the Government.  Judgment 
and interpretation of the laws and regulations by Government employees should not 
be replaced by contractor personnel.   The best interests of the Government should 
be foremost in any action taken in the contracting process.  Suspicions can easily 
arise when contractor employees are taking these actions. Trust in the system is 
fragile and can be easily and seriously jeopardized.   
Conclusion 6: The contracting out of procurement services will have a 
negative effect on the ability of the Federal Government to 
develop Contracting Officers. 
Contracting Officers grow from having worked as contract specialists.  
Contract specialists need experience.  They need to grasp the underlying 
mechanics, inner workings, and fundamentals of the contracting process.  They 
need to fail from time-to-time to discover the weaknesses and risks surrounding 
particular courses of action.  They need to rotate through various assignments in 
contracting to undergo and be exposed to the specific facets these duties have to 
offer.  Contract specialists need to be mentored.  Not only must they eventually 
acquire strong managerial skills, but they must also develop leadership capabilities.   
This is true regardless of the level within the organization to which they aspire.  
Contract specialists must learn to think critically, make valid interpretations of the 
laws and regulations, exhibit authority, execute responsibilities, create relationships 
and perform mature duties all as part of the Government’s side of the buyer-seller 
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trades.  All of these skills and abilities are accumulated on the job, integrated with 
appropriate levels of training and education.   As the decision is made to increase 
the number of contractors in the workforce, there will be less full-time Government 
employees hired, which ultimately reduces the pool of potential Contracting Officers.  
If an organization contracts out the lower level functions, then potential Contracting  
Officers may be ill-prepared to do the more complex tasks later in their careers.  
Frankly stated, “If you cut off the pipeline, how do you replace your Contracting 
Officers and first line supervisors when they retire?”   
Conclusion 7: Contracting out of procurement services may have the 
affect of expanding the ability of Government agencies to 
develop procurement options. 
Contractors can bring fresh ideas to the discussion; they can expose 
Government personnel to industry business methods and best practices; they can 
free up Government personnel to perform more complex or value-added tasks; they 
can come with specific skills and expertise to supplement Government weaknesses; 
and they operate in a competitive environment and, therefore, have developed 
innovative approaches which can be shared with the Government.   Government 
procurement has long been reproached for its lack of understanding of commercial 
methods and sound business concepts and practices. This could be a way of 
introducing commercial procedures and actions which might greatly assist in 
executing a more effective and efficient procurement system.  Contractors may, for 
example, be able to accomplish and supply market research and planning 
alternatives that would be more difficult for Government personnel to provide. 
Conclusion 8: There is mixed opinion regarding the affect contracting out 
of procurement services would have on companies 
participating in the marketplace for Government contracts. 
This research started with the premise that there could potentially be a 
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Government contracts or to be open with information, technology and data if 
contractors were performing Government contracting functions.  If companies 
become suspicious of their treatment in Government competitions, their eagerness 
to continue may be dampened.  Firms are far more likely to question the integrity of 
the process if non-Government personnel handle proprietary information and 
participate in or influence acquisition strategies and source selections.  Vendors 
could loose confidence in the fairness and objective treatment of offerors.  Several 
respondents, however, with many years of experience in using contracted 
procurement services believed that there would not be a negative affect on market 
participation.  In all of their dealings with industry, they have not seen any perceived 
or real impact on market participants.  They feel that offerors are very willing to do 
business with them even though other companies are performing contracting 
functions. 
Conclusion 9: Government contracting functions are being performed by 
contractors because buying organizations lack sufficient 
human resources to accomplish mission requirements. 
Time and again throughout the surveys and interviews, the chief response to 
a question about the need to use contractors is that the levels of Government 
personnel are too low to permit adequate performance of the workload.  Contracting 
Officers and contract specialists are overwhelmed and feel they are working in a 
sweat shop.  In certain geographical areas, the same positions in other Federal 
Agencies are far less demanding and provide the same level of compensation.  
Openings in these Agencies are very attractive.  It is literally impossible to fill vacant 
positions with qualified applicants.  They just do not exist.  Downsizing actions taken 
in the acquisition workforce over the last several years, large numbers of 
retirements, hiring freezes, slowly developing intern programs and a cumbersome 
personnel recruitment system all have led to extremely frustrated contracts 
managers.  Although hiring authority has improved in very recent years, there is a 
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level.  All of these conditions have caused desperate supervisors to seek solutions 
to their human capital dilemma in other ways. 
Conclusion 10: A majority of senior contracting personnel believe that 
contracts for procurement services should be of a 
temporary nature. 
Over sixty percent of senior contracting personnel believe that contracting out 
should be on a temporary basis and limited to surge or emergent demands while the 
Government recruits and trains organic resources.  There is recognition that a 
periodic reevaluation of need and internal capability should be the deciding point to 
continue under contract.  Although these are viewed as “temporary,” if the long-term 
plan is to convert back to the Government any functions contracted out after 
sufficient staff has been recruited and hired, then the timeframes could be in years.  
If the contracts are for certain functions, such as market research or requirements 
development, where the contractor is typically engaged in a specific acquisition 
under a task order, then these are of a more temporary nature.  There is not a 
unanimous opinion that they be temporary.  Some felt they were recognizing reality 
by pointing out we have a long-term problem of getting additional Government 
billets, and that contracts should be placed on a permanent basis until and unless 
we can recruit and retain a steady cadre of trained Government 1102s, which will 
take years.  Contract closeout is an example of a recurring need which we may 
never be able to fill, and contracted services are, out of necessity, integrated into the 
normal workload. 
Conclusion 11: Contractor personnel performing procurement functions 
should be co-located with Government contracting 
personnel. 
There is a need for close communications on a face-to-face basis between all 
members of the acquisition team. Contractor personnel must be an active part of the 
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Physically separating Government and contractor employees hampers 
communication, would not create a very conducive work environment or 
atmosphere, and might tend to develop an “us” versus “them” mentality.  With multi-
functional Government teams, it could be detrimental to segregate the contractor 
employees.  Services involve personal interaction and relationships; physical 
separation simply artificially complicates performance of a cohesive objective.  The 
interface that occurs through physical proximity outweighs most risks that might 
surface.  Professional interaction and synergy are needed to efficiently perform the 
functions. There is a need to be close to the customer for effective support and to 
reap the efficiencies of real-time decision-making. Also, co-location will aid in the 
performance of the Government’s responsibility for contractor oversight.  Examples 
exist in which contractor employees were physically separated but were relocated to 
the Government facility because the ability of Government personnel to interact with 
contractors was very difficult.  It is true that there is the potential for direction by the 
Government to lead to personal services and that physical separation would assist in 
the perception that the services are not personal.  Additionally, access to sensitive 
and proprietary data, security considerations, and the potential for conflicts of 
interest is of real concern. Safeguards and security measures must be taken to 
protect against such occurrences. 
Conclusion 12: The percentage of the contracting workforce and/or the 
percentage of the contracting workload placed on contract 
for performance by contractor employees should not 
exceed an established maximum. 
The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) report recommended that each 
contracting activity be limited to no more than twenty-five percent of their total 1102 
workforce in other than exceptional situations.  This study evaluated a limitation not 
only in terms of workforce, but workload as well.  The surveys indicated that most 
individuals advocate a maximum somewhere between twenty-five and fifty percent 
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recommendation regarding the limitation on workforce.  Although full-time 
equivalents are easy to measure and a percentage of an activity’s end strength is 
easy to calculate, it is the view of this research that the percentage limitation be 
applied to workload as opposed to workforce.  Individual contracting members of a 
buying organization perform a range of tasks and duties.  Cutting them out of the 
organization slices through these tasks without regard to the complexity or nature of 
the tasks involved.  Further, when focusing on workload, an activity can group 
various tasks that are candidates for performance by contractors, such as contract 
closeout duties, and apply the percentage to the grouped tasks.  Government 
contract specialists do not perform just one set of duties, such as contract closeout, 
but are typically engaged in a fuller range of responsibilities.  This also permits the 
organization to think in terms of grouped tasks that can easily be described in 
Statements of Work, are fairly homogeneous, may be of low risk, and might be 
easily severable and require far less interaction with Government personnel, 
therefore, potentially even allowing performance at the contractor’s facility. Although 
disagreeing with the measure of effort to be used, the researchers do agree with the 
DAU recommendation that a twenty-five percent limitation should apply. 
Conclusion 13: Requirements similar to those found in the Defense 
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) could be 
imposed on contractor employees performing Government 
procurement functions without difficulty. 
Sixty-five percent of the senior contracts leadership believe that DAWIA or 
DAWIA-like certification requirements should be imposed on contractor personnel 
performing contracting functions for the Government.  There is a feeling that these 
requirements are critical elements in the performance of complex functions.  They 
ensure individuals have demonstrated the ability to think logically, act competently, 
stay current in the field, meet contractual expectations, and perform in a proficient 
manner.  Contractors should be required to have the same level of competence as 
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complicated, of a high risk nature, and demand intellectually capable personnel who 
can reason through the issues with common sense and wisdom.  Many of the 
contractor personnel working in Government offices are former civil servants or 
military who achieved DAWIA certification while in the Government.  They most 
likely already hold the requisite credentials or could easily obtain them.  
Consideration should be given to exploring the possibility of utilizing existing 
professional association certification programs or educational institution certificate 
programs as an alternative to satisfying DAWIA-like requirements.  
Conclusion 14: There is general opposition among Navy and Marine Corps 
contracts leaders to the notion of contracting out 
procurement functions.   
Through interviews and from the surveys, it has become apparent that most 
of the Navy and Marine Corps contracting leadership are generally opposed to 
contracting out procurement functions.  They are not proponents.  Although they will 
acknowledge that some contracting functions, such as contract closeout, are being 
effectively performed by contractors and might not otherwise be accomplished in a 
timely fashion, the vast majority of tasks are, in their estimation, so closely 
intertwined with inherently governmental functions that they must be performed by 
Government civil servants.  Even in those cases in which a buying organization is 
utilizing contractors fairly extensively, there is a feeling that they would rather 
accomplish all mission requirements with Government employees.  If sufficient 
qualified personnel were available, this would be the case. 
Conclusion 15: A policy regarding the contracting out of procurement 
functions is needed. 
Much emotion and opinion have been generated over this subject.  Various 
organizations have developed their own plans to accommodate their organic 
resource shortfalls by utilizing contractor personnel to varying degrees.  Sixty 
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boundaries for contracting out and would be extremely helpful in clarifying top 
management’s position on all aspects of this issue.  Their main concern is that there 
is too much difference of opinion concerning the definition of inherently 
governmental functions and a more direct application to contracting functions is 
needed.  This is coupled with the perceived need for an identification of conflict of 
interest mitigation strategies, metrics to be used in evaluating contractor 
performance, appropriate sanctions for contractor transgressions, the qualifications 
and credentials that should be required of contractors, the hidden risks involved, and 
best practices in using contractors, to name just a few. 
C. Recommendations 
Recommendation 1: Metrics must be developed and robustly utilized to 
monitor and assess contractor performance of 
Government contracting functions. 
This research has found that the acquisition workforce believes that the 
procurement of contracting functions have been relatively effective.  This is based, 
however, on only two primary factors: (1) was the mission accomplished in that the 
contracting functions were performed, and (2) did the contractor perform well 
enough to be considered for future contracts.  As was discussed earlier, there are 
obvious shortfalls in the existing means to determine effectiveness, in that it lacks 
clearly defined criteria and the degree to which the value of effectiveness is 
determined.  To aid in the development of valid metrics to determine effectiveness, it 
is recommended that organizations use the model depicted in Figure 7-2.  Appendix 
C in this study suggests metrics that could be used as a starting point for creation of 
organization-unique metrics and measures for local application that can be inserted 
into the appropriate sections of the model.   Specific data requirements should be 
tailored within the model framework for each unique application, and should strike a 
proper balance to ensure that they can elicit contractor performance consistent with 
strategic organizational performance goals.  Activities should utilize this model 
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functions.  Higher level management and policy personnel can use this model to 
gather and disseminate informational and actionable metrics within their 
organizations.  The value of this model is that it brings together the quantitative 
(objective) and qualitative (subjective) dimension with the three types of metric 
categories (process, workforce, and outputs), and overlays these on the six phases 
of the contracting process.  The contractor’s work effort must be evaluated and 
assessed.  Government contracting personnel will have the principal responsibility 
for performing these evaluations.  In actuality, assessing the performance of a 
contractor performing Government contracting functions is not unlike the 
assessment that must occur when Government managers and supervisors are 
evaluating their own civil servant workforce.  Many of these judgments are highly 
subjective in nature but, nonetheless, must be performed.  It is suggested that this 
model will assist in that difficult task. 
Recommendation 2: The Department of Defense should issue a policy 
regarding the contracting out of procurement 
functions.  
There is overwhelming evidence, as brought out in surveys and interviews, 
that some type of policy should be disseminated from the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense that will guide the Services and Defense Agencies through the challenges 
created by utilizing contractors to perform Government contracting functions.  This is 
not to say that organizations have not already successfully carried out the 
responsibility of awarding and administering contracts under which contractors are 
effectively and productively executing these duties.  At a minimum, the policy should 
address the following areas: the extent to which  DOD endorses the use of 
contractor support, to whom the policy applies, the parameters within which 
organizations have flexibility to interpret and execute the policy, identification of 
functions that might not be inherently governmental but should be performed by civil 
servants, the conditions under which contracts may be of a temporary or permanent 
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or ratio of the workforce, safeguards that should be in place to prevent breaches by 
Government and industry of ethical principles and legal tenets (although the 
extensive body of Federal standards and ethics already extant is noted), conflict of 
interest mitigation strategies, disciplinary action that might be taken for failure to 
follow the policy, sanctions that should be used for improper contractor behavior, 
approvals and appropriate authority levels that may be necessary, re-emphasis of 
the constraint that contractor employees will have no decision or obligation authority, 
prohibition on the use of contractors to select or monitor other firms performing 
contracting functions, identification of the risks associated with using contractors and 
how they might be managed, identification of best practices in using contractor 
support, metrics and measures to be used in monitoring and assessing contractor 
performance, and the extent to which contractor qualifications and credentials 
should be aligned with those currently imposed on Government employees by the 
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act.  Such a policy will go a long way in 
helping to clarify many of the issues currently plaguing DOD acquisition 
organizations. It should be noted that consideration was given to encouraging the 
Office of Federal Procurement Policy to issue a Policy Letter regarding this area, but 
because such an issuance might require vetting from the Federal Agencies (thus 
delaying release), it would be timelier if such a policy were to come from DOD.  
Certainly, however, OFPP should consider pronouncements that may be appropriate 
from its level.   
Recommendation 3: Safeguards to protect the integrity of the contracting 
process when using contractor support to 
accomplish contracting functions should be 
strengthened and rigorously enforced.   
Utilization of contractor employees to perform Government contracting 
functions is relatively new and has posed a new set of complex challenges.  This 
research has confirmed the existence of serious challenges to the procurement 
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Not the least of these is conflicts of interest, both organizational and personal.  Other 
challenges that may be increasing as more and more contractors become involved 
in performing contracting actions are ethical problems, personal services issues, 
legal issues, and general overall threats to the integrity of the contracting process.  
Several techniques are already in place to protect the Government from improper 
and unethical behavior on the part of both civil servants and contractors.  In many 
cases, however, experience has shown that these have not been enforced as 
meticulously as they should be.  Non-disclosure statements, financial disclosures, 
procurement integrity certifications and other similar instruments should be used as 
vigilantly as possible.  Oversight methods including surveillance, reviews and audits 
are essential components of this effort.  This same concern was raised by the 
Acquisition Advisory Panel.  To mention just one area, the Panel believes that more 
expansive and detailed guidance for identifying, evaluating, and mitigating 
organizational conflicts of interest is needed.  This study has confirmed that such 
guidance is necessary.  Contracting personnel interviewed and surveyed for this 
research have repeatedly pointed to the potential for biased and less-than-objective 
action on the part of contractor employees whose loyalties and motivations may, 
from time to time, be at odds with the best interests of the Government.  The public 
image and reputation of the procurement process is vital.  The “fishbowl” 
environment within which this process takes place sets an even greater 
responsibility for preserving an untarnished image on all members of the acquisition 
workforce. 
Recommendation 4: The prohibition on the use of personal services 
contracts should be removed. 
Throughout this study, references to the difficulties encountered by 
Government organizations attempting to avoid personal services situations have 
continually arisen.  Although a contract may have been carefully crafted to eliminate 
any potential for such a relationship, including a precisely defined Statement of 
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been crossed.  Some organizations have taken extreme measures, at some 
expense, to structure working relationships that meticulously avert any opportunity 
for personal services.  Other organizations have pretty much ignored the rules 
because they are believed to be too unrealistic and unworkable.  It has been 
demonstrated in this study that the close working relationship so important to 
effective execution of contracting duties requires a significant amount of interaction 
and direction that is of a personal services nature.  This recommendation is 
consistent with a recommendation by the Acquisition Advisory Panel calling for 
removal of the restriction regarding supervision of contractor employees by 
Government personnel.  All of the other aspects of the employer-employee 
relationship, such as hiring, firing, performance appraisal, compensation, promotion, 
etc., remain exclusively within the contractor’s area of responsibility. 
Recommendation 5: Civil and criminal penalties currently applicable to 
Federal employees should be extended to contractor 
employees who are performing contracting functions 
for the Government. 
It has been noted in this study that contractor personnel performing 
procurement functions on behalf of the Government are not subject to the same 
penalties and consequences that would be enforced upon civil servants for violations 
of statutes, standards of conflict and ethical principles.  The Government is 
potentially at significant risk for unlawful or dishonest actions taken by contractor 
employees acting on its behalf.  Contractor employees are not liable for the work 
they perform or the recommendations they make.  Sanctions do exist for illegal or 
improper contractor behavior, such as suspension or debarment, but this generally 
fails to recognize employee misbehavior.  Companies who may have been injured 
by the unauthorized and prohibited actions of a contractor employee performing 
contracting actions may have recourse against the Government to obtain a remedy 
for an offense, but the Government, in turn, does not currently have recourse against 
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expressed by many that contractor personnel performing Government contracting 
actions should be held to the same standards and consequences for wrongdoing as 
civil servants.  This could occur by extending appropriate civil and criminal penalties 
to those contractor individuals performing contracting functions. 
Recommendation 6: A hierarchy of contracting functions should be 
developed by buying organizations as a 
classification of tasks that can be used to support 
various decisions and reporting requirements. 
Figure 7-1 proposes a “Hierarchy of Contracting Functions” as a conceptual 
method of arraying and evaluating contracting tasks or functions that are typically 
performed by Government buying organizations.  The hierarchy can be uniquely 
tailored to each organization to reflect its specific duties at the micro level.  The 
hierarchy can also be used by  DOD and the Services/Defense Agencies as a macro 
level approach to categorizing and distinguishing tasks and duties by specific 
characteristics.  This taxonomical approach to classifying functions permits 
organizations to identify characteristics that differentiate functions from one another.  
Once an organization has defined the objectives of its classification, e.g., candidates 
for contracting out, individual tasks can be placed in the hierarchy according to the 
interpretation it has made about each task.  Explicit justification for the category of 
placement should be maintained. The hierarchy can then be used by an organization 
as an inventory of functions for a variety of purposes.  One such purpose would be 
to support submission of function designations under the FAIR Act.  The hierarchy 
could also be used by organizations as a common framework in which to compare 
the classification of tasks and supporting rationale with each other.  Additionally, 
capability gaps in skill levels identified by  DOD Competency Model, currently in its 
experimental phase, could be overlaid on this hierarchical model to determine where 
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D. Areas for Further Research 
1. Perform a study that compares Government and industry practices 
used to contract out the performance of procurement functions. 
2. Analyze how contractors contract out (outsource) procurement 
functions (extent, what functions, under what circumstances, etc.) 
3. Analyze the nature of the industry that provides contracted 
procurement services to the Government (Small vs large businesses, 
foreign companies, geographical locations, typical skills provided, size 
of workforce, employees vs consultants, length of time in business, 
employee/consultant profile). 
4. Study in-depth the extent to which companies will hesitate or refuse to 
bid/propose on Government contracts because private firms are 
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Appendix A. Survey for Policy and Senior 
Management Personnel 




POLICY AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL  
 
1. What is your understanding of the scope of the term “contracting functions” or 
“procurement functions?” 
 
2.  Are procurement functions being contracted out in your organization? 
 ____ Yes   _____ No  
       If yes, which functions? 
 
3.  If you are contracting out contracting functions, what are the primary reasons for 
doing so? 
 
4.  If you are not contracting out contracting functions, what are the reasons? 
 
5.  If your organization contracts out procurement functions, what authority does it 
cite? 
       ___ OMB A-76      ___ Advisory & Assistance Services (FAR 37)   ___ Other 
(Explain) 
 
6.  Has a capability deficiency in your organization ever caused you to have to 
assess and determine whether a function was inherently governmental or non-
inherently governmental? 
 ____ Yes   _____ No  
       If yes, briefly explain. 
 
7.  To your knowledge, are any functions that have been determined to be inherently 
governmental or exempt from competition being performed by contractors? 
 _____ Yes   _____ No 
 
8.  Within the context of your organization, which of the following functions are 
inherently governmental and should not be contracted out and which are non-
inherently governmental and could potentially be contracted out?  Provide qualifying 















Requirements determination    
Developing Statements of Work    
Structuring market research    
Conducting market research    
Performing acquisition planning    
Developing solicitation documents    
Issuing solicitation documents    
Developing and applying evaluation criteria    
Member of  Source Selection Evaluation 
Board 
   
Evaluation of proposals/offers    
Performing cost and price analyses    
Negotiating contract prices, terms & 
conditions 
   
Structuring and approving incentive plans    
Preparing price negotiation memoranda    
Awarding contracts    
Negotiating contract modifications    
Determining cost allowability    
Exercising options    
Assessing contractor performance    
Implementing action based on contractor 
performance 
   
Accepting or rejecting goods and services    
Terminating contracts    
Preparing contracts for closeout    
 
9.  Are there any legal issues or impediments associated with contracting for 
procurement functions? 
 ____ Yes   _____ No  
       If yes, briefly explain. 
 
10.  Are there any ethical issues associated with contracting for procurement 
functions? 
 _____ Yes ______ No  
      If yes, please explain. 
 
11.  Is there a potential problem with personal services relationships when 
contracting out procurement functions? 
 _____ Yes     ______ No  
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12.  How could a conflict of interest situation arise when contracting for procurement 
services? 
 
13.  Do the DAWIA requirements have any bearing on the procurement of 
contracting functions? _____ Yes   _____ No   Please explain. 
 
14.  Should DOD or the Services issue a policy statement regarding the use of 
contractors to perform procurement functions? 
 _____ Yes   _____ No  
 
15.  If DOD or the Services were to issue a policy statement regarding contracting 
for procurement functions, what key elements should be included? 
 
16.  Should the contracting of procurement services be permitted only on a 
temporary basis or allowed to be a permanent part of an organization’s acquisition 
resource? 
 _____ Temporary   _____ Permanent  
 
17.  Should contractors be required to comply with DAWIA or “DAWIA-like” 
certification requirements as a condition for receiving contracts for the performance 
of procurement functions? 
 _____ Yes   _____ No 
       Please explain 
 
18.  Could contracting out of procurement services either (1) limit or (2) expand an 
organization’s decision-making ability to develop and consider procurement options? 
       _____ Limit   _____ Expand   _____ Neither 
      Please explain 
 
19.  Would contracting out of procurement services have either (1) a negative affect 
on or (2) a positive affect on an organizations’ ability to develop Contracting 
Officers? 
 _____ Positive   _____ Negative   _____ No affect 
       Please explain 
 
20.  Might contracting out of procurement services have a real or perceived negative 
impact on market participants? 
 _____ Yes   _____ No  
       If yes, what are these negative aspects? 
 
21.  What steps should be taken to ensure the integrity of the contracting process is 
protected when contracting for procurement functions? 
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May we interview you regarding your answers?   _____Yes     _____No 
Please recommend someone in your organization to whom we could send this 
survey. 




May we cite your responses with attribution in the published research report?   





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 225 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=








MANAGEMENT AND OPERATING LEVEL PERSONNEL 
 
1.  Are procurement functions being contracted out in your organization? 
 ____ Yes   _____ No  
       If yes, which functions? 
 
2.  If you are contracting out contracting functions, what are the primary reasons for 
doing so? 
 
3.  If you are not contracting out contracting functions, what are the reasons? 
 
4.  In your organization and to your knowledge, how effective have contracts which 
procure contracting functions been? 
       ____ Highly Effective    ____ Somewhat Effective     
       ____ Not Effective   ____ Very Ineffective 
 
5.  For contracts in progress in your organization, identify and discuss three positive 
aspects of contractor performance of contracting functions. 
 
6.  For contracts in progress in your organization, identify and discuss three 
problems associated with contractors performing contracting functions. 
 
7.  In your organization, what measures of effectiveness are used to evaluate 
contractor performance of procurement services? 
 
8.  In your organization, do you believe you are measuring the appropriate (correct) 
data, events, etc. as part of your responsibility to manage contractors? 
 _____ Yes   _____ No  
       Please explain 
 
9.  What specific policies and/or protocols exist in your organization to ensure that 
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10.  Given that you have authority to contract for procurement services, for what 
reasons are you not utilizing this authority when needed? 
 _____ Fuzzy area 
 _____ Timing 
 _____ Lack of protocols to distinguish effort from inherently governmental  
  functions 
 _____ Organic workforce perception of contracting out these functions 
 _____ Other 
 
11.  How difficult would it be to enforce DAWIA or “DAWIA-like” certification 
requirements on contractors who are awarded contracts to perform procurement 
functions? 
 _____ Very Difficult   _____ Difficult   _____Easy 
 
12.  If you were to limit the percentage of the effort an organization would contract 
out, what should be the maximum limitation on that percentage? (Circle appropriate 
%) 
 
Workforce (end strength): <10%, 10-25%, 26-50%, 51-75%, >75%, unlimited 
Workload: <10%, 10-25%, 26-50%, 51-75%, >75%, unlimited 
Other Factor _________ : <10%, 10-25%, 26-50%, 51-75%, >75%, unlimited 
 
13.  Should contractor employees performing procurement services be physically 
separated from Government employees? 
 _____ Yes   _____ No  
       Please explain 
 
14.  Would contracting out of procurement services have either (1) a negative affect 
on or (2) a positive affect on an organizations’ ability to develop Contracting 
Officers? 
 _____ Positive   _____ Negative   _____ No affect 
       Please explain 
 
15.  Could contracting out of procurement services either (1) limit or (2) expand an 
organization’s decision-making ability to develop and consider procurement options? 
       _____ Limit   _____ Expand   _____ Neither 
      Please explain 
 
16.  What steps should be taken to ensure the integrity of the contracting process is 
protected when contracting for procurement functions? 
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May we interview you regarding your answers?   _____Yes     _____No 
Please recommend someone in your organization to whom we could send this 
survey. 




May we cite your responses with attribution in the published research report?   
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Appendix C. Contracting System Metrics 
CONTRACTING SYSTEM METRICS 
1. Acquisition Planning Phase 
Acquisition Planning Phase Metrics 
Quantitative:   
• Process and sub-element process milestones met (sections 
completed, reviews passed) 
• Number of process integrity violations detected and 
reported 
• Statement of Work tasks completed 
Process 
Qualitative: 
• Reviewed and determined compliant with all regulations 
and directives 
• Rated process integrity compliance as to excellent, good, or 
poor 
• Maintained proper security and accountability for all 
documentation as rated excellent, good, or poor 
• Quality of Statement of Work tasks completed as excellent, 
good, or poor 
Quantitative: 
• Contractor provided the correct number of personnel to 
accomplish the task 
• Contractor provided correct oversight to assigned 
personnel as indicated by ratio of management to 
employee 
• Total cost of contracted out function  
• Per-action cost of contracted out function 
• Total cost reduction compared to established benchmark 
for this function (dollars and percentage) 
Workforce 
Qualitative:  
• Contractor personnel had the correct skill level and 
credential as needed for the task 
• Contractor personnel demonstrated a sound work ethic and 
value 
• Contractor provided adequate direction and oversight to its 
employees as rated as excellent, good, or poor 
• Contractor personnel conducted themselves in a 
professional manner  
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Quantitative: 
• Number of plans created 
• Number of pre-planning/planning conferences conducted 
• PALT (clock time to complete this phase) 




• Plans reviewed and scored by organic force as being 
overall excellent, good or poor 
• Effectiveness of plan in meeting command/customer 
objectives as rated excellent, good, or poor 
• Long-term efficacy rating of the plan as excellent, good, or 
poor (to what degree did the plan have its long-term effect 
on mission contribution) 
• Plan clearly delineated requirements for participants in a 
clear, accurate and meaningful manner according to ratings 
of excellent, good, or poor 
• Plan clearly defined subsequent deliverables (such as test 
and evaluation plans) required in remaining phases 
according to ratings excellent, good or poor 
• Plan recommended and utilized commercial item 
acquisition, socio-economic goals, and other key mandates 
as defined by Federal, Agency, and local requirements as 
rated excellent, good or poor 
• Degree to which the contractor met other defined metrics 
uniquely tailored to the activity as rated as excellent, good, 
or poor 
• Contractor documented all actions required for 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 231 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
2. Solicitation Phase 
Solicitation Phase Metrics 
Quantitative:   
• Process and sub-element process milestones met (sections 
completed, reviews passed) 
• Number of process integrity violations detected and 
reported 
• Number of process-related protest actions filed 
• Number of process-related protest actions sustained 
• Statement of Work tasks accomplished 
Process 
Qualitative: 
• Reviewed and determined compliant with all regulations 
and directives 
• Rated process integrity compliance as to excellent, good, or 
poor 
• Maintained proper security and accountability for all 
documentation as rated excellent, good, or poor 
• Quality of Statement of Work tasks as excellent, good, or 
poor 
Quantitative: 
• Contractor provided the correct number of personnel to 
accomplish the task 
• Contractor provided correct oversight to assigned 
personnel as indicated by ratio of management to 
employee 
• Total cost of contracted out function  
• Per-action cost of contracted out function 
• Total cost reduction compared to established benchmark 
for this function (dollars and percentage) 
Workforce 
Qualitative:  
• Contractor personnel had the correct skill level and 
credential as needed for the task 
• Contractor personnel demonstrated a sound work ethic and 
value 
• Contractor provided adequate direction and oversight as 
rated as excellent, good, or poor 
• Contractor personnel conducted themselves in a 
professional manner  
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Quantitative: 
• Number of solicitations created 
• Number of requests for solicitations 
• Number of proposals submitted per solicitation 
• Number of clarifications requested 
• PALT (clock time to complete this phase) 
• Percent of milestone dates met (on-time performance 
percentage) 
• Number of protests filed (negative outcome) 
• Number of protests sustained (negative outcome) 
Outputs (Outcomes) 
Qualitative: 
• Solicitation packages reviewed and scored by organic force 
as to excellent, good, or poor 
• Proper incorporation of evaluation criteria and instructions 
to offerors as rated as excellent, good, or poor 
• Effectiveness of solicitation in meeting command/customer 
objectives as rated excellent, good, or poor 
• Solicitation created achieving harmony with contract type, 
method, protocol (commercial/non-commercial/SAP) and 
other parameters defined in the acquisition plan as rated 
excellent, good, or poor 
• Efficacy of the solicitation(s) at achieving long-term goals 
(to what degree did the plan have its long-term effect on 
mission contribution) as rated excellent, good, or poor 
• Participant ratings from those receiving the solicitation 
package as to its quality in terms of communicating the 
requirement, instructions to offerors, and evaluation criteria 
as rated excellent, good, or poor 
• Degree to which the contractor met other defined metrics 
uniquely tailored to the activity as rated as excellent, good, 
or poor 
• Contractor documented all actions required for 
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3. Evaluation Phase 
Evaluation Phase Metrics 
Quantitative:   
• Process and sub-element process milestones met (sections 
completed, reviews passed) 
• Number of process integrity violations detected and 
reported 
• Number of process-related protest actions filed 
• Number of process-related protest actions sustained 
• Statement of Work tasks accomplished 
Process 
Qualitative: 
• Reviewed and determined compliant with all regulations 
and directives 
• Rated process integrity, including defined protocols for 
vendor rating, compliance as to excellent, good, or poor 
• Maintained proper security and accountability for all 
documentation as rated excellent, good, or poor 
• Reviewed and rated evaluation board results against 
criteria without introduction of non-advertised criteria and/or 
bias as excellent, good, or poor 
• Quality of Statement Work tasks rated as excellent, good, 
or poor 
Quantitative: 
• Contractor provided the correct number of personnel to 
accomplish the task 
• Contractor provided correct oversight to assigned 
personnel as indicated by ratio of management to 
employee 
• Total cost of contracted out function 
• Total cost reduction compared to established benchmark 
for this function (dollars and percentage) 
Workforce 
Qualitative: Contractor assigned personnel: 
• Contractor personnel were the correct skill level and 
credential as needed for the task 
• Contractor personnel demonstrated a sound work ethic and 
value 
• Contractor provided adequate direction and oversight to its 
employees as rated as excellent, good, or poor 
• Contractor personnel conducted themselves in a 
professional manner  
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Quantitative: 
• Number of solicitations created 
• Number of requests for solicitations 
• Number of proposals submitted per solicitation 
• Number of clarifications requested 
• PALT (clock time to complete this phase) 
• Percent of milestone dates met (on-time performance 
percentage) 
• Number of protests filed (negative outcome) 
• Number of protests sustained (negative outcome) 
Outputs (Outcomes) 
Qualitative: 
• Solicitation packages reviewed and scored by organic force 
as to excellent, good, or poor 
• Proper incorporation of evaluation criteria and instructions 
to offerors as rated as excellent, good, or poor 
• Effectiveness of solicitation in meeting command/customer 
objectives as rated excellent, good, or poor 
• Efficacy of the solicitation(s) at achieving long-term goals 
(to what degree did the plan have its long-term effect on 
mission contribution) as rated excellent, good, or poor 
• Participant ratings from those receiving the solicitation 
package as to its quality in terms of communicating the 
requirement, instructions to offerors, and evaluation criteria 
as rated excellent, good, or poor 
• Degree to which the contractor met other defined metrics 
uniquely tailored to the activity as rated as excellent, good, 
or poor 
• Contractor documented all actions required for 
accountability and auditing as rated excellent, good, or poor 
• Product output quality was sufficient to commence next 
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4. Negotiations Phase 
Negotiations Phase Metrics 
Quantitative:   
• Process and sub-element process milestones met (sections 
completed, reviews passed) 
• Number of process integrity violations detected and 
reported 
• Number of process-related protest actions filed 
• Number of process-related protest actions sustained 
• Statement of Work tasks accomplished 
Process 
Qualitative: 
• Reviewed and determined compliant with all regulations 
and directives 
• Rated process integrity compliance as to excellent, good, or 
poor 
• Maintained proper security and accountability for all 
documentation as rated excellent, good, or poor 
Quantitative: 
• Contractor provided the correct number of personnel to 
accomplish the task 
• Contractor provided correct oversight to assigned 
personnel as indicated by ratio of management to 
employee 
• Total cost of contracted out function  
• Per-action cost of contracted out function 
• Total cost reduction compared to established benchmark 
for this function (dollars and percentage) 
Workforce 
Qualitative:  
• Contractor personnel had the correct skill level and 
credential as needed for the task 
• Contractor personnel demonstrated a sound work ethic and 
value 
• Contractor provided adequate direction and oversight to its 
employees as rated as excellent, good, or poor 
• Contractor personnel conducted themselves in a 
professional manner  




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 236 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Quantitative: 
• Number of negotiations conducted 
• Number of firms participating per each solicitation issued 
• Number of firms submitting final offers for evaluation 
• PALT (clock time to complete this phase) 
• Percent of milestone dates met (on-time performance 
percentage) 
• Number of debriefs requested and conducted 
• Number of protests filed (negative outcome) 
• Number of protests sustained (negative outcome) 
Outputs (Outcomes) 
Qualitative: 
• Negotiations observed, reviewed and scored by organic 
force as to excellent, good, or poor 
• Proper incorporation of customer and solicitation-based 
issues for resolution through discussions with offerors as 
rated as excellent, good, or poor 
• Effectiveness of negotiation in meeting command/customer 
objectives as rated excellent, good, or poor 
• Solicitation created achieving harmony with contract type, 
method, protocol (commercial/non-commercial/SAP) and 
other parameters defined in the acquisition plan as rated 
excellent, good, or poor 
• Efficacy of the solicitation(s) at achieving long-term goals 
(to what degree did the plan have its long-term effect on 
mission contribution) as rated excellent, good, or poor 
• Participant rating in negotiations and debriefs for quality in 
terms of professionalism and integrity, as rated excellent, 
good, or poor 
• Degree to which the contractor met other defined metrics 
uniquely tailored to the activity as rated as excellent, good, 
or poor 
• Contractor documented all actions required for 
accountability and auditing as rated excellent, good, or poor 
• Product output quality was sufficient to commence next 
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5. Contract Award Phase 
Contract Award Phase Metrics 
Quantitative:   
• Process and sub-element process milestones met (sections 
completed, reviews passed) 
• Number of process integrity violations detected and 
mcreported 
• Number of process-related protest actions filed 
• Number of process-related protest actions sustained 
• Statement of Work tasks accomplished 
Process 
Qualitative: 
• Reviewed and determined compliant with all regulations 
and directives 
• Rated process integrity compliance as to excellent, good, or 
poor 
• Maintained proper security and accountability for all 
documentation as rated excellent, good, or poor 
Quantitative: 
• Contractor provided the correct number of personnel to 
accomplish the task 
• Contractor provided correct oversight to assigned 
personnel as indicated by ratio of management to 
employee 
• Total cost of contracted out function  
• Per-action cost of contracted out function 
• Total cost reduction compared to established benchmark 
for this function (dollars and percentage) 
Workforce 
Qualitative:  
• Contractor personnel had the correct skill level and 
credential as needed for the task 
• Contractor personnel demonstrated a sound work ethic and 
value 
• Contractor provided adequate direction and oversight to its 
employees as rated as excellent, good, or poor 
• Contractor personnel conducted themselves in a 
professional manner  
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Quantitative: 
• Number of debriefs, orientations, and tasks defined in the 
SOW conducted 
• PALT (clock time to complete this phase) 
• Percent of milestone dates met (on-time performance 
percentage) 
• Number of debriefs requested and conducted 
• Number of post-award orientations conducted 
• Number of protests filed (negative outcome) 
• Number of protests sustained (negative outcome) 
Outputs (Outcomes) 
Qualitative: 
• Debriefs and/or orientations observed, reviewed and scored 
by organic force as to excellent, good, or poor 
• Proper incorporation of customer and contract-based 
issues addressed with participants rated as excellent, good, 
or poor 
• Effectiveness of debriefs and orientations (or other tasks) in 
meeting command/customer objectives as rated excellent, 
good, or poor 
• Debriefs and orientations created achieving harmony with 
contract type, method, protocol (commercial/non-
commercial/SAP) and other parameters defined in the 
acquisition plan as rated excellent, good, or poor 
• Efficacy of the debriefs and orientations (or other tasks) at 
achieving long-term goals (to what degree did the plan 
have its long-term effect on mission contribution) as rated 
excellent, good, or poor 
• Participant rating debriefs and orientations (or other tasks) 
for quality in terms of professionalism and integrity, as rated 
excellent, good, or poor 
• Degree to which the contractor met other defined metrics 
uniquely tailored to the activity as rated as excellent, good, 
or poor 
• Contractor documented all actions required for 
accountability and auditing as rated excellent, good, or poor 
• Product output quality was sufficient to commence next 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 239 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
6. Contract Administration Phase 
Contract Administration Phase Metrics 
Quantitative:   
• Process and sub-element process milestones met (sections 
completed, reviews passed) 
• Number of process integrity violations detected and 
reported 
• Number of process-related actions completed 
• Statement of Work tasks accomplished 
Process 
Qualitative: 
• Reviewed and determined compliant with all regulations 
and directives 
• Rated process integrity compliance as to excellent, good, or 
poor 
• Maintained proper security and accountability for all 
documentation as rated excellent, good, or poor 
Quantitative: 
• Contractor provided the correct number of personnel to 
accomplish the task 
• Contractor provided correct oversight to assigned 
personnel as indicated by ratio of management to 
employee 
• Total cost of contracted out function  
• Per-action cost of contracted out function 
• Total cost reduction compared to established benchmark 
for this function (dollars and percentage) 
Workforce 
Qualitative:  
• Contractor personnel had the correct skill level and 
credential as needed for the task 
• Contractor personnel demonstrated a sound work ethic and 
value 
• Contractor provided adequate direction and oversight to its 
employees as rated as excellent, good, or poor 
• Contractor personnel conducted themselves in a 
professional manner  
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Quantitative: 
• Number of FAR Part 42 and/or tasks defined in the SOW 
conducted 
• Clock time to complete this phase 
• Clock time for each task (efficiency measure) 




• Management and administrative tasks observed, reviewed 
and scored by organic force as to excellent, good, or poor 
• Proper incorporation customer and contract-based issues 
addressed with participants rated as excellent, good, or 
poor 
• Effectiveness of management and administrative tasks in 
meeting command/customer objectives as rated excellent, 
good, or poor 
• Actions conducted in harmony with contract type, method, 
protocol (commercial/non-commercial/SAP) and other 
parameters defined in the contract and/or administration 
plan as rated excellent, good, or poor 
• Efficacy of management and administrative tasks at 
achieving long-term goals (to what degree did the plan 
have its long-term effect on mission contribution) as rated 
excellent, good, or poor 
• Participant rating management and administration for 
quality in terms of professionalism and integrity, as rated 
excellent, good, or poor 
• Degree to which the contractor met other defined metrics 
uniquely tailored to the activity as rated as excellent, good, 
or poor 
• Contractor documented all actions required for 
accountability and auditing as rated excellent, good, or poor 
• Product output quality was sufficient to commence next 
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